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Problems of Post-Communism
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Recent Developments in Democracy in Slovenia
Alenka Krašovec & Lars Johannsen
To cite this article: Alenka Krašovec & Lars Johannsen (2016): Recent Developments in
Democracy in Slovenia, Problems of Post-Communism, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2016.1169932
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Recent Developments in Democracy in Slovenia
Alenka Krašovec1
and Lars Johannsen2
1
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
2
Department of Political Science, School of Business and Social Sciences, Aarhus University,
Denmark
The article offers insight into the development of democracy in Slovenia, which is consistently
placed among the countries that made the most progress toward consolidated democracy.
Recently, however, Slovenian democracy has been challenged. The article shows that the
balance between responsible and responsive policies tipped following the first decade, due to
the demise of corporatism, distrust in political parties, and the personalization of politics.
INTRODUCTION
As judged by some prominent international institutions, the
Slovenian transition to democracy that started in the early
1990s was both relatively quick and tremendously successful.
Slovenia, considered a “good pupil” (Bugaric and Kuhelj
2015, 273), was a frontrunner among the newly established
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): it was
already considered “free” by the mid-1990s, according to
Freedom House’s annual survey, Nations in Transit (NIT),
and it received a high ranking in the World Bank Governance
Index. The Slovenian state was thus both democratic and
able to meet the challenges of transition. Slovenia’s economy
was back on track, and its political and economic
integration into the European Union (EU), including the
adoption of the common currency, was a success. Slovenia
seemed destined to consolidate democracy.
This expectation is not tremendously surprising,
considering the frequently debated and empirically tested
determinants of successful transitions and democratic consolidation:
socio-economic development, the level of development
of civil society, institutional choices, and favorable
external factors (Przeworski et al. 1996). Slovenia exhibited
high levels of economic and human development, a tradition
of involvement of social actors in addition to a mushrooming
of new actors during the transition, the adoption of a parliamentary
system, and benevolent support from the regional
behemoth—the EU. Moreover, except during the transformation
depression in 1991–1993, Slovenia experienced rather
favorable socio-economic development in the 1990s (FinkHafner
and Hafner-Fink 2009) and stable growth without
major macroeconomic imbalances (Šušteršič 2009).
In recent years, however, the democratic fairy tale has
been sputtering. The ranking institutions have been downgrading
the status of Slovenian democracy, a pattern also
seen in other CEE countries (Rupnik and Zielonka 2013;
Epstein and Jacoby 2014). NIT in particular has emphasized
the corruption in the country, and Slovenia’s overall position
on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index has worsened,
dropping four places (from second to sixth). In political
life, voter turnout in parliamentary elections dropped from
83 percent in the first multiparty and free elections in 1990 to
a low of 51 percent in 2014, and, as demonstrated below,
satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions has
declined steadily since the middle of the first decade of
democracy in Slovenia (Politbarometer 2014). By 2014,
fewer than one-in-ten Slovenes were satisfied with the state
of democracy in the country. Slovenian democracy showed
some weaknesses even before the advent of the global financial
crisis and the ensuing European debt crisis; we argue
that this crisis fueled dissatisfaction and anti-political attitudes
as well as fatigue and apathy.
Diamond’s observation (2011, 17) that “hard economic
times are supposed to mean hard times for democracy,
particularly when it is new and fragile,” brings up the
question of balance between the responsive and responsible
traits of the state. Johannsen (2002) finds the responsive
traits to be rooted in the argument by Przeworski (1995)
that sustainable democracy requires that the political
Address correspondence to Alenka Krašovec, Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Kardeljeva ploscad 5, Ljubljana 1000,
Slovenia. E-mail: alenka.krasovec@fdv.uni-lj.si.
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 00, no. 00, 2016, 1–10
Copyright © 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1075-8216 (print)/1557-783X (online)
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2016.1169932
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system should actually produce normatively desired policies.
Diamond and Morlino (2004) have argued that responsiveness
constitutes a separate dimension of the quality of
democracy in terms of vertical accountability. The responsible
trait is evident in Fukuyama’s (2011, 431) observation
that political liberty also requires a state “strong enough to
act when action is required.” The difficulty of striking this
balance is clearly outlined in the works of Evans (1995),
Leftwich (1995), and Weiss (1998), who all stress the
benefits of responsiveness as well as the dangers of particularism
associated with involving societal actors in the
policy process. While responsiveness might be easier to
define and describe than responsibility, Bardi, Bartolini,
and Trechsel (2014, 237) present a useful definition,
arguing that political parties and leaders must be able to
consider the “long-term needs of their people … [that] go
beyond the short-term demands of those same people,” and
at the same time be able to adjust and react to policies of
international organizations, such as the European Union,
the International Monetary Fund, and others that impose
constraints on domestic policies. We concur, arguing that
responsiveness and responsibility cannot be a trade-off;
instead, they constitute a balance that must be constantly
iterated to consolidate democracy successfully.
The issue with the recent developments in democracy in
Slovenia is the tipping of this balance: success in overcoming
the current crisis, but with the political system in disarray. On
the one hand, the political system has produced responsible
policies, firmly securing the integration of Slovenia into the
EU and overcoming the debt crisis, to the extent that Slovenia,
in contrast to Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, did not
request a bailout. Even so, one stream within the electorate
continues to demand “managerialism” and is solution-driven.
On the other hand, responsiveness has declined. The corporatist
model that was an integral part of Slovenia’s exceptional
transition model (Crowley and Stanojević 2011; Guardiancich
2012a; Feldmann 2014) was put on hold for six years between
2009 and 2015 (Johannsen and Krašovec 2015). Moreover,
another stream within the electorate continues to demand
accountability from the political elite, which is increasingly
seen as particularistic and clientelistic, if not outright corrupt.
To this bleak picture could be added the increased dissatisfaction
with democracy; although that part of the discussion
involves the usual chicken-and-egg causality, the result is
that episodic bursts of movements and parties with
populist tendencies have become normal. Clearly, iteration
is called for.
In the following, we argue that the transition to democracy
and market economy was managed through public consensus
and the corporatist institutions specific to Slovenia. Citing
several failings with this model, we continue with the argument
that the 2004 election proved to be a critical juncture for
the increasing polarization between left and right on a quid
pro quo basis. Subsequently, we discuss how popular
dissatisfaction and disillusionment have increased and how
Slovenia only narrowly saved itself from possible bankruptcy
in the end. Finally, we discuss the decline of formal organizations
such as trade unions and the rise of personalist political
parties, asking if both phenomena lead not only to instability
but also to alienation and widespread dissatisfaction.
Furthermore, we expect that the conjunction between personalist
and populist parties with an increasingly volatile party
system prevents the development of long-term policies, as
political parties and their leaders react to the short-term
demands of the electorate, stressing responsiveness rather
than responsibility. In the conclusion, we briefly discuss the
possibility of realigning the political system to produce more
responsibility, accountability, and responsiveness.
TIGHTROPE WALKER: TRANSITION BY
CONSENSUS
At the beginning of the 1990s, the newly independent state
and young democracy of Slovenia had to overcome the
crisis of transition. As in other CEE countries, the economy
contracted and industrial production declined while unemployment
and inflation spiked (Mencinger 2012). Other
CEE countries that adopted neo-liberal reforms at a forced
pace assumed that political and social resistance to such a
move would not materialize, as there was no time to organize
opposition before the reforms became irreversible
(Balcerowicz 1994). However, Slovenia gave credence to
Katzenstein’s (1985, 198) stance that “democratic corporatism
was not an institutional solution to the problems of
economic change, but a political mechanism for coping
with change.” Here, corporatism—following Woldendorp
(1997, 49–50) and Pryor (1988, 317) —is understood as
cooperation between the government and relevant socioeconomic
interest groups. Corporatism is a triadic exchange
based on the recognition of each partner. Each organization
earns a monopoly on representation, and, in return, political
leaders receive not only information and valuable insights
concerning substance but, more importantly, acceptance
and support from the partner (Johannsen 2008). As
Johannsen and Krašovec (2015, 3) observe, it is very
difficult to criticize an agreement one has participated in
making. In this sense, we argue that the corporatist model
in Slovenia, through the adoption of social pacts, enabled—
in line with the definition of Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel
(2014) —the political parties and leaders to provide stability
(responsiveness) as well as credibility of long-term
policies and goals, including structural change of the
economy and accession to the EU (responsibility).
From its inception in 1990 through a commission under
the auspices of the Ministry of Labor, corporatism reflected
both the pre-socialist and socialist past of the nation (Zver
1992; Lukšič 1997; 2003). Slovenia was the most
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liberalized republic within the former Yugoslavia, as gradual
reforms were taking place in the 1980s (Šušteršič
2009). Continuing this “gradualist” path, corporatism was
(re)established as a social partnership among trade unions,
employers’ organizations, and the government; it found
political expression in the composition of the upper parliamentary
chamber, in which half of the representatives are
chosen according to a corporatist formula. In addition to
reflecting traditions, the latter, it was argued, consciously
secured responsiveness, given that political parties, at the
time the constitution was written, were only embryonic
and few understood the interests they represented
(Johannsen 2008).
Corporatism became an integral part of what
Guardiancich (2012a) and Feldmann (2014) have called
Slovenia’s exceptional transition model. Although it is
debated how exceptional the model actually was (Adam
and Tomšič 2012), Johannsen and Krašovec (2015) demonstrate
that Slovenia was an exception among the CEE
countries when corporatism is measured using the indicators
developed by Siaroff (1999). Furthermore, it appeared
to be a model with fewer losers, as Slovenia has remained
one of the most egalitarian societies in the EU
(Guardiancich 2012a). Bernik and Malnar (2005) found
widespread popular support for economic equality and an
active welfare state. The model and outcome were largely
in accordance with popular values.
The political and economic organization of the corporatist
arrangements later became institutionalized in the
Social and Economic Council (SEC; Ekonomsko-socialni
svet). Consisting of employer, employee, and government
representatives, the council became the forum for responsive
and responsible policies. Social pacts, negotiated
regularly between 1994 and 2007, gradually expanded
from a narrow focus on wage policy to include broader
political issues such as social policies, housing policies,
employment and health insurance policies, and equal
opportunity policies (Stanojević and Krašovec 2006; 2011).
Within the corporatist framework, policies aimed at
stabilizing the macroeconomic situation, liberalizing the
economy, and mitigating the social consequences of the
transition costs were developed. Furthermore, the political
process leading toward EU integration was cleared and
steered to some degree though the SEC. With respect to
the former, wage and price policies were traded for a stake
in privatization (Stanojević 2012), and an early retirement
scheme was introduced to reduce unemployment. By 1993,
growth resumed. With respect to the latter, the corporatist
tradition appeared to provide a good fit with the EU
partnerships requirement (Andreou and Bache 2010).
The cultural struggle, or kulturkampf, associated with
the role of the Roman Catholic Church in society and
politics was the main divider within parliament. This was
a question of not merely modernity and tradition but also
the specific connotations of the interpretation of World War
II history, of partisans versus collaborators, and, in continuation
thereof, the interpretation of Yugoslav communism.
The economic situation took priority, however, and the
prevailing corporatist arrangements facilitated compromise
(Bebler 2002), setting up a centripetal process of increased
consensus. With the gradualist approach and with the
population’s clear expectations of retaining the welfare
state, all of the parliamentary parties advocated similar
social-democratic and socio-economic policies until the
2004 election (Stanojević and Krašovec 2011; FinkHafner
2012). In addition, Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek
consciously used Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS;
Liberalna demokracija Slovenije), the main governmentforming
party from 1992 to 2004, to overcome ideological
bi-polarization in government formation. Despite ideologically
mixed coalitions, Slovenian governments fostered
consensus and appeared among the most stable in the
CEE countries (Blondel et al. 2007).
In conclusion, and as also follows from our analysis of
the fragmentation and volatility of the party system below,
Slovenia appeared exceptionably stable (Lewis ed. 2001;
Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015), and the corporatist
model allowed the political parties, social organizations,
and leaders to pursue more responsible long-term policies
in the first decade of democracy than other CEE countries.
TILTING THE BALANCE: CRITICAL JUNCTURE
AND POLARIZATION FROM THE 2004 ELECTION
The tranquillity did not last. Evidence of deeper social and
political changes began to emerge in the 2004 election, and a
centrifugal process was set in motion. The 2004 election
appears to represent a critical juncture. The corporatist
arrangement had produced its own seeds of destruction,
which in combination with increased alienation, as
evidenced by declining public trust and participation in
democracy, would eventually tilt the balance in favor of the
state, which was trying to preserve the capacity for autonomous
action, but at the cost of increased fragmentation and
polarization.
First, as part of the corporatist deal, the privatization
process deviated from the general pattern seen in other CEE
countries by supporting internal buy-offs, where workers
and managers by preferential arrangement were included in
the redistribution of previously socially owned property,
while the state retained at least a 40 percent share
(Bohinc and Bainbridge 2001; Stanojević 2012). For a
decade, this consolidated the role of the state and insiders
(managers, workers), but as workers sold their shares, it
became evident that the managers—with a significant
though not golden share—benefited the most from the
privatization process (Mencinger 2012; Stanojević 2012).
DEVELOPMENTS IN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVENIA 3
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This contributed to the empowerment of an elite network
with cross-membership from and circulation across
business, politics, and administration (Fink-Hafner 1998),
leading to suspicions of increased political nepotism and
patrimonialism (Krašovec et al. 2014). In 2011, the AntiCorruption
Agency (Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije)
found evidence of systemic corruption on 12 of 13 indicators
(Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije 2011). Finally, it
has been argued that the gradualist reform process led
vested interests to maintain the status quo, thus hampering
competitiveness and leading to persistent inflation and the
excessive growth of public spending (Šušteršič 2009).
Corporatism proved to be less responsible in that these
side-effects blocked further reforms (Adam and Tomšič
2012). Furthermore, although Slovenia had been labeled
the “good pupil,” Bugaric and Kuhelj (2015, 273–79)
argue that the speed made possible by corporatism
and the uncritical clearance of EU legislation resulted in
shallow Europeanization.
Second, although the preparation for EU membership
was the big issue from 1996 onwards, in reality, only a
limited number of social partners were included in the
process. Securing membership took priority, and the ministries
tended to keep coordination in-house, resulting in the
gradual centralization (and Europeanization) of the government
and administration (Andreou and Bache 2010, 41).
Stanojević and Krašovec (2011) found that deinstitutionalization
of the tripartite arrangement set in along with
Slovenia’s membership in the EU.
Third, in retrospect, many people within the government
and administration may have felt the need to regain autonomous
capacity; that is, the corporatist arrangement was
seen as a straitjacket, if not an outright state capture. The
following example is evidence enough of this phenomenon.
In 1994, the Slovenian parliament voiced criticism that the
SEC had not been included in the budget preparations, and
the resulting political “storm” was only resolved when
Prime Minister Drnovšek issued a written apology to the
social partners for the “procedural mistake” and promised
to rectify the situation (Lukšič 1997; Stanojevič and
Krašovec 2006).
Fourth, politics became polarized. During the Drnovšekled
governments, the political climate sought to “bridge”
the center, but the victory of Janez Janša’s Slovenian
Democratic Party (SDS; Slovenska demokratska stranka)
in 2004 led to a new phase of polarization that has dominated
Slovenian politics ever since. Rather than governing
with majorities from both sides of the spectrum, now, major
reforms were carried through with small majorities from
either the right or the left side of the parliament. Thus,
Janša’s 2004 government initiated a package of neoliberal
socio-economic reforms (Prunk 2012; Stanojevič 2012;
Haughton and Krašovec 2013) and, despite public discontent
and trade union criticism, it did not budge from its
position or invite representatives of the aggrieved sectors
for negotiations. When Borut Pahor and the Social
Democrats (SD; Socialni demokrati) won the 2008 election,
they returned the favor in kind by narrowly passing pension
and labor-market reforms through parliament. In comparison,
Drnovšek had managed to pass the earlier reforms by
consensus in 2000. When Janša returned to power with
another swing of the pendulum in 2012–2013, the pattern
repeated itself (Prunk 2012, 54) with the institution of
radical austerity measures, including significant downsizing
of the welfare state, which many still considered worth
fighting (Kolarič 2012, 295).
The “old institutions” through which the transition and
European integration had been overseen through compromise
and consensus were outplayed when the global financial crisis
hit with full force in 2009. Thus, the neo-liberal reforms,
austerity packages, and major social reforms concerning
pensions and the labor market—fundamental reforms to the
economy, society, and public sector—were based on narrow
majorities. Many felt excluded.
DISSATISFACTION INCREASES, BUT THE ABYSS
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IS AVOIDED
Apparently, Slovenes can be hard to satisfy. Ever since the
successful securing of independence and the establishment
of democracy, those who are satisfied with democracy have
been outnumbered by those who are dissatisfied. As
Figure 1 amply demonstrates, however, the relative distance
between the satisfied and dissatisfied forms a “crocodile
gap”; that is, the gap narrowed until 2005, after which
point the dissatisfied outnumbered the satisfied. In 2013,
fewer than 10 percent of the people reported being satisfied
with democracy. This is not to say that the 90 percent of
Slovenes who are dissatisfied with democracy no longer
support the principles of democracy; this is manifestly
untrue. Rather, as argued by Linde and Ekman (2003)
when investigating the parallel question concerning “satisfaction
with how democracy works” used in other surveys,
it is a reflection on how the system works in practice.
We thus see the gloom as an attitudinal response to the
political system. When no less than 55 percent in a survey
from 2013 agreed to the need for a strong/powerful leader
(Toš et al. 2013), it is worrying; but perhaps this is less an
expression of support for an authoritarian solution than it is
the gloom about economic development and clientelistic
politics translated into a demand for managerialism and
accountability.
The gloom is understandable, but it is important to
underscore that satisfaction began declining before the
advent of the financial crisis. It must also be recognized
that the political system did produce policies enabling
4 KRASOVEC AND JOHANNSEN
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Slovenia to escape bailout conditions. Having said this, the
task was neither easy nor popular.
Pahor’s Social Democratic government was in power
when the financial crisis triggered a dramatic economic
contraction of 7.8 percent in 2009 (Table 1). Pahor sought
to guarantee social protection through several measures,
including subsidies for shorter working hours, raising the
minimum wage, and increasing social transfers. It was a
partial success: the economy stabilized thereafter, but the
budget deficit remained high and debt soared—albeit from
a low level.
In 2010, when the government of the day announced a
package of reforms for the pension system and labor market,
increased political polarization and the inability to “bridge”
led to the collapse of the reforms already passed in the
parliament. The opposition, backed by students and trade
unions, exercised its constitutional right to call a referendum
(until 2013, the 1991 Constitution required that a legislative
referendum be backed by at least one-third of the deputies,
the National Council, or 40,000 voters). The government
was defeated and already in disarray when prominent leaders
of two of the government coalition parties—Gregor Golobič,
leader of Zares (For Real), and Katarina Kresal, leader of
LDS—came under suspicion for corruption and clientelism
(Haughton and Krašovec 2013).
Before the 2011 election campaign, the financial crisis
had become the European sovereign debt crisis, and
Pahor’s government was heavily criticized for being too
slow to make decisions and for introducing inappropriate
measures to respond to the crisis (Haughton and Krašovec
2013), even if this was partly due to the referendum.
With Janša’s SDS returning to power in late 2011, the
government proved unstable and largely incapable of
implementing reforms. Janša chose to resume the kulturkampf.
His downfall, however, came quickly, although it
was brief. The report on parliamentary party leaders by the
Anti-Corruption Agency cited numerous failures by Janša
to declare his personal economic activities, and in February
2013 the government was felled by a constructive vote of
no confidence. In June 2013, the Ljubljana District Court
sentenced Janša to two years in prison for soliciting commissions
from a Finnish firm during his first term. (In April
2015, the Constitutional Court overturned the conviction
and ordered a retrial; but in September 2015, a new judge
declared that the original charge had expired, so the case
will not be retried.)
At the same time, Zoran Janković, leader of Positive
Slovenia (LZJ–PS; Lista Zorana Jankovića–Pozitivna
Slovenija), had to suspend his leadership of the largest parliamentary
party when his name was featured in the same
report by the Anti-Corruption Agency. The political system
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
FIGURE 1 Satisfaction with democracy (1996 –2014), in percent. Authors’ calculation of averages by year from underlying surveys (Politbarometer 2014).
TABLE 1
Selected Economic Indicators, 2008–2014
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Growth of GDP (in %) 3.3 –7.8 1.2 0.6 –2.6 –1.0 2.6
Public debt (in % of GDP) 21.6 34.5 38.2 46.5 53.7 70.3 80.9
Budget deficit 1.9 –6.1 –5.7 –6.2 –3.7 –14.6* –4.5
Note. * The increase was due to a one-time expenditure—the recapitalization
of five banks.
Sources: Ministry of Finance of Slovenia 2013, 2014, 2015; Institute
of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 2013, 2014; Statistical
Office of Slovenia.
DEVELOPMENTS IN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVENIA 5
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was in disarray. Alenka Bratušek, a relatively inexperienced
LZJ–PS member of parliament (MP), faced the challenge of
forming a government and forging ahead with a rocky coalition.
When the three largest banks went bust in the autumn of
2013 and required recapitalization, Bratušek was confronted
with a severe economic crisis. To avoid the harsh bailout
terms seen in Greece and Cyprus, her government continued
to privatize state holdings and implemented an austerity
package that included public sector job cuts, reduced
salaries, limitations on social transfers, and a higher valueadded
tax.
Despite the volatile political environment, successive
Slovenian governments ultimately demonstrated that the
financial crisis and European debt crisis could be handled.
However, the associated difficulties and political costs
essentially traded short-term responsiveness for long-term
goals. The population was dissatisfied, the party system
proved increasingly unstable, and the parties themselves
came to resemble populist elements.
DANGERS BENEATH THE SURFACE:
DEMOCRATIC WEAKNESSES
As noted, the victory of the Slovenian Democratic Party in
the 2004 parliamentary election marked a visible shift in
political leadership style; after 2004, neither the trade unions
nor employer organizations found governments as cooperative
as was formerly the case (Fink-Hafner et al. 1996;
2012). The fall of tripartism as such, however, was also a
function of the declining influence that the social partners,
the trade unions in particular, could bring to the table.
No reliable figures exist for trade-union membership.
Stanojević (2003) reports a density of 69 percent in 1989,
but survey results indicate that union membership has
declined continuously since the transition. At the turn of
the millennium, membership had dropped to less than 30
percent, and by 2013 little more than 13 percent of the
respondents reported being trade-union members (Toš et al.
2013). In a parallel process, the Chamber of Commerce
(Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije) and the Chamber of
Craft and Small Business (Obrtno-podjetniška zbornica
Slovenije) have seen a radical decline in membership,
shrinking from universal coverage to about 50 percent of
the employers in 2010 (Guardiancich 2012b; Stanojević
and Klarič 2013).
Even if trade unions were more trusted than political
parties, the corporatist channel for responsiveness narrowed
as trade unions and business interests experienced increasing
difficulty in claiming to represent employers and
employees. Thus, the ability to funnel interest into the
political system was weakened.
The political parties mushroomed. As in other CEE
countries, the first parties sprang not only from the
reformed Communist Party into various social democratic-leaning
parties but also from myriad civil society
organizations. Some had their roots in the alternative
youth culture prior to independence and regime change,
and they turned political under the “protection” of the
official socialist youth organization (ZSMS) (Mastnak
1990). Others sought to represent traditional cleavages. A
second phase, which was slow in building, is gradual ideological
crystallization. The Slovenian Democratic Party
came to represent conservatism, for example, although it
claimed to be a social-democratic party in the 1990s (Zver
2004). The Communist Party, which transformed into the
Social Democratic party (SD—Socialni demokrati), developed
a more distinct social-democratic profile as compared
to the former young communists in the Liberal Democracy
of Slovenia. The polarization that took place after the 2004
election is related to this development, as the parties
increasingly sought distinct ideological profiles. The third
phase grew out of increased voter dissatisfaction resulting
from economic problems and the view that the political
elite was corrupt. In response, new personalist parties
emerged, in the form of the List of Zoran Janković—
Positive Slovenia (PS) and the Civic List of Gregor
Virant (DL), overcoming the mistrust in the established
parties and the weak connection between established parties
and society (Tomšič and Prijon 2015). The former party
was built on the charisma of the mayor of Ljubljana, who
had previously managed the largest grocery chain in
Slovenia, while Gregor Virant gained his popularity
through public service reforms as the minister of public
administration in the 2004 SDS-led government.
It is relatively undemanding to establish new political
parties and compete in elections. Doing so requires 200
signatures, and because the proportional system applies a
threshold of 4 percent, new parties have sought representation
in every election. Until the 2011 election, however,
none of the new parliamentary parties received more than a
10 percent vote share (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2013).
There are many political parties in Slovenia—no less
than 17 different lists competed in the 2014 election—but it
is also important to note that the people do actually join
them. According to data from Slovenian Public Opinion
Polls (Toš et al. 1999; 2004; 2009; 2012; 2013) and the
base estimation of the membership figures as reported by
the parties themselves, the ratio of party members to eligible
voters has been between 3.5 and 6 percent over the
years (Krašovec 2015). There is no evidence of a clear
decline in the membership numbers.
The Slovenian numbers are, thus, roughly similar to the
Danish numbers, where 6.5 percent of the eligible voters
were party members toward the end of the 1980s, but
dwarfed by the Swedes, 21.2 percent of whom were members.
On the other hand, the Slovenian numbers are double
those of the Netherlands, where only 2.8 percent were
6 KRASOVEC AND JOHANNSEN
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political party members (Katz et al. 1992). The ratio has
continued to decline for most European countries. Thus, by
2009, Slovenia was reported to be slightly above the 4.7
percent European average and a champion among the CEE
countries (van Biezen et al. 2012).
Hence, from the outset, there is little evidence to support
the conclusion that the political parties did not function as a
responsive channel. As Krašovec and Haughton (2011)
discuss, however, Slovenian parties are highly interwoven
with the state and benefit from the resources and influence
it can provide. Furthermore, the ease with which political
parties can be established prioritizes capital over membership.
Why bother to establish and maintain a party organization
when it is easy to collect the required signatures and
run a blitz campaign in the media?
Thus, the elites governing the parties have found it less
attractive to develop the party organization and its ties to
society (Krašovec 2000) because of the easy access to state
resources. Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel (2014) found that
these characteristics lower the capacity of political parties to
be both responsive and responsible. Moreover, if this balance
fails, a window of opportunity for populist or anti-establishment
parties is opened. Should this be the case, then we should
not only expect an increasingly volatile and unstable party
system, but also the appearance of populist parties epitomized
by their short-term responsiveness to the electorate.
With respect to volatility, Powell and Tucker (2014)
distinguished between “normal” volatility, where voters
shift between established parties, and the volatility owing
to the entry and exit of new parties. However, disentangling
the two requires strong assumptions about established parties,
particularly in the post-communist context. This is
why Table 2 instead lists the total volatility in accordance
with the 1983 Pedersen index and the calculation of the
share of “new parties” used by Pedersen and Johannsen
(2011). In both cases, seats are used instead of the percentages
of votes won in the elections to tally parliamentary
instability more closely.
Table 2 demonstrates that, until and including the 2004
election, the party system appeared to be consolidating. The
waning turnout paralleled similar processes in other
European countries but remained high, particularly in comparison
to CEE countries such as Poland and Lithuania.
Slovenia was best described as a moderately fragmented,
multiparty system that was gradually consolidating. In the
first decade, the effective number of political parties was
higher than in Bulgaria (Pedersen and Johannsen 2011) and
lower than in Poland, but it was comparable to the numbers
for the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia. In addition, the
number of MPs who left their respective groups to become
independent or join another party was comparable to the
incidence in other emerging CEE democracies (Zajc 1997).
When Tavits (2005) and Powell and Tucker (2014) found
that the mean volatility declined in successive elections
only to increase toward the end of the first two decades,
Slovenia fit the bill. It is also evident, as reported in
Table 2, that the 2004 election marked a low point in
terms of volatility but—as the previous discussion has
demonstrated—also a critical juncture. Thus, volatility
again increased in 2008 and the share of new parties grew
dramatically, surpassing 50 percent in the 2014 election.
Slovenia appears to be a poor fit for the explanation
offered by Powell and Tucker (2014). When they find the
best predictor for “unhealthy” volatility to be economic
performance relative to the start of the transition, it should
be noted that the Slovenian economy first began to contract
in 2009. However, the assertion that the 2008 financial
crisis contributed to the volatility and instability is not
incompatible with the warning issued by Bardi, Bartolini,
and Trechsel (2014).The calculations, however, underestimate
real instability, as the newcomers (the List of Zoran
Janković—Positive Slovenia and the Civic List of Gregor
Virant in 2011, and the Party of Miro Cerar and the
Alliance of Alenka Bratušek in 2014) more resemble movements
formed around a personality than structured political
parties in the traditional sense. Moreover, if Kriesi’s (2014)
TABLE 2
Turnout, Effective Number of Parties, Volatility, and the Share of New Parties in Parliament, 1990–2014
1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 2014
Turnout 83.3 85.9 73.7 70.4 60.7 63.1 65.6 51.7
Effective number of parties: N(s) 8.2 6.6 5.5 4.9 4.9 4.4 4.7 4.1
Volatility (V) in % 25.7 32.3 25.5 20.0 34.4 40.0 56.7
Share of seats for “new parties,” % 13.3 5.6 13.3 0.0 10.0 44.4 51.1
Note: Authors’ calculation for the effective number of parties, volatility, and share of new parties. Seats for minorities (2 seats) are included in the
calculations and treated as a party. The specific effect of this procedure increases N(s) with a constant and underestimate volatility and the share of seats for
new parties. The effective number of parties: N sð Þ¼ 1P
p2
1ð Þ
where p is the share of seats in the parliament. Volatility (Pedersen Index): v ¼
Pn
i¼1
PitÀPi tþ1ð Þj j
2
where n is the number of parties and p represents the share of seats received by that party in time periods t and t+1.
Sources: Turnout: IDEA for 1992–2014; and Official Gazette 17/1990 for 1990.
DEVELOPMENTS IN DEMOCRACY IN SLOVENIA 7
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definition of populism is applied, several of these newcomers
to the political scene share core features of populist
parties—parties that are characterized by short-term
responsiveness and escape from responsibility. Aside from
the dominance of charismatic leaders, the parties lack
detailed or concrete programs and advance an anti-elitist
critique, alluding to how the leaders of the established
parties are prone to corruption.
It is not that Slovenes do not join political parties; part
of the explanation is probably that the parties themselves
invest more in public campaigns through various media
outlets rather than investing in organization-building
(Krašovec and Haughton 2011; Fink-Hafner 2012; FinkHafner
and Krašovec 2013)—an organization that would be
difficult to mobilize, control, and dominate by the “party
owners.”
CONCLUSION
The Slovenian transition to democracy, market economy,
and integration into the EU was largely a managed affair in
which corporatist institutions and a consensual policy style
provided stability and relatively smaller welfare losses than
other CEE countries experienced. This offers evidence of
the responsible dimension of democracy. Long-term goals
were set and met. The tranquillity could not last, however,
as corporatist institutions declined in importance and trade
unions lost members—becoming less responsive in the
process—and the economic solutions proffered had come
to produce a clientelistic network, bordering on systemic
corruption, among the managers of the former socialist
companies and the political elite. Where corporatism was
initially a stepping-stone, it had now become a stumblingblock
(Adam and Tomšič 2012). With the 2004 election as
a catalyst, Slovenian politics became increasingly polarized.
Rather than seeking broad political solutions, each
camp sought narrow majorities to defeat the other, and
when unsuccessful, used popular mobilization to block
policy reform through referendum. Short-term political
gains were favored over long-term political solutions.
With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that it took the
removal of two prominent political leaders on corruption
charges to foster a consensus that clawed Slovenia back
from the abyss of bankruptcy and bailout.
The last decade has witnessed increasing political turmoil
and instability, not only with frequent indictments of
political leaders on charges of abuse and corruption, but
also with new parties emerging while others collapse. It is
not that Slovenes do not join political parties, but that the
parties themselves are investing less in developing their
organizations and prefer to appeal to the electorate through
the media. The result is a dissatisfied electorate that is
easier to swing based on the current mood. If such
developments continue, Slovenia will face the appearance
of full-blown populist parties. While this means responsiveness
in the short-term, organizational underdevelopment
implies that long-term policymaking is going to be more
difficult.
It is difficult to advance suggestions for iteration or
even, perhaps, resetting. Reform of the electoral system
has been suggested—namely, a majoritarian system with
single-seat constituencies that would strengthen direct relationships
between the elected and the electorate. Improved
direct accountability is a likely consequence, but given the
discussion and lifetime work of Lijphart (1999), it is also
likely to come at the expense of compromise and consensus.
Contrary to public belief, there is no silver bullet.
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