The Neglected (III): Jacob Burckhardt - Defender of Culture and Prophet of Doom
Author(s): Wolfgang J. Mommsen
Source: Government and Opposition , AUTUMN 1983, Vol. 18, No. 4 (AUTUMN 1983), pp.
458-475
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44484477
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Wolfgang J. Mommsen
The Neglected (III)
Jacob Burckhardt - Defender of Culture
and Prophet of Doom
IN THE STRICTEST MEANING OF THE TERM, JACOB
Burckhardt, the eminent historian and widely acclaimed exp
on European art, cannot be considered a neglected autho
Yet nor does he belong to the mainstream of European polit
thinking; he is to be found on the sidelines as a remarkabl
but somewhat erratic, figure, representing a unique sort o
extreme cultural criticism directed against modernity.
Even in his own time Jacob Burckhardt was very much a
outsider, to a considerable degree as a result of his own choo
ing. Born in Basel in 1818 into a highly respected local fami
he remained for most of his life in this beautiful, althoug
comparatively remote, Swiss city, rather than seeking
accepting academic honours abroad, with the possible except
of the five years 1854-58 when he taught history of art
the Eidgenössiche Technische Hochschule in Zürich. Repeate
offers of chairs at the Universities of Tübingen and Heidelbe
were declined and when in 1872 he was offered Ranke's famous
chair at the University of Berlin, the foremost chair of history
in Germany, he again refused. Likewise, he displayed little
ambition as a writer; only a fraction of his oeuvre was published
during his lifetime. Admittedly, though, his Die Zeit
Constantin des Großen and Kultur der Renaissance in Italien
were spectacular successes with a far-reaching impact on further
research in these fields and even on the writing of historiography
in general. Even so, the most important writings, or at
any rate those which were of the greatest interest to the general
public, were only published after his death. His most momentous
book, the Welthistorische Bertrachtungen , or more correctly,
his lectures Über das Studium der Geschichte , were
even published contrary to his own intentions. Indeed, it is
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 459
only since 1982, thanks to Peter Ganz, th
factory edition of this most spectacular of
This was in fact a series of rather loosely
with many additions and notes accompa
only to his students and a fairly small cir
and academic acquaintances that he con
thoughts and as time went by he became
to address himself to the general public:
only his students who were privy to his thou
Jacob Burckhardťs rather remote wa
almost exclusively to scholarly work and
including numerous trips to see art treasures
and the like in Italy and elsewhere in
deliberately. Early in his life Burckhardt
acted as political editor of the Basel newspa
he decided to leave politics alone: Tor m
whatever I do, I do as a human being'.2
become entangled in any way whatsoever in
Instead, he deliberately opted for a cont
which might at first sight be considere
sense in which Nietzsche used the term
this was not so. His exclusive concern
cultural heritage was not a mere refuge, it w
politically motivated. Burckhardt acted
that historical reflection helps the indivi
from the popular prejudices to which e
in his own age, enabling him to judge even
elevated far above everyday affairs. He hims
'Our contemplative approach is not only le
but also a dignified need: for it is tant
»Jacob Burckhardt, Über das Studium der Ge
'Weltgeschichtlichen Betrachtungen ' auf Grund der Vor
nach den Handschriften herausgegeben von Peter Gan
Wolfgang Hardtwig, Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Alt
Jacob Burckhardt in seiner Zeit , Göttingen, 1974 and Ha
The Historical Imagination in 19th Century Europe , B
Also Jörn Rüsen, 'Jacob Burckhardt', in Deutsche Histori
Göttingen, 1972.
2 Cf. Karl Löwith, Jacob Burckhardt. Der Mensch in
Stuttgart, second ed., 1966, p. 127. Translations by the au
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460 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
amidst general servitude and the stream of necessity'.3
cal observation provided a fixed vantage point in the
of an ever accelerating process of historical chang
as he saw it, had during his lifetime entered the init
of what he called the terminal crisis of occidental civi
associated with the inevitable decline of the old E
culture.
LE TERRIBLE ESPRIT DE NOUVEAUTÉ
In political terms Jacob Burckhardt was, at any rate at first
sight, a radical conservative. In his earlier years he sympathized
for a while with the ideas of liberalism. But he soon developed
his own brand of conservative thinking which, while it had
little in common with conservative party politics, did partially
coincide with the conservative positions of his own day. He
deliberately stood in the camp of traditional European culture
and he was convinced that it could not survive under the
conditions of an egalitarian, modern society. Most, if not all,
great cultural achievements of the past had been brought
about by tiny ruling elites in conjunction with small privileged
groups of artists, scholars and writers. The modern age of
egalitarianism sounded, so Burckhardt believed, the death knell
for the old European culture.
Burckhardt's position was in many ways similar to that of
Alexis de Tocqueville. Both observed the dechne of the traditional
European order with dismay and concern regarding
the likely future of freedom and civilization in the approaching
age of mass democracy and material civilization. Both were
oriented to the social conditions of the pre-revolutionary
era, i.e. eighteenth-century Europe with its relatively stable
social order and its modest degree of state interference in the
life of the average citizen, at least as far as he belonged to the
higher orders. Whilst Tocqueville praised the essential role
of the intermediate orders in society in providing a maximum
of freedom for the individual, Jacob Burckhardt favoured
smaller political units and a decentralized European system
of powers which allowed a great variety of principalities,
3 Jacob Burckhardt, Gesammelte Werke , Darmstadt, 1956 ff., vol. 4, p. 7.
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 461
small or large, to live alongside one anothe
ground for art, literature and scholarship.
If anything, Jacob Burckhardt was ev
influenced than Tocqueville by the impact
processes of his own day, which he traced
Revolution. Tocqueville did not consider t
of modern times, which he saw at work
in the United States, entirely in negativ
as the new democratic principles could be
as well as destructive, though perhaps f
from the viewpoint of individual freedom
was much more of a pessimist. His asses
considered to be the revolutionary trends
was far more radical. He was of the opinion
aries were living in an Age of Revolution
ively different from all hitherto known
as there was not only historical change
the time, often imperceptibly, but change
institutions, political or otherwise, and th
erating speed.4 In November 1871 Jacob Bu
. . . almost everything which we witness in our own
cally an Age of Revolution; we are probably on
perhaps the second act of this great drama; the
decades from 1815 to 1848 have in fact turned out
in it. This revolutionary age appears to become
which stands out in stark contrast to all known his
In Burckhardťs opinion the decisive fa
' le terrible esprit de nouveauté 9 which f
had promised to tame, but which by then
whole of society and had influenced deepl
of all classes of the population.6 The
had brought about one principle of decis
justifying and willing change allegedly for th
More radical than most conservativ
Burckhardt saw in this desire for change,
* Jacob Burckhardt, Historische Fragmente. Aus dem
Emtl Dürr , Stuttgart, 1957, pp. 260 ff.
« Ibid., p. 269.
« Ibid., p. 275.
7 Ibid., p. 276. Translated by the author.
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462 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
was the most distinctive feature of his own age, es
a 'blind force' nurtured by a shallow belief in prog
propelled by the hope of material gain rather than
spiritual or cultural values of any description. On
of it, people believed in the possibility of improveme
progress through intentional social action; in fact,
'blind desire for change' at work, fuelled by mere mat
motives and gaining more and more widespread recog
in the course of undermining traditional authority. It
because of this fact that, in Burckhardt's view, th
Revolution had turned into an accelerating process of
which was about to undermine all social differentiations.
Burckhardt's extremely critical assessment of his ow
and indeed of modern times up to our own, was ar
against the backcloth of a highly original interpretatio
history of Western culture or, to put it more precisel
ticular conception of universal history. Jacob Bur
repeatedly stated that he had nothing in common
philosophers of history of his own time and his frequ
emics against Hegel are a case in point. He objecte
attempts at reconstructing the course of world history
ine to a guiding principle. 'Such bold anticipation of
of world history is bound to fail, because it starts
erroneous principle.'8 Hayden White pointed out
that this radical stance was based not only on em
grounds, notably the argument that usually the gener
according to which universal history was reconstruct
systematic manner by the philosophers was merely a p
of their own personal views, or at any rate the views
own time, upon the past. Burckhardt in fact objected
varieties of the philosophy of history which attem
reconstruct history upon teleological principles of an
in particular Hegel's concept of 'progress in the cons
of freedom', because he recognized that such philo
schemes always contained an element of encouraging
by conscious human action, in order eventually to bri
an ideal or, at any rate, a better world ana that th
fuelled the general desire for change even more.9
s Gesammelte Werke , vol. 4, p. 26.
« White, op. cit. y p. 236 f.
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 463
Burckhardťs objections to this kind of inte
extended to his fellow historians as well,
National Liberal school of historians who
structed history in the light of the present,
certain political trends of their own time
with an historical aura. All genetic hist
genre was repugnant to him, precisely bec
to be servile to the predominant fashions
knowingly or, more often, unknowingly.
Burckhardt^ own frequent statement
nothing to do with a systematic approach t
of history and that he preferred to give
cross-sectional interpretations of particular h
have to be taken with a pinch of salt. Even
method indulged in the colourful descr
phenomena, he in fact wanted to find out
factors in the historical process rather than
events. He went for the typical, recurrent
As a historian he concentrated his end
he called 'those things which repeat them
the recurrent which correspond with o
are therefore understandable to us'.10 He
his objective as a historian as 'cultural h
marked contrast to the then current noti
of history. Cultural historiography was, i
a special discipline of history, but an alte
of how to reconstruct past reality: 'cul
study of a sequence of configurations [ Zus
nary history considers the sequence of ev
connections.' Likewise, Burckhardt did n
primarily in terms of the deeds and ac
deliberately shifted the emphasis towards
approach which accentuateci the role of m
indeed, as a rule, helpless object of histo
his control, rather than as being master o
this does have a role in his writings as wel
10 Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, p. 3.
u Cf. Jörn Rüsen, *Die Uhr, die die Stunde schlägt. G
Kultur bei Jacob Burckhardt', in Historische Prozesse
Meier, München, 1978, pp. 189 ff.
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464 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
works): 'Our point of departure is the only lasting and,
our vantage point, acceptable centre, namely man as an en
ing, striving and acting human being as he is and wa
always will be.'12 The sequence should be noted, endu
(and indeed suffering) is listed first and deliberate ac
last! In accordance with this he wanted the word 'happin
to be deleted from history, while the opposite notion 'mi
tune' ought to be retained. Burckhardt was guided in all t
issues by fundamental misgivings as to the notion of the abil
of man consciously to determine his own future, on how
small a scale, or to reconstruct society in such ways
effect genuine progress and a greater degree of freedom
the individual. Indeed, he believed that most political ph
ophies of his own time, notably liberalism and socia
were based upon the false conception of the goodnes
man which the prevailing social conditions prevent from
experienced in reality. Burckhardt blamed Jean-Jac
Rousseau above all for having launched this fundamen
false notion as to the original nature of man. His own
was essentially a pessimistic one, though, as Theodor Sch
pointed out, it proves on closer inspection to be of a dua
character. Man has a dual nature: on the one hand he is but
a 'bird of prey', on the other he is a spiritual creature and as
such is capable of achieving great deeds.13 It is this polar
tension in man as a human being which is at the centre of
Burckhardt's historical thinking.
CULTURE AND THE STATE
Indeed, Burckhardt's historiography sought to assess h
epochs as being conditioned by the predominance of pa
types of human beings. This is most notably the case
Griechische Kulturgeschichte , but also in his Kul
Renaissance in Italien which in his interpretation w
much the creation of a new, extremely individualis
of man who excelled in the uninhibited living of his
the full and who made full use of all human potent
12 Über das Studium der Geschichte , ed. P. Ganz, p. 226.
i3 'Die historischen Krisen im Geschichtsdenken Jacob Burckhard
Begegnungen mit der Geschichte , Göttingen, 1962, pp. 142 f.
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 465
while not hesitating to use force in ord
way, if need be, as did the 'men of vio
Renaissance period. However, Burckhardt d
mind the so-called 'great individuals', the B
(who succeeded in imposing their own per
tory), but all those who were carriers of a
These people are, however, in Burckhardt
minorities. Indeed, whether culture, in it
can flourish or not depends on whether th
viduality is upheld against pressures fr
by the state or the religious authorities) o
from below, notably the rabble which,
greed, would not allow any culture which
cratic by nature to emerge or to survive.
High culture is, all in all, a rare species
It flourishes under particular political,
conditions and indeed can attain peaks
certain fortunate junctures of history, bu
endangered phenomenon prone to suppr
of the moment by political, economic, relig
of the most diverse kind. It would appe
cultural achievements can only come ab
of the great drama of world history, par
ditional political or religious power structu
whilst the resulting power vacuum has no
masses who always demand a proper sh
which is a corollary to and, to a certain d
prerequisite for great art, literature or sc
no justification whatsoever for a notion
assumes that there is after all progress in
slow discontinuous process towards a high
humanity and culture. On the contrary, t
tells of suffering, of the rise and fall of e
and the repeated thoughtless and irrepa
cultural achievements of the first order.
in the historical process as such; rather
events often caused by utterly blind fo
the action of 'men of motion' (Bewegungs
know about the history of mankind and i
nor possess a sound vision of the futur
to bring about. History must be considered
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466 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
in which constellations occur from time to time which allow
men to achieve momentous cultural deeds or to create cultural
artefacts, if and because they can afford to elevate themselves
above the sphere of mere material deeds.
These great cultural achievements constitute a kind of
ideal history of mankind which, however, is only present in
the minds of a small educated elite which is the main bearer
of tradition from one generation to the next. This ideal history
of culture stands in stark contrast to general history. It serves
as a signpost and provides orientation for all those who want
to be human beings in the genuine sense of the word, although
they find themselves in the midst of a stream of obligations
by which their everyday lives are determined to an ever greater
degree.
It is at this point that Burckhardt assigns a certain social,
or perhaps political, function to the cultural elite, that is to
say the so-called Gebildete . In the introduction to Griechische
Kulturgeschichte Burckhardt puts this as follows: 'It is the
special duty of the educated [des Gebildeten] to acquire
as complete a knowledge of the development of culture as
possible; this distinguishes him as a conscious human being
from the unconscious barbarian.'14 The Gebildete are called
upon to act as a counterweight to all those forces in history
which operate in favour of the consolidation of the power
of the rulers and the further extension of state control which
may eventually stifle all individual creative activity and impose
rigid doctrinaire views upon the people. Likewise, however,
they should resist the rabble who do not care and indeed do not
know about culture and aim at levelling all social differentiations
regardless of the social costs, material or ideal.
In his most famous work, wrongly, but not entirely unjustifiably
known by the title World Historical Reflections , Jacob
Burckhardt set out to describe the precarious balance between
domination and freedom, between the unrestrained rule of
individualism and complete state control of all individual
conduct. This is the core of his famous, ideal-typical theory
of the three great historical forces {Potenzen) of state, religion
and culture which forms the backbone of his interpretation
of world history and which can rightly be called a philosophy
u Gesammelte Werke, vol. 5, p. 15.
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 467
of history, albeit of a genre different fr
Marx, Comte and Spencer. None of these t
entirely without the others. Culture in par
without a degree of protection by the
satisfaction of the primary religious requirem
of the population by religious institutions
the three Potenzen are reciprocally dep
another, whilst nonetheless in irreconcilab
another.
Burckhardt^ notion of the state or, as w
call it in modern terms, of domination is
if not pessimistic. He would have nothin
the conception of the state as an instituti
it is to act as the guardian of certain fund
ciples in society or which even embodie
as was argued at the time by a whole schoo
ophers from Hegel onwards. Nor did Burck
with the various attempts to justify, or i
origins of the state by reference to natura
tual agreement on the part of the ruled in
In a rather naturalistic vein he maintaine
far as we can see violence is always f
constituted by power and not by whate
principles to which recourse may be take
domination in one way or another. In the
is always evil, whoever is exercising it. It
facto insatiable, hence as such unhappy an
to make others unhappy as well.'15 The
propensity to extend its control over an e
human affairs and at the same time a passi
which may prove irresistible if it is no
of the other two primary forces in world
conceded that in modern times a certain moderation in the
brutal nature of state power had been achieved, as often
happened in the later stages of cultural development, but he
stuck rigidly to the opinion that the state has no function in
the sphere of morality. It was not the duty of the state to
impose moral principles upon society; this was entirely up
to the latter.
is Über das Studium der Geschichtet ed. Ganz, p. 257.
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468 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
Burckhardt also strongly objected to those notions
attributed to the state, and in particular to the moder
state, a cultural mission of whatever kind. He was qu
spoken about this: 'On the contrary, in the first p
nation wants power above all. . . one wishes to be
something great and thereby reveals that power is th
and culture at best a secondary objective.' 16 There
one relative justification for state power and even fo
power status, namely 'the necessity of achieving great ob
in foreign affairs, the preservation and protection of
which would otherwise perish and the promotion of
sections of the people, themselves given to passivity.
from the point of view of culture, not the great but t
state, like those to be found in the system of city st
signorie in Renaissance Italy or in eighteenth-century Ger
were infinitely preferable. A decentralized exercise o
was an ideal figuration for the growth of sublime culture
The function of religion in history was asse
Burckhardt with even more detachment and coolness of attitude.
The great world religions undoubtedly catered for the
religious needs of the people, known in all ages and by all
peoples, but in doing so they tended to petrify the original
religious messages by gradually creating powerful religious
institutions which largely monopolized the teaching of religious
doctrine and the ways of achieving salvation, thereby becoming
serious rivals to the state. The institutionalization of religious
doctrine, which kept the latter alive long after the original
religious fervour had evaporated, was tantamount to stifling
all cultural growth again, if not held in check by the state,
or by the forces of society in its own right.
While state and religion are static elements in the great
drama of world history, permanently attempting to extend
their sway over their peoples by all the means at their disposal
and, if necessary, eliminating ail individual spheres of activity,
culture is a dynamic element. 'Its impact uppn both state and
religion is one of continuous modification and decomposition except
under conditions when they have subjected culture
totally to their will and made it subservient to their own
i« Gesammelte Werke , vol. 4, p. 70.
n Ibid., p. 24.
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 469
objectives.' This led Burckhardt to emphasize
always have to be a strict dividing line betwe
ciety; for, at least in its outward form, soc
culture against the other two Potenzen. Ind
was rather modern in that he did include the sp
life and economic production in his notion of
which on close examination is by no means mea
a lofty matter exclusively concerned with art
scholarship; rather, it encompasses the whole of m
It is the spontaneity of human action and n
principles by which culture is defined, at leas
material culture, as it were, creates a certain 'sp
which, being accumulated over the centuries,
ground for all those forms of human activity
becomes conscious of himself as a spiritual
stage is reached, however, this most sublime
activity becomes a historical force in itself: 6 We
einmal seiner selbst bewußt geworden, bildet
seine Welt weiter.' ls
At this juncture Burckhardt is far closer to
himself was aware. Indeed, his naturalistic app
cal reality in many ways reflects the classical
towards history as a force not dissimilar to
governed by fate and undisclosed laws rather
will and human action. The great cultural ach
acquire a semi-eternal status inasmuch as t
become part and parcel of the cultural heri
or a group of peoples, are ultimately creation
spirit. Even the destructive forces which inevit
empires and religious institutions which seem
built for eternity originate from this most s
of human activity. It is apparent from this t
Burckhardt was not such a rigid conservative t
appear from his commentaries concerning
politics in his own time. It should be noted
any such dynamic activity leading to social cha
manifestations, whilst being the source of su
scholarly achievements, is the province of
elites who enjoy a markedly privileged sta
»8 Gesammelte Werke , vol. 4, p. 44.
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470 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
materially and otherwise, while the common people h
furnish the means of subsistence for them. Burckhardt
inclined to think that the smaller and the more elevated from
everyday life these elites were, the more they achieved. Hence,
culture requires social conditions of a very specific nature.
These elite groups can never be upheld against the many without
invoking state authority or religious tradition in order to
justify a hierarchical order in society which gives them a privileged
status.
Culture is, therefore in a way, just as dependent upon the
state as an agency providing protection against outside forces
or internal convulsions and upon religion as a source of traditionalist
legitimation, as they, in turn, are dependent upon
society and culture. Everything depends, therefore, upon
whether a reasonable balance exists between these elements;
only under such conditions can genuine culture really thrive
for any long period and create lasting cultural artefacts. The
Greek polis would appear to have been one such fortunate
configuration and the Italian Renaissance another. Possibly,
the decentralized system of a plurality of smaller powers in
Central Europe, with but a fictitious central authority during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was another, though
perhaps not quite as propitious for the cultivation of an individualist
culture.
But quite apart from that, a relative balance between the
three key forces of history would appear to be essential for
culture to flourish and furthermore for the survival of any
given social system as such. It is historically possible for one
of the three forces (Potenzen) to gain the upper hand over
the other two, or perhaps for two of them jointly to dominate
the third. For example, the state may take over complete
control of religion, or subject culture entirely to its own
interests. If this happens, it may be irretrievably lost as an independent
variable in the unending stream of the historical process.
This would be tantamount to condemning the respective
social system to slow but certain petrification. More often than
not, culture was made totally subservient to state power,
thereby losing its inherent quality of being a source of dynamic
change, let alone great cultural achievement. (It is difficult nowadays
not to think of the social systems within the Soviet bloc
which conform almost exactly to the criteria just mentioned.)
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 471
According to Burckhardt it is more likely t
between the three Potenzen may trigger o
respective social system which may, accordi
stances, not only lead to its rapid destruc
other, adjacent historical formations into it
all be doomed to eventual death due to a serie
convulsions. Indeed, in such times the pro
change accelerates. Social formations whic
up gradually over decades or even centuries m
tally altered or destroyed within months or
states or established religions may either co
course of such 'historical crises', or enhan
beyond what had been thought possible b
least in its more sublime variations, is alway
badly if not become lost altogether.
THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL CHANGE
It is this theory of historical change which provides
of departure for Burckhardt's judgments on the po
social developments of his own age. Burckhardt w
convinced that since the rise of the modern industr
and the French Revolution, the precarious balan
three Potenzen had been severely disturbed. Th
had been a necessary prerequisite for the emergenc
ditional European culture as a most sublime exp
man's spiritual activity. The impact of the French R
and of the doctrines of liberalism and democracy
so deep that the all-important dividing line betw
and society (the latter being the material embo
culture) was about to be progressively eroded. U
conditions of universal or at any rate popular suffra
demands upon the state to fulfil the material ne
people, rather than to stick to its traditional role a
of the social order externally and internally, ha
too strong to be resisted any longer. This, however, n
an extension of state control over society in almost
of life.
In Burckhardt's opinion this development would do neither
of them any good. On the one hand it would result in a mushrooming
of state power, through which all individual initiative
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472 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
would gradually be stifled, on the other hand govern
power would become more and more subservient to th
of the masses. The eventual outcome would be, he
the rise of caesaristic regimes as the obvious form of a
compatible with universal suffrage. The caesaristic gre
state of the future would have little patience with th
heritage of its predecessors, nor would it any longer
sufficient shelter for those social groups primarily in
in the arts and the sciences. The rise of modern nation
was another factor which worked in the same direction. It
gave additional stimuli to the rise of the omnipotent state
which subjects society entirely to its objectives.
Indeed, from the start, Burckhardt was disillusioned with the
nationalist doctrine of his age, with its liberal just as much as
with its more conservative variation.
Burckhardťs deep-seated worries were further intensified
by his analysis of the emerging industrial system. On the whole
he assessed its momentous consequences for the modern world
remarkably correctly. It was about to change fundamentally
the condition of life for everybody, but he had ht tie to say
in its favour. Rather, he was appalled by the impact of the new
industrial spirit upon the cultural heritage of Europe. With
the greatest concern he observed that railways and industry
were making deep inroads daily into what could be considered
the European cultural heritage; with considerable fervour,
reminiscent of present-day ecological debates, he deplored
that the great historical metropolises of Europe were about
to be defaced by railways, bridges, factories and opulent but
tasteless buildings on an ever grander scale. He certainly
welcomed the foundation of new museums everywhere and
the great efforts being made by the new bourgeoisie, as well
as by the aristocracy, to collect art treasures, a process which
was facilitated by the enormous wealth created by industrial
capitalism, partly because it was so unevenly spread amongst
the population. But he nonetheless complained bitterly about
the almost daily loss or defacement of important artefacts
of the culture of the past. During his second visit to London
in 1879 Burckhardt filled his diary with many notes to this
effect; he regretted that the face of London was being
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 473
destroyed by more and more new, ugly railw
preposterous buildings.19
This attitude was more than mere sentiment
the past. Burckhardt was fully aware that t
of historical monuments or the gradual def
historical aspect, of the urban environment i
bound to have unfortunate repercussions on
traditional cultural ideas as such. This was
only from an aesthetic point of view, but also
and, in a way, on Uberai grounds; the cultu
in Burckhardťs view the breeding ground f
creative initiatives might grow which, in turn
impetus for the rise of new forms of soci
expression and, perhaps, for the rise of new h
tions. What Burckhardt was concerned about w
finahty of what he saw going on; the driving
the new industriahzation appeared to be b
and irreversible as they were propelled, in
by a desire for material gain and progress in the
of the masses. It was at this very juncture th
high conservatism converged with extreme lef
the nature of the capitalist system which alle
mankind to a new servitude. The people, or at
whelming majority of them, were not, howev
at all. On the other hand, Burckhardt anticip
for culture which might originate from anti-c
Rather gloomily he remarked: 'You cannot
a tyranny will be exercised over the spirit und
that erudition is a clandestine ally of capit
be annihilated.'20
Burckhardt was fairly sure that the twin forces
and industriahzation were bound to lead to an era of 'national
wars and deadly international competition'.21 This in turn
would encourage the rise of militarism as the most effective
19 Cf. Werner Kaegi, 'Europäische Horizonte im Denken Jacob Burckhardts',
Drei Studien , Basel, 1962, pp. 13 ff.
20 Löwith, op. cit., p. 156.
21 Historische Fragmente , p. 278.
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474 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
form of mobilizing the political and physical power of
engaged in political and economic rivalry or even open
with each other. Soon the rulers would discover the ad
of a militaristic organization of society from the vie
of the power interest of the caesarist state which in
seemed to be the obvious answer to the needs of
In prophetic visions Burckhardt sketched the outlines
he thought was bound to come sooner or later. In Ap
he wrote to Heinrich von Preen:
The fate of the workers will perhaps be most conspicuous; I hav
boding which may sound silly right now, but which nonetheles
get out of my mind: the military state is bound to become an in
on a grand scale. The agglomerations of men in the huge industr
shops must not be left forever to their misery and their greed
measure of misery, carefully controlled, begun and ended w
of drums, with advancement and in uniform - it is this that is
bound to come.22
This and other similar prophetic statements have righ
considered as a forecast, however vaeue, of the ris
totalitarian state and, in particular, Fascism. I
Burckhardt's concern with the amorphous structur
modern state which has somehow swallowed society,
itself becoming prey to nationalism and demands
greater welfare provisions, touched a sore point. Sinc
Talmon and many others have elaborated upon m
same point, namely that an unstructured society in w
individuals have no independent standing and no inter
institutions to fall back on in case of necessity, tend
rise to despotic rule, as the balance of the social force
is a necessary prerequisite for free societies, is lost.
It has to be admitted, however, that Burckhardt
overemphasized the authoritarian and indeed the ca
trends of his own time and much the same can pe
said of his rather negative assessment of modern indu
He was so much of an anti-modernist that he sometimes t
to exaggerate his observations to a more than tolerabl
On the other hand, he was always careful to prese
in a cautious and indeed merely impressionistic mann
« Cf. Jacob Burckhardt, Briefe, ed. M. Burckhardt, Bremen, 1965,
April, 1872).
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JACOB BURCKHARDT 475
forecast of the caesaristic super-state never
region; nor were his forebodings of despo
distant future intended to be more than ind
certain trends of post-revolutionary Europ
lighted, trends which might assert themse
reality only if no counteracting factors i
Burckhardt offered were impressionistic,
analyses which, however tentatively they w
nonetheless threw and still throw light on key
society. They were arrived at by a careful an
tory and opened up possible alleys for inter
present and the future alike.
Burckhardt himself was deeply pessimistic
of European civilization as he knew it. 'I d
thing of the future', he wrote as early as 18
that we will still be granted a few fairly
similar to Roman antiquity under the emper
hope that he still had, he placed on a nearly
from the predominant trends of his own time a
keep knowledge about the old European cu
the public or, at any rate, among the erudite
the standard-bearers of aestheticism, cult
consciousness. Burckhardt defended this o
defensive yet at the same time remarkably p
'We may all perish, but at least I want to ch
the interest for which I am to perish, name
Old Europe.'24 This was perhaps not quite
to take as Burckhardt would have had hi
believe.25 If anything could help, he thought
the study of art and literature and history in
from the predominant fashions of his age. A
might emerge in which the spirit of European c
and indeed hidden in aesthetic artefacts and s
might provide once again the fertile ground
by which the historical process might be given
able direction.
23 Briefe, ed. M. Burckhardt, vol. III, p. 112.
24 Ibid., p. 146 (5 March 1846).
25 A few lines later Burckhardt speaks of 'reconstruction
the crisis is over', as his and his partner's destiny.
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