The Global Risks
Report 2025
20th Edition
I N S I G H T R E P O R T
Acknowledgement
The Global Risks Report is produced exclusively by
the World Economic Forum. We are grateful to our
longstanding partners on previous editions, Marsh
McLennan and Zurich Insurance Group. Their
generous inputs and in-depth guidance have been
invaluable over the last 20 years.
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The Global Risks Report 2025January 2025
Global Risks Report 2025 2
Contents
Preface
Overview of methodology
Key findings
Chapter 1: Global Risks 2025: A world of growing divisions
1.1 The world in 2025
1.2 The path to 2027
1.3 “Geopolitical recession”
1.4 Supercharged economic tensions
1.5 Technology and polarization
Endnotes
Chapter 2: Global Risks 2035: The point of no return
2.1 The world in 2035
2.2 Structural forces
2.3 Pollution at a crossroads
2.4 Losing control of biotech?
2.5 Super-ageing societies
2.6 Looking back: 20 years of the Global Risks Report
Endnotes
Appendix A: Definitions and Global Risks List
Appendix B: Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025
Appendix C: Executive Opinion Survey: National Risk Perceptions
Appendix D: Risk governance
Partner Institutes
Acknowledgements
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102
Global Risks Report 2025 3
Preface
The multi-decade structural forces highlighted in
last year’s Global Risks Report – technological
acceleration, geostrategic shifts, climate change
and demographic bifurcation – and the interactions
they have with each other have continued their
march onwards. The ensuing risks are becoming
more complex and urgent, and accentuating a
paradigm shift in the world order characterized by
greater instability, polarizing narratives, eroding trust
and insecurity. Moreover, this is occurring against a
background where today’s governance frameworks
seem ill-equipped for addressing both known and
emergent global risks or countering the fragility that
those risks generate.
This is the 20th edition of the Global Risks
Report. Looking back over the last two decades,
environmental risks have steadily consolidated their
position as the greatest source of long-term concern.
This year’s Global Risks Perception Survey shows
that a sense of alarm is also mounting in the shorter
term: Environmental problems, from extreme weather
to pollution, are here now and the need to implement
solutions is urgent.
Concerns about state-based armed conflict and
geoeconomic confrontation have on average
remained relatively high in the ranks over the last 20
years, with some variability. Today, geopolitical risk
– and specifically the perception that conflicts could
worsen or spread – tops the list of immediate-term
concerns. Fear and uncertainty cloud the outlook in
various parts of the world, including in Ukraine, the
Middle East, and Sudan, with multilateral institutions
struggling to provide effective mediation and work
towards resolutions.
Societal risks such as inequality rank high among
today’s leading concerns as well as over the
last years. Polarization within societies is further
hardening views and affecting policy-making. It also
continues to fan the flames of misinformation and
disinformation, which, for the second year running,
is the top-ranked short- to medium-term concern
across all risk categories. Efforts to combat this risk
are coming up against a formidable opponent in
Generative AI-created false or misleading content
that can be produced and distributed at scale.
More broadly, technological risks, while not seen as
immediate, rise in the rankings for the 10-year time
horizon, given the rapid pace of change in areas
such as AI and biotech.
Saadia Zahidi
Managing Director
Economic risks have fallen in the rankings since
last year, with inflation and the risk of an economic
downturn no longer top of mind among decisionmakers
and experts. But there is no room for
complacency: if the coming months see a spiral of
tariffs and other trade-restricting measures globally,
the economic consequences could be significant.
Elevated valuations in several asset classes make
them more vulnerable to these and other risks.
In this report we dive deep into key global risk
themes – conflict, trade wars, and technology
and polarization as leading short- to medium-term
concerns, as well as pollution, biotech and superageing
as areas where serious risks could unfold
over a longer-term time horizon. We also provide
a retrospective view of the last two decades of
assessing global risks. Twenty years ago, when
we were preparing our first Global Risks Report,
the world was in a different place. Risks that have
been well managed and mitigated since then were
those where the concerted and collective efforts of
multistakeholder leaders helped to build common
ground, compromises and mutually acceptable
solutions. It will be up to visionary leaders to involve
all key stakeholders to address the risks now
foreseen for the next decade and to build durable
peace and prosperity.
The report highlights the latest findings from our
annual Global Risks Perception Survey, which this
year brought together the collective intelligence of
over 900 global leaders across academia, business,
government, international organizations and civil
society. It also leverages insights from some 100
thematic experts, including the risk specialists who
form the Global Risks Report Advisory Board, the
Global Future Council on Complex Risks, and the
Chief Risk Officers Community. We would also
like to express our gratitude to the core team that
developed this report – Mark Elsner and Grace
Atkinson – and to Ricky Li, Ignacio Moreno and
Gayle Markovitz for their support.
The world has changed profoundly over the last 20
years and will continue to do so in unpredictable
ways. But foresight based on informed, expert views
remains critical for better planning and preparation,
in both the short and long term. The 20th Global
Risks Report continues to shine a light on globally
relevant risks that are often complex and sometimes
alarming. Yet, in examining the trajectory of the risks
foreseen over the last two decades, it is clear that
there is no viable alternative to multilateral solutions
going forward. Leaders across the public and private
sectors, civil society, international organizations and
academia must seize the baton to work openly and
constructively with each other. By deepening honest
dialogue and acting urgently to mitigate the risks that
lie ahead, we can rebuild trust and together create
stronger, more resilient economies and societies.
Global Risks Report 2025 4
Overview of
methodology
The Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS)
has underpinned the Global Risks Report for two
decades and is the World Economic Forum’s
premier source of original global risks data. This
year’s GRPS has brought together leading insights
on the evolving global risks landscape from over 900
experts across academia, business, government,
international organizations and civil society.
Responses for the GRPS 2024-2025 were collected
between 2 September and 18 October 2024.
“Global risk” is defined as the possibility of the
occurrence of an event or condition that, if it occurs,
would negatively impact a significant proportion
of global GDP, population or natural resources.
Relevant definitions for each of the 33 global risks
are included in Appendix A: Definitions and
Global Risks List.
The GRPS 2024-2025 included the following
components:
	– Risk landscape invited respondents to assess
the likely impact (severity) of global risks over
one-, two- and 10-year horizons to illustrate the
potential development of individual global risks
over time and identify areas of key concern.
	– Consequences asked respondents to consider
the range of potential impacts of a global risk
arising, to highlight relationships between risks
and the potential for compounding crises.
	– Risk governance invited respondents to reflect
on which approaches have the most potential
for driving action on global risk reduction and
preparedness.
	– Outlook asked respondents to predict the
evolution of key aspects underpinning the global
risks landscape.
Appendix B: Global Risks Perception
Survey 2024-2025 provides more detail on the
methodology.
To complement GRPS data on global risks, the
report also draws on the World Economic Forum’s
Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) to identify
risks that pose the most severe threat to each
country over the next two years, as identified by
over 11,000 business leaders in 121 economies.
When considered in context with the GRPS, this
data provides insight into local concerns and
priorities and points to potential “hot spots” and
regional manifestations of global risks. Appendix
C: Executive Opinion Survey: National Risk
Perceptions provides more detail.
Finally, the report integrates the views of leading
experts to generate foresight and to support
analysis of the survey data. Contributions were
collected from 59 colleagues across the World
Economic Forum’s platforms. The report also
harnesses qualitative insights from 96 experts
from across academia, business, government,
international organizations and civil society
through community meetings, private interviews
and thematic workshops conducted from April
to November 2024. Experts included members
of the Global Risks Report Advisory Board, the
Global Future Council on Complex Risks and
the Chief Risk Officers Community. Refer to
Acknowledgements for more detail.
Global Risks Report 2025 5
Key findings
The Global Risks Report 2025 presents the findings
of the Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-
2025 (GRPS), which captures insights from over
900 experts worldwide. The report analyses global
risks through three timeframes to support decisionmakers
in balancing current crises and longer-term
priorities. Chapter 1 explores current or immediateterm
(in 2025) and short- to medium-term1
(to 2027)
risks, and Chapter 2 focuses on the risks emerging
in the long term (to 2035). The report considers
not only the survey findings and the range of
implications, but also provides six in-depth analyses
of selected risk themes.
Below are the key findings of the report, in which
we compare the risk outlooks across the three time
horizons.
Declining optimism
As we enter 2025, the global outlook is increasingly
fractured across geopolitical, environmental,
societal, economic and technological domains.
Over the last year we have witnessed the expansion
and escalation of conflicts, a multitude of extreme
weather events amplified by climate change,
widespread societal and political polarization, and
continued technological advancements accelerating
the spread of false or misleading information.
Optimism is limited as the danger of miscalculation
or misjudgment by political and military actors
is high. We seem to be living in one of the most
divided times since the Cold War, and this is
reflected in the results of the GRPS, which reveal
a bleak outlook across all three time horizons –
current, short-term and long-term.
A majority of respondents (52%) anticipate an
unsettled global outlook over the short term (next
two years), a similar proportion to last year (Figure A).
Another 31% expect turbulence and 5% a stormy
outlook. Adding together these three categories
of responses shows a combined four percentage
point increase from last year, indicating a heightened
pessimistic outlook for the world to 2027.
Compared to this two-year outlook, the landscape
deteriorates over the 10-year timeframe, with 62%
of respondents expecting stormy or turbulent
times. This long-term outlook has remained similar
to the survey results last year, in terms of its level
of negativity, reflecting respondent skepticism
that current societal mechanisms and governing
institutions are capable of navigating and mending
the fragility generated by the risks we face today.
Deepening geopolitical and
geoeconomic tensions
Comparing this year’s findings for the world in
2025 with the two-year risk outlook provided
by the GRPS two years ago shows how far
Short- and long-term global outlookF I G U R E A
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2024-2025
Short term (2 years)
1%
Long term (10 years)
Stormy: Global catastrophic risks looming
Turbulent: Upheavals and elevated risk of global catastrophes
Unsettled: Some instability, moderate risk of global catastrophes
Stable: Isolated disruptions, low risk of global catastrophes
Calm: Negligible risk of global catastrophes
"Which of the following best characterizes your outlook for the world over the following time periods?"
Note
The percentages in the graph may not add up to 100% because values have been rounded
up/down.
11%52%31%5%
17% 45% 30% 8%
Global Risks Report 2025 6
Share of respondents (%)
State-based armed conflict
Extreme weather events
Geoeconomic confrontation
Misinformation and disinformation
Societal polarization
Economic downturn
Critical change to Earth systems
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms
Inequality
Involuntary migration or displacement
Natural resources shortages
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Cyber espionage and warfare
Crime and illicit economic activity
Disruptions to a systemically important
supply chain
Concentration of strategic resources
and technologies
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Asset bubble burst
Decline in health and well-being
Biological, chemical or nuclear weapons
or hazards
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Debt
Infectious diseases
Intrastate violence
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Inflation
Pollution
Online harms
Censorship and surveillance
Non-weather-related natural disasters
Talent and/or labour shortages
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
Current Global Risk LandscapeF I G U R E B
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
“Please select one risk that you believe is most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2025.”
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
perceptions have darkened when it comes to
conflict. State-based armed conflict, now ranked
as the #1 current risk by 23% of respondents
(Figure B), was overlooked as a leading two-year
risk two years ago.
In a world that has seen an increasing number
of armed conflicts over the last decade,2
national
security considerations are starting to dominate
government agendas. Section 1.3: "Geopolitical
recession" dives deep into the dangers of
Global Risks Report 2025 7
unilateralism taking hold in national security
considerations and highlights the worsening
humanitarian impacts of the ongoing conflicts.
The risk of further destabilizing consequences
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as
in the Middle East and in Sudan are likely to be
amplifying respondents’ concerns beyond 2025 as
well. In the two-year outlook, State-based armed
conflict has moved up from #5 to #3 since our
GRPS 2023-24 (Figure C).
Section 1.4: Supercharged economic tensions
explores how global geoeconomic tensions
could unfold. The rise in the two-year ranking of
Geoeconomic confrontation, from #14 last year to
#9 today reflects unease about the path ahead for
global economic relations. The role of technology
in geopolitical tensions also concerns respondents,
with Cyber espionage and warfare ranked #5 in
the two-year outlook.
However, the top risk in 2027 is Misinformation
and disinformation, for the second year in a
row (Figure C). There are many ways in which
a proliferation of false or misleading content is
complicating the geopolitical environment. It is a
leading mechanism for foreign entities to affect
voter intentions; it can sow doubt among the
general public worldwide about what is happening
in conflict zones; or it can be used to tarnish the
image of products or services from another country.
A growing sense of societal
fragmentation
Societal fractures are central to the overall risks
landscape, as shown in the risk interconnections
map (Figure D). Inequality (wealth, income) is
perceived as the most central risk of all, playing
a significant role in both triggering and being
influenced by other risks. It is contributing to
weakening trust and diminishing our collective
sense of shared values.
As well as Inequality, other societal risks also
feature in the top 10 of the two-year ranking:
Societal polarization, Involuntary migration or
displacement and Erosion of human rights and/
or civic freedoms. The importance ascribed to this
set of societal risks by respondents suggests that
social stability will be fragile over the next two years.
Respondent concern around certain key economic
risks – Economic downturn and Inflation – has
subsided since last year, with these two risks
witnessing the largest falls in the two-year ranking
(Figure 1.5). Nonetheless, the impacts of the costof-living
crisis since 2022 contributed to Inequality
becoming the top interconnected risk this year:
Economic downturn, Inflation, and Debt were
selected among the top causes of Inequality by
GRPS respondents.
Although there are fewer societal risks in the top
10 of the 10-year risk ranking than in the top 10
of the two-year risk ranking (two compared to
four, see Figure C), the profound societal fractures
that feature prominently in this report should not
be perceived as solely short-term risks. Looking
ahead to the next decade, Inequality and Societal
polarization continue to feature among the top 10
risks. This is an important pair of risks to watch,
given how related they can be to bouts of social
instability, and in turn to domestic political and to
geostrategic volatility. In super-ageing societies
– such as Japan, South Korea, Italy or Germany –
unfavourable demographic trends could accentuate
these risks over the next 10 years. Pensions
crises and labour shortages in the long-term care
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Global risks ranked by severity over the short and long termF I G U R E C
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Please estimate the likely impact (severity) of the following risks over a 2-year and 10-year period."
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
2 years 10 years
Extreme weather events
Critical change to Earth systems
Natural resource shortages
Misinformation and disinformation
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Inequality
Cyber espionage and warfare
Societal polarization
Pollution
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
Misinformation and disinformation
Extreme weather events
Societal polarization
Cyber espionage and warfare
State-based armed conflict
Inequality
Involuntary migration or displacement
Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms
Geoeconomic confrontation
Pollution
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 8
sector are likely to become acute and widespread
problems in super-ageing societies, with no easy
fix for governments. Section 2.5: Super-ageing
societies explores this risk theme.
Environmental risks - from longterm
concern to urgent reality
The impacts of environmental risks have worsened
in intensity and frequency since the Global Risks
Report was launched in 2006, as discussed in
depth in Section 2.6: Looking back: 20 years of
the Global Risks Report. Moreover, the outlook
for environmental risks over the next decade
is alarming – while all 33 risks in the GRPS are
expected to worsen in severity (Figure E) from the
two-year to the 10-year time horizon, environmental
risks present the most significant deterioration.
Extreme weather events are anticipated to
become even more of a concern than they already
are, with this risk being top ranked in the 10-year
risk list for the second year running. Biodiversity
loss and ecosystem collapse ranks #2 over the
10-year horizon, with a significant deterioration
compared to its two-year ranking.
The GRPS shows generational divergence when it
comes to risk perceptions related to environmental
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble burst
Biodiversity loss
and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Concentration of
strategic resources
and technologies
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Critical change
to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Disruptions to
critical infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Extreme weather
events
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource
shortages
Non-weather-related
natural disasters
Online harmsPollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or
labour shortages
Concentration of
strategic resources
and technologies
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble burst
Biodiversity loss
and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Critical change
to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Disruptions to
critical infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Extreme weather
events
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource
shortages
Non-weather-related
natural disasters
Online harmsPollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or
labour shortages
Global risks landscape: An interconnections map³F I G U R E D
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025
Edges
Relative influence
High
Low
Medium
Risk influence
Nodes
High
Low
Medium
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 9
issues, with younger survey respondents being
more concerned about this over the next 10 years
than older age groups. Take Pollution, for example,
which the under 30s rank as the #3 most severe
risk in 2035, the highest of any age group surveyed.
As noted in last year’s Global Risks Report, there
is also divergence in how Pollution is ranked by
stakeholder, with the public sector placing Pollution
as a top 10 risk in the 10-year ranking, but not the
private sector (Figure 2.4). Section 2.3: Pollution
at a crossroads aims to fill awareness gaps by
exploring under-appreciated pollutant risks that
need to become more prominent in policy agendas
by 2035 – and ideally much sooner given their
significant impacts on health and ecosystems.
Technological risks - still “under
the radar”
In a year that has seen considerable experimentation
by companies and individuals in making the best use
of AI tools, concerns about Adverse outcomes of
AI technologies are low in the risk ranking on a twoyear
outlook. However, complacency around the risks
of such technologies should be avoided given the
fast-paced nature of change in the field of AI and its
increasing ubiquity. Indeed, Adverse outcomes of AI
technologies is one of the risks that climbs the most
in the 10-year risk ranking compared to the two-year
risk ranking (Figure G). In this report we highlight the
role of Generative AI (GenAI) in producing false or
misleading content at scale, and how that relates to
societal polarization. Section 1.5: Technology and
polarization explores this and the broader risks from
greater connectivity, rapid growth in computing power
and more powerful AI tools.
Among the areas experiencing the most rapid
technological advances is the Biotech sector.
Section 2.4: Losing control of biotech? takes
an in-depth look at emerging risks in biotech,
supercharged by AI. Over a 10-year time horizon,
low-probability, high-impact risks exist, including
Intrastate violence from biological terrorism and
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
involving accidental or malicious misuse of gene
editing technologies, or even of brain-computer
interfaces. At the same time, such risks do not
Short-term severity (2 years)
Long-termseverity(10years)
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
2.5
1
1
7
7
3 3.5 4 4.5 5.55
Visible area
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Deteriorating risks
Relative severity of global risks over a 2- and 10-year periodF I G U R E E
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2024-2025.
Note
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale [1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity].
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble bursts
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Concentration of strategic resources
Crime and illicit economic activity
Critical change to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain
Disruptions to critical
infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Extreme weather events
Geoeconomic confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource shortages
Non-weather related natural disasters
Online harms
Pollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or labour shortages
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble bursts
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Concentration of strategic resources
Crime and illicit economic activity
Critical change to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain
Disruptions to critical
infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Extreme weather events
Geoeconomic confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource shortages
Non-weather related natural disasters
Online harms
Pollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or labour shortages
Global Risks Report 2025 10
diminish the tremendous actual and potential
progress for humankind stemming from biotech.
The time to act is now - is
consensus possible in a
fragmenting world?
Deepening divisions and increasing fragmentation
are reshaping international relations and calling into
question whether existing structures are equipped
to tackle the challenges collectively confronting
us. Levels of global cooperation across many
areas of geopolitics and humanitarian issues,
economic relations, and environmental, societal and
technological challenges may reach new lows in the
coming years. Key countries appear to be turning
inward, focusing on mounting domestic economic
or societal concerns, just when they should be
seeking to strengthen multilateral ties to confront
shared challenges.
When asked about the characteristics of the global
political outlook over the next decade, 64% of GRPS
respondents believe that we will face a Multipolar
or fragmented order, in which middle and great
powers contest, set and enforce regional rules and
norms (Figure F). Perceptions in response to this
question have changed little compared to last year.
The Western-led global order is expected to continue
its decline over the next decade but will nonetheless
remain an importance locus of power. Alternative
power centres are likely to strengthen, not just led by
China, but also by key emerging powers, including
India and the Gulf states.
The decade ahead will be pivotal as leaders will be
confronted with increasingly complex global risks.
But to prevent a downward spiral in which citizens
worldwide will be worse off than before, ultimately
there is no option other than to find avenues for
dialogue and collaboration.4
Global political outlookF I G U R E F
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025
19%
Bipolar or bifurcated order shaped by strategic
competition between two superpowers
8%
Continuation or reinvigoration of the US-led,
rules-based international order
64%
Multipolar or fragmented order in which middle and great
powers contest, set, and enforce regional rules and norms
9%
Realignment towards a new international order
led by an alternative superpower
“Which of the following best characterizes the global political environment for cooperation on global risks in 10 years?”
Global Risks Report 2025 11
Global risks ranked by severity over the short and long termF I G U R E G
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025
"Please estimate the likely impact (severity) of the following risks over a 2-year and 10-year period."
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
1st
Misinformation and disinformation
Online harms
2nd
Extreme weather events
3rd
Societal polarization4th
Cyber espionage and warfare5th
State-based armed conflict
6th
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
7th
Inflation
8th
Involuntary migration or displacement
Inequality
9th
Economic downturn
10th
Pollution
11th
Critical change to Earth systems
12th
13th
Natural resource shortages
14th
Geoeconomic confrontation
15th
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
16th
Debt
17th
Intrastate violence
18th
Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections
19th
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain
20th
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse21st
Censorship and surveillance
22nd
Talent and/or labour shortages
23rd
Infectious diseases
24th
Concentration of strategic resources
25th
Disruptions to critical infrastructure26th
Asset bubble bursts
27th
Decline in health and well-being
28th
Crime and illicit economic activity
29th
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
30th
31st
Biological, chemical or nuclear hazards
32nd
33rd
Non-weather related natural disasters
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
Short term (2 years)
State-based armed conflict
Inequality
Decline in health and well-being
Crime and illicit economic activity
1st
Extreme weather events
2nd
Critical change to Earth systems3rd
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
4th
Natural resource shortages
5th
Misinformation and disinformation
6th
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
7th
Involuntary migration or displacement
8th
Cyber espionage and warfare9th
Societal polarization
10th
Pollution
11th
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
12th
Online harms
13th
Concentration of strategic resources
14th
Censorship and surveillance
15th
16th
Geoeconomic confrontation
17th
Debt
18th
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
19th
Infectious diseases
20th
21st
Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections
22nd
Intrastate violence
23rd
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
24th
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
25th
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain26th
Biological, chemical or nuclear hazards
27th
28th
Economic downturn
29th
Talent and/or labour shortages
30th
Asset bubble bursts
31st
32nd
Inflation
33rd
Non-weather related natural disasters
Long term (10 years)
Global Risks Report 2025 12
Global Risks 2025:
A world of growing
divisions
1
The current geopolitical climate, following Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and with wars raging in
the Middle East and in Sudan, makes it nearly
impossible not to think about such events when
assessing the one global risk expected to present
a material crisis in 2025: close to one-quarter
of survey respondents (23%) selected Statebased
armed conflict (proxy wars, civil wars,
coups, terrorism, etc.) as the top risk for 2025
(Figure 1.1). Compared with last year, this risk has
climbed from #8 to #1 in the rankings. Geopolitical
tensions are also associated with the rising risk of
Geoeconomic confrontation (sanctions, tariffs,
investment screening), ranking #3, which is also
driven by Inequality, Societal polarization and
other factors.
The risks associated with Extreme weather events
also is a key concern for the year ahead, with 14%
of respondents selecting it. The burden of climate
change is becoming more evident every year, as
pollution from continued use of fossil fuels such as
coal, oil and gas leads to more frequent and severe
extreme weather events. Heatwaves across parts
of Asia; flooding in Brazil, Indonesia and parts of
Europe; wildfires in Canada; and hurricanes Helene
and Milton in the United States are just some recent
examples of such events.
Similar to last year, Misinformation and
disinformation and Societal polarization
remain key current risks, in positions #4 and #5
respectively. The high rankings of these two risks is
not surprising considering the accelerating spread
of false or misleading information, which amplifies
the other leading risks we face, from State-based
armed conflict to Extreme weather events.
A sense of increasingly fragmented societies is
reflected by four of the top 10 risks expected to
present a material crisis in 2025 being societal in
nature: Societal polarization (6% of respondents),
The world in 20251.1
Current Risk LandscapeF I G U R E 1 . 1
"Please select one risk that you believe is most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2025 (top 10 risks selected risks
by respondents)."
State-based armed conflict
Extreme weather events
Geoeconomic confrontation
Misinformation and disinformation
Societal polarization
Economic downturn
Critical change to Earth systems
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms
Inequality
Share of respondents (%)
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 13
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
(3%), Erosion of human rights and/or civic
freedoms (2%) and Inequality (2%).
On the economic front, Inflation is perceived as
less of a concern this year than in 2024. However,
perceptions of the overall economic outlook for
2025 remain fairly pessimistic across all age groups
surveyed. The risk of an Economic downturn
(recession, stagnation) continues to be a common
concern among respondents, coming in at #6 (5%
of respondents), the same position as last year.
The perceived vulnerabilities associated with the
Economic downturn risk are higher for younger
age groups: it is ranked #3 for under 30s, #4 for the
30-39-year age group and #5 for the 40-49-year
age group (Figure 1.2), but does not even feature in
the top 10 for those aged 60 years or older.
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
Current global risks, by age groupF I G U R E 1 . 2
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025
Extreme weather
events
State-based armed
conflict
Economic downturn
Misinformation and
disinformation
Societal polarization
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Adverse outcomes of
AI technologies
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Lack of economic
opportunity
Natural resources
shortages
Asset bubble burst
Decline in health and
well-being
Extreme weather
events
State-based armed
conflict
Extreme weather
events
State-based armed
conflict
Extreme weather
events
State-based armed
conflict
Extreme weather
events
State-based armed
conflict
Extreme weather
events
State-based armed
conflict
Economic downturn
Misinformation and
disinformation
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Critical change to
Earth systems
Disruptions to a
supply chain
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic
opportunity
Concentration of
strategic resources
Inflation
Misinformation and
disinformation
Economic downturn
Economic downturn
Societal polarization
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Concentration of
strategic resources
Critical change to
Earth systems
Critical change to
Earth systems
Critical change to
Earth systems
Critical change to
Earth systems
Lack of economic
opportunity
Adverse outcomes of
AI technologies
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Misinformation and
disinformation
Societal polarization
Debt
Inequality
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Disruptions to critical
infrastructure
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Disruptions to critical
infrastructure
Concentration of
strategic resources
Inequality
Misinformation and
disinformation
Societal polarization
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Biological, chemical
or nuclear hazards
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Biological, chemical
or nuclear hazards
Economic downturn
Misinformation and
disinformation
Societal polarization
Adverse outcomes of
AI technologies
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Asset bubble burst
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
Note
Sample size by age group varied, and all respondents were weighted equally for the purposes of global
rankings. The results are based on the following: <30 years, n=122 (14% of total); 30-39, n=154 (17%);
40-49, n=250 (28%); 50-59, n=222 (25%); 60-69, n=104 (12%); and 70+, n=42 (5%).
Global Risks Report 2025 14
The global outlook for 2027 is one of increased
cynicism among survey respondents, with a high
proportion of respondents to the GRPS 2024-25
anticipating turbulence (31%), a four percentagepoint
increase since last year’s edition (Figure 1.3).
There is also a two percentage-point year-on-year
increase to 5% in the number of respondents
who are anticipating a stormy outlook – the most
alarming of the five categories respondents were
asked to select from – over the next two years.
The top risk for 2027 according to survey
respondents is Misinformation and disinformation
– for the second year in a row, since it was introduced
into the GRPS risk list in 2022-23. Respondent
concern has remained high following a year of “super
elections”, with this risk also a top concern across a
majority of age categories and stakeholder groups
(Figures 1.6 and 1.7). Moreover, it is becoming more
difficult to differentiate between AI- and humangenerated
Misinformation and disinformation. AI
tools are enabling a proliferation in such information
The path to 20271.2
Short- and long-term global outlookF I G U R E 1 . 3
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2024-2025
Short term (2 years)
1%
Long term (10 years)
Stormy: Global catastrophic risks looming
Turbulent: Upheavals and elevated risk of global catastrophes
Unsettled: Some instability, moderate risk of global catastrophes
Stable: Isolated disruptions, low risk of global catastrophes
Calm: Negligible risk of global catastrophes
"Which of the following best characterizes your outlook for the world over the following time periods?"
Note
The percentages in the graph may not add up to 100% because values have been rounded
up/down.
11%52%31%5%
17% 45% 30% 8%
Global risks ranked by severity over the short term (2 years)F I G U R E 1 . 4
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025
"Please estimate the likely impact (severity) of the following risks over a 2-year period."
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
Inequality
Involuntary migration or displacement
Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms
Geoeconomic confrontation
Pollution1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Misinformation and disinformation
Extreme weather events
Societal polarization
Cyber espionage and warfare
State-based armed conflict
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 15
in the form of video, images, voice or text. Leading
creators of false or misleading content include state
actors in some countries.5
In a year that has seen the mass rollout
of developments in AI and considerable
experimentation with AI tools by companies and
individuals, concerns about Adverse outcomes of
Inflation
Economic downturn
Critical change to Earth systems
Crime and illicit economy activity
Lack of economic opportunity or
unemployment
Concentration of strategic
resources
Biological, chemical, or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Misinformation and disinformation
Extreme weather events
Involuntary migration or displacement
Non-weather related natural disasters
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
17
17
8
12
Geoeconomic confrontation 5
22
10
6
Intrastate violence 7
Talent and/or labour shortages 6
29th
19th
24th
17th
28th
11th
13th
12th
23rd
9th
1st
2nd
8th
32nd
33rd
Stable level of concern Biggest increase in ranking Biggest fall in ranking
Overallranking
Change in short-term (2 years) global risks perception, 2023-2024 vs 2024-2025F I G U R E 1 . 5
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Surveys 2024-2025
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Inequality
Pollution
Global risk perceptions over the short term (2 years), by age groupF I G U R E 1 . 6
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Note
Each column represents the top 8 risks by age group, ordered by global ranking rather than within-age
group rankings. A cell is coloured if the ranking of the risk for that age group is the same as the global
ranking of that risk. Sample size by age group varied, and all respondents were weighted equally for the
purposes of global rankings. The results are based on the following: <30, n=122 (14% of total); 30-39,
n=154 (17%); 40-49, n=250 (28%); 50-59, n=222 (25%); 60-69, n=104 (12%); and 70+, n=42 (5%).
Misinformation and
disinformation
Extreme weather events
Societal polarization
Cyber espionage
and warfare
State-based armed
conflict
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Involuntary migration
or displacement
<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
Global Risks Report 2025 16
AI technologies is low in the risk ranking. In fact,
it has slightly declined in the two-year outlook, with
the risk now ranking #31 compared with #29 in
last year’s report. However, complacency around
the risks of such technologies should be avoided
given the fast-paced change in the field of AI and
its increasing ubiquity. In this report we highlight
how AI models are a factor in the relationship
between technology and polarization. Section 1.5:
Technology and polarization explores the risks for
citizens resulting from the combination of greater
connectivity, rapid growth in computing power, and
more powerful AI models. In Section 2.4: Losing
control of biotech? we highlight the role of AI in
accelerating developments in this field, for both
good and bad.
Respondents also express unease over Cyber
espionage and warfare, which is #5 in the
two-year ranking, echoing concerns outlined in
the World Economic Forum's 2024 Chief Risk
Officers Outlook, where 71% of Chief Risk Officers
expressed concern about the impact of Cyber
risk and criminal activity (money laundering,
cybercrime etc.) severely impacting their
organizations. The rising likelihood of threat actor
activity and more sophisticated technological
disruption were noted as particular concerns.6
Elevated cyber risk perceptions are one aspect of
a broader environment of heightened geopolitical
and geoeconomic tensions, which is reflected in the
two-year ranking of State-based armed conflict
moving up from #5 in last year’s report to #3 now.
The risk of further destabilizing consequences in
Ukraine, the Middle East, and Sudan are likely
to be amplifying respondents’ concerns. In a
world that has been seeing an increasing number
of armed conflicts for a decade, as detailed in
Section 1.3: "Geopolitical recession", national
security considerations are increasingly dominating
government agendas. That section of the report
dives deep into the dangers of unilateralism taking
hold, including its implications for deepening
humanitarian crises.
Overall, the GRPS risks with some of the sharpest
rises in ranking compared to the previous year
are geostrategic in nature. Biological, chemical,
or nuclear weapons or hazards (#23) and
Geoeconomic confrontation (#9) are up eight
and five positions, respectively, since the GRPS
2023-24. Section 1.4: Supercharged economic
tensions explores how global geoeconomic
tensions could unfold over the next two years.
Private-sector concern with the two-year outlook
for Geoeconomic confrontation has moved up
from last year’s edition of the report, where it was
not a top 10 risk; it now is #6. There is also concern
among both governments and academia, who rank
this risk #9 and #10, respectively (Figure 1.7).
Extreme weather events
Misinformation and
disinformation
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Societal polarization
Misinformation and
disinformation
Extreme weather events
State-based armed
conflict
Societal polarization
Misinformation and
disinformation
Extreme weather events
Societal polarization
Pollution
Extreme weather events
State-based armed
conflict
Misinformation and
disinformation
Societal polarization State-based armed
conflict
Cyber espionage
and warfare
State-based armed
conflict
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Pollution
Geoeconomic
confrontation
InequalityCrime and illict
economic activity
Pollution
Debt Crime and illicit
economic activity
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Inequality
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Geoeconomic
confrontation
PollutionErosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Pollution
Inequality InequalityGeoeconomic
confrontation
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Extreme weather events
Misinformation and
disinformation
Societal polarization
State-based armed
conflict
Pollution
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Inequality
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Natural resource
shortages
Civil society
International
organizations Academia Government Private sector
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
Global risks over the short term (2 years), by stakeholder groupF I G U R E 1 . 7
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 17
Last year, two economic risks – Inflation and
Economic downturn (recession, stagnation) –
were new entrants in the top 10 ranking. Concerns
around both have since subsided; in this year’s
two-year risk ranking, there are no economic
risks in the top 10. Inflation, which was #7 last
year, has fallen to #29, with a similar decline for
Economic downturn, which was #9 last year and
is now #19. No stakeholder group selected either
Inflation or Economic downturn as a top 10 risk,
although there is ongoing concern about Debt
among government stakeholders (at #7), and Crime
and illicit economic activity among international
organizations, private-sector and government
respondents (#6, #7 and #8, respectively). Across
stakeholders in the aggregate, however, there are
some sharp upticks in economic risk perceptions,
with Crime and illicit economic activity increasing
17 positions to #11, and Concentration of
strategic resources at #12, up 12 positions from
last year.
This overall mixed picture for economic risk
perceptions is not mirrored in societal risk
perceptions, which have risen and feature
prominently in the two-year risk landscape.
Inequality (wealth, income) is #7 and Societal
polarization is even higher, at #4. Involuntary
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble burst
Biodiversity loss
and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Concentration of
strategic resources
and technologies
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Critical change
to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Disruptions to
critical infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Extreme weather
events
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource
shortages
Non-weather-related
natural disasters
Online harmsPollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or
labour shortages
Concentration of
strategic resources
and technologies
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble burst
Biodiversity loss
and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Critical change
to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Disruptions to
critical infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Extreme weather
events
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource
shortages
Non-weather-related
natural disasters
Online harmsPollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or
labour shortages
Global risks landscape: An interconnections mapF I G U R E 1 . 8
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025
Edges
Relative influence
High
Low
Medium
Risk influence
Nodes
High
Low
Medium
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 18
migration or displacement (#8), and Erosion of
human rights and/or civic freedoms (#10) are
also in the top 10. Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment has increased 17 positions
from last year’s edition and is now #13. Inequality
(wealth, income) is perceived as the most central,
interconnected risk of all, with significant potential
to both trigger and be influenced by other risks
(Figure 1.8). The importance ascribed to this set of
societal risks suggests that social stability will be
fragile over the next two years, weakening trust and
diminishing our collective sense of shared values.
This is being felt not only within societies but also
between societies and governments: the perceived
risk of Censorship and surveillance (#16) is up five
places compared to last year.
Fractures across societal lines are also relevant to
environmental risks, which have become a more
divisive issue in domestic politics in many countries
in recent years. On aggregate across GRPS
respondents, concerns about environmental risks
are high over the two-year horizon. Respondents
list Extreme weather events as the #2 most severe
risk for 2027, with Pollution at #6, up four places
from last year’s report. While Extreme weather
events remain a persistent concern year-on-year
– the risk was also ranked #2 last year – the uptick
in Pollution demonstrates that environmental
risks that are often perceived as long-term threats
are starting to be perceived with more certainty
by respondents as short-term realities, as their
effects become more apparent. Climate change is
also an underlying driver of several other risks that
rank high. For example, Involuntary migration or
displacement is a leading concern, at #8.
The following sections explore in-depth three risk
themes and examine how these could play out
over the next two years. State-based armed
conflict (#3) and Geoeconomic confrontation
(#9) are, respectively, at the core of Section
1.3: "Geopolitical recession" and Section
1.4: Supercharged economic tensions, while
Section 1.5: Technology and polarization
explores the links between Societal polarization
(#4), Misinformation and disinformation (#1),
algorithmic bias and Censorship and surveillance
(#16).
Global Risks Report 2025 19
"Geopolitical recession"1.3
2%
14% 16% 23% 19% 19% 7%
Short-term (2 years) risk severity score: State-based armed conflictF I G U R E 1 . 9
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025
2-year rank: 3rd
Bilateral or multilateral use of force between states and/or between a state and non-state actor(s), often with ideological, political, or
religious goals, manifesting as war and/or organized, sustained violence. Includes, but is not limited to: hot wars; proxy wars; civil wars;
guerilla warfare; terrorism; genocide; and assassinations.
2-year average risk severity score: 4.6
7
High Low
6 5 4 3 2 1
SeverityNote
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale
[1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity]. The percentages in the
graphs may not add up to 100% because values have
been rounded up/down.
2 years	
– Over the next two years, uncertainty around the course of current conflicts and their aftermath is likely to
remain high, and tensions elsewhere could escalate.	
– A loss of support for and faith in the role of international organizations in conflict prevention and
resolution has opened the door to more unilateralist moves.	
– Humanitarian crises are multiplying and worsening, given funding constraints and major powers’ lack of
sustained focus on them.
State-based armed conflict (proxy wars, civil
wars, coups, terrorism, etc.) was highlighted as by
far the greatest risk for 2025 among the 33 risks
ranked in the GRPS, with 23% of respondents
anticipating a material global crisis. GRPS
respondents cite Geoeconomic confrontation
as well as the technology-related concerns Cyber
espionage and warfare and Misinformation
and disinformation among the risks most closely
linked to State-based armed conflict (Figure 1.10).
Concern about this risk among respondents
remains alarming on a two-year horizon, with Statebased
armed conflict ranked #3, increasing two
positions from last year’s risk ranking.
In the EOS, Armed conflict – encompassing
interstate, intrastate, proxy wars and coups – is
identified as one of the top 10 global risks over
the next two years. According to the EOS, this
geopolitical risk ranks as the primary concern for
executives in 12 countries, including Armenia, Israel,
Kazakhstan and Poland, and features among the
top five risks in an additional 11 economies, such as
Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Figure 1.11). Executives who
prioritize this risk according to the EOS frequently
cite a high perception of related risks, including
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or
hazards and Geoeconomic confrontation.
The top ranking of State-based armed conflict
may also demonstrate concern among respondents
that we are in what has been termed a “geopolitical
recession”7
– an era characterized by a high
Anzhela Bets, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 20
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Global risk interconnections: State-based armed conflictF I G U R E 1 . 1 0
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Edges
Relative influence
High
Low
Medium
Risk influence
Nodes
High
Low
Medium
Reference
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Disruptions to
critical infrastructure
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Misinformation and disinformation
State-based armed conflict
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Disruptions to
critical infrastructure
Geoeconomic
confrontation
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Misinformation and disinformation
State-based armed conflict
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
number of conflicts, in which multilateralism is
facing strong headwinds. It can also be argued
that such a geopolitical recession started almost
a decade ago (see Figure 1.12). Since 2014, the
number of armed conflicts has been elevated
compared to the period from the 1990s to the
early 2010s. Interstate conflicts, while they tend to
present the greatest threats to global stability, only
constitute a small proportion of the total number of
armed conflicts, which also include one-sided, nonstate
and intrastate armed conflicts.
Escalation pathways
The GRPS results are also likely to reflect the depth
of respondents’ fears surrounding the two major
current cross-border conflicts, Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, and
perhaps also concern around the risks of conflict
over Taiwan, China.
Regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the position
taken by the new US administration will be critical
to its evolution. Will the United States take a firmer
stance towards Russia, counting on such a move
acting as a deterrent to further Russian escalation,
and/or will it increase pressure on Ukraine, including
reducing financial support? In the latter case,
European governments might increase their own
support for Ukraine. The spectrum of possible
outcomes over the next two years is wide, ranging
from further escalation, perhaps also involving
neighbouring countries, to uneasy agreement to
freeze the conflict.
In the Middle East, any shift towards a full-scale
Iran-Israel war over the next two years would draw
in the United States further. Such a war would, in
turn, generate more long-term instability in the entire
region, including the Gulf economies, where US
military bases could become targets. Meanwhile,
recent political developments in Syria raise both
opportunities and risks. Hopes are high that there
could be a revitalization of the economy and a more
inclusive political environment. However, building
stability across Syria will be challenging, given the
many competing interests that are involved. These
include both domestic groups and foreign states;
if other countries decide to intervene more heavily
while the transition unfolds, this could lead to
renewed confrontations.
In addition, conflict over Taiwan, China cannot be
ruled out. Limited armed confrontation could be
triggered more easily if global tensions are high
around geoeconomic confrontation and if rhetoric
Global Risks Report 2025 21
National risk perceptions: Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy wars, coups, etc.)F I G U R E 1 . 1 1
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question “Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
1st
10th
20th
30th
33th
Rank
is aggressive. Both the United States and China
may go further in the coming years in undertaking
military manoeuvres close to Taiwan, China
designed to show strength and act as deterrent. A
major risk is that just one such manoeuvre could
be misinterpreted by the other side and/or lead to
accidental loss of life or destruction of hardware,
leading to tit-for-tat military escalation.
Waning appetite for
multilateralism
With the world facing this wide spectrum of ongoing
armed conflicts, and escalation risks in the two major
cross-border conflicts, the current weakness of the
multilateral security framework with the UN Security
Council (UNSC) at its core is alarming. The UNSC
has not managed to stop conflicts from escalating,
including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the wars in
the Middle East and in Sudan.
Despite discussions over the last year about
reinvigorating UN peacekeeping operations, these
are in decline on aggregate, with their size having
been reduced from over 100,000 peacekeepers in
20168
to around 68,000 in 2024.9
The UNSC faces ongoing structural challenges,10
and over the next two years risks having even less
impact, given the new US administration’s likely
less favourable stance towards the UN generally
and its preference for seeking solutions to conflicts
unilaterally. There is a danger that more governments
lose faith not only in the UNSC, but in multilateralism
as a forum for resolving conflicts, and that the world
instead becomes more adversarial, with conflicts
ending only via battlefield, winner-takes-all victories
and not through negotiated, multistakeholder peace
agreements. While there continue to be discussions
that aim towards reform of the UNSC, they are
unlikely to make meaningful progress over the next
two years given the complexity of aligning national
interests and the current lack of political will to do
so. Furthermore, there is no viable alternative global
governance set-up in sight.
The growing vacuum in ensuring global stability at
a multilateral level will lead governments around
the world increasingly to take national security
matters into their own hands, coordinating
security and defense efforts only with select allied
countries, or making unilateral military decisions.
More countries will attempt to gain a greater
degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency. Defense
budgets could be prioritized over other long-term
Global Risks Report 2025 22
One-sided violence InterstateNon-state conflict Intrastate
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Number of armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War (1989-2023)F I G U R E 1 . 1 2
Source
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
investments, placing at risk spending in areas such
as healthcare, education and infrastructure. This
accelerating military spending would represent
a continuation of recent trends: World military
expenditure increased for the ninth consecutive
year in 2023, reaching a total of $2.4 trillion,11
with
2023 seeing a steep rise over 2022 (see Figure
1.13). The top five countries accounted for 61%
of the total. As governments with strengthening
militaries perceive that multilateral constraints
on unilateral military action are weaker, there
could be more instances of cross-border military
interventions in the coming years.
Unilateralism and the dominance of national security
considerations in political agendas may also
have increasingly far-reaching repercussions for
state-society relations worldwide. Increased state
surveillance of citizens and restrictions on individual
freedoms may become more commonplace in
the name of national security. Perceived or actual
threats from other countries also provide an opening
for governments to seize control of narratives
and suppress information, perhaps blurring the
lines between genuine security considerations
and political expedience. Governments may take
measures that diminish the transparency of public
expenditure, for example when it comes to funding
parties to a conflict abroad. These are all conditions
that will help authoritarian regimes consolidate their
power and may lead to democratic regimes taking
on more authoritarian characteristics.
Salah Darwish, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 23
2,500
2,000
1,500
500
1,000
0
World military expenditure (billion $), 1992-2023F I G U R E 1 . 1 3
Source
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military
Expenditure Database.
Note
Values are in billion $ at constant 2022 prices and exchange rates.
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Worsening humanitarian crises
Even beyond global security considerations,
multilateralism appears set to endure its most
difficult period since the founding of the UN in 1945.
Over the next two years, more questions are likely
to be asked by national governments about the
roles and priorities of key multilateral institutions,
and there could be constraints placed on their
funding. The outlook for this broader weakening of
multilateralism is associated with declining global
budgets for humanitarian aid (see Figure 1.14).
Declining funding translates into an acute risk of
humanitarian crises deepening. Global humanitarian
efforts are highly dependent on the financial and
human resources and institutional know-how
provided by the UN. This know-how, in areas such
as logistics or relationships with local governments
and NGOs, has been built up over decades and
is irreplaceable over a short- or even mediumterm
time horizon. Over 90 million people in need
receive humanitarian aid or development assistance
from UN institutions on an annual basis.12
A rising
number of these individuals, as well as others
who also need support but are unable to access
it, will be at increasing risk of insecurity, disease,
malnutrition and starvation over the next two years
if UN institutions and the humanitarian sector overall
are weakened further.
Furthermore, higher levels of desperation will in some
settings create more opportunities for armed groups
to recruit. Countries in which serious humanitarian
crises risk deepening further over the next two years
and in turn fueling more violence include Sudan,
Mali and Haiti. In Sudan, the domestic and regional
impacts of reduced agricultural production and
exports are already far-reaching. Like Ukraine, Sudan
is a large exporter of agricultural products. It plays a
critical role for neighbouring countries Ethiopia, South
Sudan, Chad and Egypt.13
Forced displacement is also set to rise as
international humanitarian aid efforts struggle to
keep up. It is already at an all-time high, with over
122 million forcibly displaced people globally,14
and 56% are displaced within their own countries.
Among the 44% who are cross-border refugees,
three quarters are hosted in low-income countries
that have limited resources to support them.
Sometimes refugees are confronted with nationalist
sentiment or identity-related violence because of
their ethnicity or religion, further fueling the potential
for conflict in border areas. Increased competition
Global Risks Report 2025 24
45
40
BillionUSD
35
25
20
15
10
5
30
0
Humanitarian funding (billion $), 2022-2024F I G U R E 1 . 1 4
Source
Financial Tracking Service by UN OCHA.
2022 2023 2024
for jobs between refugees and locals can also be a
source of tensions.
Rising unilateralism will have softer implications, too.
Societies are developing more disinterested mindsets
when it comes to conflicts and humanitarian crises
in which their own citizens are not involved. As
local media deprioritize reporting on “far-away”
conflicts, a self-fulfilling cycle emerges, with greater
tolerance by governments and societies of civilian
casualties in warfare. This is a risk that has already
started unfolding with respect to current conflicts,
for example when it comes to Sudan: This war
has rarely been at the top of global policy agendas
despite its huge humanitarian toll. Such disinterest
makes internationally coordinated humanitarian
responses more difficult, especially when combined
with the prevailing geopolitical and funding
conditions.
Actions for today
A. Support multilateral institutions
The GRPS finds that the approach that respondents
believe has the most long-term potential for driving
action on risk reduction and preparedness regarding
State-based armed conflict is Global treaties
and agreements (Figure 1.15. See also Figure
1.16), followed by Multistakeholder engagement.
These findings strongly suggest that it is critical
for public, private and civil society stakeholders
across all countries to work together to reinforce
existing multilateral institutions wherever feasible.
This includes the UN Security Council; despite
the challenges and complexity of reforming it,
governments should continue dialogues with that
ultimate objective in mind.
In highlighting the benefits of multilateralism in conflict
resolution, leaders should draw on case studies
of resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts. An
example was the Colombian government’s peace
agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) in November 2016. Broad
international cooperation has also helped to tackle
armed threats, for example in combating piracy off
the Somali coast over the course of many years
from 2008. Global leaders can draw optimism from
such examples and showcase lessons learned and
actionable strategies for ending current conflicts.
B. Expand the role of regional organizations in
managing tensions
Amid the current challenges facing global
multilateralism, there is space for regional
organizations to expand their roles in managing
Global Risks Report 2025 25
Share of respondents (%)
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons
or hazards
Geoeconomic confrontation
(sanctions, tariffs, investment screening)
State-based armed conflict
(proxy, civil wars, coups, terrorism, etc.)
Critical change to Earth systems
Cyber espionage and warfare
Involuntary migration or displacement
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Pollution (air, soil, water, etc.)
Concentration of strategic resources
(and technologies)
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
(quantum, biotech, geoengineering)
Top risks that can be addressed by global treaties and arrangementsF I G U R E 1 . 1 6
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
“Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the
next 10 years?
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Risk Governance: State-based armed conflictF I G U R E 1 . 1 5
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2024-2025.
“Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10
years? Select up to three for each risk.”
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
State-based armed conflict
(proxy, civil wars, coups, terrorism, etc.)
Share of respondents
Approach
a. Financial instruments
b. National and local regulations
c. Minilateral treaties and
agreements
d. Global treaties and
agreements
e. Development assistance
f. Corporate strategies
g. Research & development
h. Public awareness and
education
i. Multistakeholder engagement
Global Risks Report 2025 26
geopolitical tensions in their regions. The African
Union is a good example: It already has a track
record in this regard, having carried out several
peacekeeping operations across Africa and on other
occasions has played a mediator role.15
Nonetheless,
there is a need for it to play a greater role in future in
both peacekeeping and mediation.
C. Diversify supply chains
For organizations, one of the big lessons taken
from the ongoing conflicts is the need for supply
chain resilience and diversification. With geopolitical
volatility likely to remain high over the next two years,
organizational investment in geopolitical risk foresight
and risk management is a must. When the level of
uncertainty around conflicts or potential conflicts is
high, scenario planning exercises can be a valuable
tool to help organizations prepare for a range of
different outcomes. Organizations need to consider
not only whether their suppliers and supply routes are
vulnerable to conflicts, but also what the reputational
risks are of partnering or doing business with
counterparts that are in any way party to a conflict.
Matthew
TenBruggencate,
Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 27
Supercharged economic tensions1.4
	– A worldwide escalation of broad tariff-based protectionism could lead to global trade declining.
	– Deeper decoupling of trade between West and East would have worldwide repercussions, even beyond
trade relationships.
	– With economic growth in China and Europe already weak, an escalating trade war will introduce
additional uncertainties into the global economic outlook.
Global trade relations are tense and there is a risk of
unpredictable and potentially sharp changes in trade
policies worldwide. Geoeconomic confrontation
(sanctions, tariffs, investment screening) ranks #3
for current (2025) risks according to the GRPS and
#9 over a two-year horizon. This comes after trade
tensions have already been rising steeply since
2017. According to Global Trade Alert, the number
of harmful new policy interventions per year rose
globally from 600 in 2017 to over 3,000 in each of
2022, 2023 and 2024.16
The incoming US administration has suggested
that it will implement higher tariffs on imports
from all trading partners, often singling out China,
as well as Mexico and Canada. While these
statements may have been the opening gambits
ahead of future negotiations covering trade and
other issues, they undoubtedly are a signal to the
rest of the world that deepening protectionism is
on the agenda.
US trading partners are considering retaliatory
measures, as well as the timing for potentially
implementing them. Over the next two years, there
is a significant risk of escalating tariffs and other
trade-related protectionism globally, which could
accelerate broader decoupling between the United
States and China, and their respective allies. While
Cold War-style rhetoric between the United States
and China could ramp up and fuel trade tensions
between the two blocs, even the many countries
that are not aligned with either West or East would
find themselves affected by these tensions.
In such an unfolding trade war scenario, initiatives
currently underway could easily stall or come apart.
For example, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism is more likely to face retaliation from
trading partners; and efforts to cooperate in the
area of digital regulation will come up against
hardening negotiating positions. These and other
initiatives need ongoing collaboration to keep
moving forward.
Across-the-board tariffs
In a worst-case scenario for tariff escalation over
the next two years, governments would decide to
impose tariffs not only on those countries/blocs
imposing tariffs on them, but instead on all their
trading partners. This widespread imposition of
across-the-board tariffs globally would lead to a
substantial contraction in global trade.17
This scenario could originate from an escalation
of the tariff conflict between the United States
and China. The latter’s dominance of global
export markets is at the core of the new US
administration’s concerns. Not only in the United
States, but manufacturing sectors worldwide have
struggled to compete with Chinese products in a
2%2-year rank: 9th
2-year average risk severity score: 4.1
7% 12% 19% 26% 22% 12%
Short-term (2 years) risk severity score: Geoeconomic confrontationF I G U R E 1 . 1 7
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Deployment of economic levers by global or regional powers to reshape economic interactions between nations, restricting goods,
knowledge, services, or technology with the intent of building self-sufficiency, constraining geopolitical rivals and/or consolidating spheres
of influence. Includes, but is not limited to: currency measures; investment controls; sanctions; state aid and subsidies; and trade controls.
7
High Low
6 5 4 3 2 1
SeverityNote
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale
[1 – Low severity, 7 – High severity]. The percentages in the
graphs may not add up to 100% because values have
been rounded up/down.
2 years
Global Risks Report 2025 28
range of sectors, such as solar panels or electric
vehicles. While Chinese exports slowed from 2022-
2023,18
their growth has remained strong over a
five-year timeframe.
If Chinese access to the US market is constrained
by new tariffs, Chinese exports will be likely to flow
to EU and other markets. But the EU has already
started pushing back in selected areas of trade
with China, for example imposing tariffs on electric
vehicles imports from China for a period of five
years in October 2024.19
If faced with a potential
influx of Chinese imports redirected from the United
States, the EU might impose new tariffs on Chinese
imports.
Other regions such as Latin America could take
similar approaches in the face of diverted imports
as they aim to defend local industries. Over the next
two years, this could lead to a pattern of rolling,
progressive protectionism spreading worldwide, at
different speeds in different sectors, going wellbeyond
bilateral tit-for-tat tariffs. Some governments
would move more aggressively than others, and
once the first countries impose across-the-board
tariffs on their trading partners, more countries
could quickly follow.
Escalation beyond tariffs
Research published in November 2024 assessed
the vulnerability of 173 countries to restrictive
US trade measures. The research considers key
concerns of US policy-makers, including those
countries’ bilateral trade surpluses with the United
States, restrictions on market access for US
exports, and existing tariffs, among other criteria.20
Weighing the countries according to these criteria,
South Korea is found to be the most at risk for
being targeted with restrictive US trade measures,
followed by China, Japan, Canada and India, at
the next level of risk. However, other countries and
blocs are found to be at risk, too: Brazil, the EU,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico
and Thailand are the next group of economies.21
This assessment chimes with the results of
the EOS, which show that geoeconomic
confrontation (sanctions, tariffs, investment
screening, etc.) is a prominent concern in Eastern
Asia, in particular (Figure 1.18). In Taiwan, China
and Hong Kong SAR, China, this risk is the thirdmost
significant concern in their two-year outlooks.
Moreover, 12 other economies, including Japan
and South Korea, rank geoeconomic confrontation
among their top 10 risks. While Eastern Asia may
National risk perceptions: Geoeconomic confrontationF I G U R E 1 . 1 8
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question “Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
Rank
1st
10th
20th
30th
34th
Global Risks Report 2025 29
be one region most immediately impacted by new
trade restrictions, broadening global geoeconomic
fragmentation would affect all economies, with
those likely to suffer the most ultimately being
emerging markets and low-income countries.22
Beyond tariffs, industrial policy is at the core of
other trade-related protectionist measures. The
world is already in an era of industrial policy, with a
high number of non-tariff barriers impacting trade
relations. Two-thirds of all harmful trade restriction
measures implemented in the last five years have
been subsidies,23
excluding export subsidies.
Legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act24
or initiatives such as Make in India25
are a rising
characteristic of countries’ inward focus and this
trend could accelerate in a fragmenting trade
environment. Although industrial policy can have
benefits, for example addressing market failures,
its risks include corruption and misallocation of
resources.26
A related area likely to see escalation
is more blocking of trade and investment on
national security grounds, with the number of
sectors classified by governments as “strategically
sensitive” expanding.
As the space for a multilateral, rules-based
and open global trade environment diminishes,
government interventions in the private sector
could be used more frequently as a form of
retaliation against companies’ home governments.
Employees of foreign companies could increasingly
be prosecuted or have more restrictions placed
on their in-country stays, and the number and
size of fines imposed on companies for alleged
regulatory non-compliance could be ratcheted up.
Governments may make more use of sanctions
targeting individuals, financial transactions
and companies.
Some governments may foment more aggressive
Misinformation and disinformation campaigns
about goods and services from targeted countries.
Results from the EOS indicate widespread
concerns about the Misinformation and
disinformation risk in a diverse set of countries,
including India (#2), Germany (#4), Brazil (#6),
and the United States (#6). Hardening public
perceptions could lead to more frequent consumer
boycotts of products.
Costs for companies doing business internationally
will rise in this scenario. Global firms will need to
navigate divergent sets of regulations in different,
fragmenting parts of the world. Regulatory
technology (RegTech) will be used more by
governments to surveil foreign companies and
ensure compliance,27
reducing the time between
new regulations being imposed and the need
for companies to become fully compliant. IT
infrastructure as well as data security and storage
protocols will continue to be adapted to national
security interests at the expense of cross-border
commercial considerations. Finally, international
data flows and financial transactions will become
more cumbersome and costly, setting back some
of the rapid progress made in recent years through
the implementation of new technologies.
Government-led efforts at commercial cyber
espionage could become more frequent as part of
efforts to tilt the playing field towards their national
champions. The EOS reveals that respondents in highincome
countries tend to highlight cybersecurity risk.
In some of these – for example Denmark, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands – Cyber insecurity is one of the
top three risks. Governments may also put pressure
on domestically headquartered cloud services
companies to restrict access in other countries.
Bernd Dittrich, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 30
Such a global fragmentation scenario will weaken
the kind of multilateral collaboration required in
many fields. For example, coordinating regulatory
efforts and mobilizing the vast financial resources
needed for the green transition will become much
more difficult. Technological innovations that might
make a difference towards greening economies
will face more impediments to being shared across
borders and scaled globally. Other areas where
deeper global collaboration is badly needed, such
as global health, energy or infrastructure, will also
be likely to see slowdowns or reversals in progress.
This will leave the world less well prepared for the
next global pandemic, for example, while urgent
public health and broader humanitarian issues
will slip even further down the global agenda.
Contagion from trade disruptions could spill over
into food insecurity, too. Some large cities in SubSaharan
Africa that are reliant on global commodity
markets for their food supply are particularly at risk.
Greater economic uncertainty
The World Economic Forum’s September 2024
Chief Economists Outlook found that most of
the chief economists surveyed (54%) expect
the condition of the global economy to remain
unchanged over the next year, but four times as
many expect conditions to weaken (37%) rather
than to strengthen (9%).28
This outlook aligns
closely with the latest IMF forecast, which has
economic growth stable at 3.2% annually in 2024
and 2025.29
Even without accounting for the
potential impacts of downside risks, this growth rate
is tepid compared to the long-term average growth
rate of 3.8% from 2000-2019.30
The IMF notes rising risks to the economy posed
by conflict escalation, tariffs and trade policy
uncertainty, lower migration, and the tightening of
global financial conditions.31
The latter could pose a
challenge to financial stability given that valuations
are elevated in several asset classes and the
amount of leverage used by financial institutions is
significant.32
The rapid growth in the private credit
market is one area to monitor.33
More generally,
both government and private-sector debt levels
continue to rise globally.34
There have been early
signs that fiscal concerns could re-emerge over the
next two years as markets will face a high volume of
sovereign debt supply.35
Globally, Economic downturn tops the EOS
global risk ranking in the next two years. This risk
ranks first in five regions: Latin America and the
Caribbean, Northern America, Oceania, SouthNational
risk perceptions: Economic downturn (e.g. recession, stagnation)F I G U R E 1 . 1 9
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question “Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
1st
5th
10th
15th
18th
Rank
Global Risks Report 2025 31
Eastern Asia and Southern Asia. It also ranks first
in three out of the four country income groups,
with the only exception being lower-middle income
countries. Respondents in 25 countries see
Economic downturn as the leading risk, including
developed economies such as the United States
and United Kingdom, and emerging markets such
as Brazil, Kenya and Malaysia (Figure 1.19).
In the short term, higher import tariffs cause an
increase in the price of imported goods. The impact
on global GDP depends on factors including the
substitutability between imported and domestic
goods; the response of exporting firms facing tariffs;
and monetary policy reactions.36
When it comes
to the latter, monetary policy-makers are in the
fortunate position of having just brought inflation
back under control. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) projects headline global inflation to fall to
3.5% by the end of 2025, which is lower than the
average in the two decades prior to the COVID-19
pandemic.37
However, one risk is that an escalating
trade war will lead to another upturn in inflation,
forcing central banks to halt or even reverse course
from cutting interest rates. If this is associated with
a strengthening US dollar, there could be knock-on
risks for countries and companies with US dollar
debt refinancing needs.
Indirect impacts of tariffs include a fall in
productivity, due to a change in the allocation of
productive resources from more to less productive,
more protected sectors and firms; a rise in the cost
of capital caused by financial stress; and a drop in
investment due to an increase in uncertainty about
future business conditions, which causes firms
to adopt a “wait-and-see” approach.38
The latest
World Investment Report, released in June 2024,
cites fragmenting trade and regulatory environments
as among the key drivers of a 10% slump in global
foreign direct investment last year.39
Analysis by the World Trade Organization (WTO)
of the phase of the US-China trade conflict from
2018-2020 indicates that the direct impacts on the
global economy of tariff increases during this period
were far outweighed by the impacts of broader
uncertainty around trade policy. With these broader
impacts, the loss to global GDP was estimated
at 0.34-0.50% during this period.40
A true global
trade war would have correspondingly more severe
impacts, with estimates of global GDP losses highly
uncertain but potentially much higher.41
The US-China trade conflict since 2018 also had
clear business impacts: exits of foreign companies
from China increased by 34% compared to pre-
2018 levels.42
Importantly, the impacts were much
broader than only in the specific sectors targeted by
US tariffs on Chinese products and affected nonUS
companies as well as US companies. These
findings suggest that even the “scalpel” approach
– levying tariffs on specific sectors – does not have
a well-targeted outcome in terms of either sector
or geography.43
To reiterate, a broader global trade
war would magnify these impacts on businesses.
Actions for today
A. Foster multilateralism
The GRPS finds that the approach that has the most
long-term potential for driving action on risk reduction
and preparedness regarding Geoeconomic
confrontation is Global treaties and agreements
(Figure 1.20). A specific area to prioritize would be
Risk Governance: Geoeconomic confrontationF I G U R E 1 . 2 0
Source
Source: World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
“Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10
years? Select up to three for each risk.”
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Geoeconomic confrontation
(sanctions, tariffs, investment screening)
Share of respondents
Approach
a. Financial instruments
b. National and local regulations
c. Minilateral treaties and
agreements
d. Global treaties and
agreements
e. Development assistance
f. Corporate strategies
g. Research & development
h. Public awareness and
education
i. Multistakeholder engagement
Global Risks Report 2025 32
a revival of reforms at the WTO to address dispute
resolution, tariff-setting rules and digital trade issues.
With US-China Geoeconomic confrontation at the
core of a fragmenting world, more opportunities will
open up for rising powers, such as India or the Gulf
countries, to fill the void and propose multilateral
alternatives to the current global political economic
order. These countries can also benefit by acting as
a bridge between West and East, even though they
too will suffer many of the negative impacts of the
fragmenting environment. Smaller countries will face
increasing pressure to align with the West or the East
in their trade relationships.
B. Develop strategic relationships
Governments could consider further prioritizing
efforts to develop strategic regional or bilateral ties
with countries that offer complementarity in terms of
sectoral strengths, natural resource endowments and
skills. “Deep” regional trade agreements – outside
the WTO but consistent with WTO requirements
– and WTO-based plurilateral44
or “minilateral”
agreements can be considered (Figure 1.21).45
Even
at these levels, multistakeholder dialogue needs to
be deepened to reinforce the message that welldesigned
deepening of trade can lead to mutually
beneficial economic and social outcomes.
C. Strengthen domestic economic resilience
In an environment where trade becomes more costly
and cumbersome, emphasis needs to be placed
on policies that strengthen the domestic economy,
such as financial sector development or investment
in education, health and infrastructure. On the
supply side, developing greater self-sufficiency in
key strategic sectors such as Energy, Agriculture,
and Defense will increasingly become an important
aspect of resilience at the national level.
Share of respondents (%)
Geoeconomic confrontation
(sanctions, tariffs, investment screening)
State-based armed conflict
(proxy, civil wars, coups, terrorism, etc.)
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards
Concentration of strategic resources
(and technologies)
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain
Involuntary migration or displacement
Cyber espionage and warfare
Intrastate violence
(riots, mass shootings, gang violence, etc.)
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Crime and illicit economic activity (incl. cyber)
Top risks that can be addressed by “minilateral” treaties and agreementsF I G U R E 1 . 2 1
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 33
Technology and polarization1.5
6% 17% 25% 23% 16% 11%
Short-term (2 years) risk severity score: Societal polarizationF I G U R E 1 . 2 2
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
2-year rank: 4th
2%
Present or perceived ideological and cultural divisions within and across communities leading to declining social stability, gridlocks in
decision-making, economic disruption and increased political polarization.
2-year average risk severity score: 4.6
Proportion of respondents
Note
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale
[1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity]. The percentages in the
graph may not add up to 100% because values have
been rounded up/down.
2 years
7
High Low
6 5 4 3 2 1
Severity	
– Rising use of digital platforms and a growing volume of AI-generated content are making divisive
misinformation and disinformation more ubiquitous.	
– Algorithmic bias could become more common due to political and societal polarization and associated
misinformation and disinformation.	
– Deeper digitalization can make surveillance easier for governments, companies and threat actors, and
this becomes more of a risk as societies polarize further.
An estimated two-thirds of the world’s population
– 5.5 billion people46
– is online and over five billion
people use social media.47
The increasing ubiquity
of sensors, CCTV cameras and biometric scanning,
among other tools, is further adding to the digital
footprint of the average citizen. In parallel, the
world’s computing power is increasing rapidly.48
This is enabling fast-improving AI and GenAI
models to analyse unstructured data more quickly
and is reducing the cost to produce content. With
Societal polarization ranking #4 in the GRPS
two-year ranking, the vulnerabilities associated
with citizens’ online activities look set to continue
deepening hand in hand with societal and political
divisions. Taken as a whole, these developments
threaten to fundamentally undermine individuals’
trust in information and institutions.
Like last year, Misinformation and disinformation
tops this year’s GRPS two-year ranking. The
amount of false or misleading content to which
societies are exposed continues to rise, as
does the difficulty that citizens, companies and
governments face in distinguishing it from true
information. The interplay of rising Misinformation
and disinformation with political and Societal
polarization creates greater scope for algorithmic
bias. If human, institutional and societal biases are
not addressed, and/or best practices in modelling
are neglected, the conditions will be ripe for
algorithmic bias to become more prevalent. Such
bias, whether inherent in data, models or their
creators, can lead to unjust outcomes.
Despite the dangers related to false or misleading
content, and the associated risks of algorithmic
bias, citizens need to strike a balance between
privacy on one hand and increased online
personalization and convenience on the other
hand. While data governance and regulation vary
worldwide, it is becoming easier for citizens to
be monitored, enabling governments, technology
companies and threat actors to reach deeper
into people’s lives. Those with access to rising
computing power and the ability to leverage
sophisticated AI/GenAI models could, if they
choose to, exploit further the vulnerabilities provided
by citizens’ online footprints. Rising political and
Societal polarization could become more of a
driving force for such increased surveillance.
Misinformation and
disinformation in a polarized
world
The advent of new technologies and the increase
in user-generated content platforms is leading to a
corresponding rise in the volume of content online.
Flows of Misinformation and disinformation from
those creating it are becoming more challenging to
detect and remove in an increasingly fragmented
media landscape.
Differentiating between AI- and human-generated
false or misleading content – in the form of video,
Global Risks Report 2025 34
National risk perceptions: Misinformation and disinformationF I G U R E 1 . 2 3
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Survey Opinion rank of national risks from the question “Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
Rank
1st
10th
20th
31st
images, voice or text – can be difficult. GenAI
lowers the barriers for content production and
distribution, and some of that content is inaccurate.
Threat actors, state agencies in some countries,49
activist groups, and individuals who may or
may not have criminal intentions can automate
and expand disinformation campaigns, greatly
increasing their reach and impact.50
Misinformation
and disinformation can also be the result of
AI-hallucinated content or human error, and these
too are likely to rise amid the growing volume of
content.
The upshot is that it is becoming increasingly hard
to know where to turn for true information. Both
political and Societal polarization skew narratives
and distort facts, contributing to low and declining
trust in media.51
Across a sample of 47 countries,
only 40% of respondents said that they trusted
most news.52
According to the EOS, respondents in high-income
countries are generally more likely to express
concern about the risk of Misinformation and
disinformation over the next two years than
respondents in lower-income countries, with some
exceptions. This risk ranks among the top five in 13
countries, including India, Germany and Canada,
and features in the top 10 in 30 additional countries
(Figure 1.23). Respondents identifying this risk
often also highlight Societal polarization as one
of the most severe risks in the same timeframe.
Poor quality content and lack of trust in information
sources continue to present a threat to societies.53
Algorithms, especially complex machine learning
models, can also be an entry point for cyberattacks
that use disinformation. An example of this would
be a structured query language injection attack, in
which inputs are manipulated to generate incorrect
outcomes or to compromise training data sets.54
As
many models lack transparency, either by intention,
by accident, or because of intrinsic opacity, it
is difficult to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate
potential threats. In addition, given the reliance of
algorithms on third-party data sources, software
libraries and network infrastructures, threat actors
can compromise the supply chain to manipulate
algorithms and cause widespread damage. Further,
as algorithms come to govern or influence more
aspects of society, the potential for coordinated
cyberattacks using automated systems grows.
Global Risks Report 2025 35
Algorithmic bias
Algorithmic bias can both be influenced by
Misinformation and disinformation and can be
a cause of it.55
The risks of algorithmic bias are
heightened when the data used for training an
AI model is itself a biased sample. Sometimes,
the bias can be obvious. For example, in a hiring
process, a set of bios used as examples of good
candidates might be drawn from a pool of previous
candidates, all of whom might have the same
gender, race or nationality. Other times, a bias can
be less obvious: for example, a model could be
trained on citizens’ previous spending on education,
without accounting for certain minority groups
typically spending less on education. Synthetic data
may be used, aiming to remove bias, but that can
itself introduce new biases.56
Examples of biases against citizens include
waiting times for a government appointment being
assigned on the basis of a questionable set of input
data and criteria, or automated responses failing
to respond adequately to citizens’ needs. When
algorithms are applied to sensitive decisions, biases
in training data or assumptions made during model
design can perpetuate or exacerbate inequities,
further disenfranchising marginalized groups.
Predictive policing is one area where algorithmic
bias based on race can be a concern.57
Such risks
are heightened further when there is no human
participation in decision-making.
Unless there are clear accountability frameworks
in place, the use of automated algorithms makes
it challenging to assign responsibility when harmful
or erroneous decisions are made, especially when
AI is involved. Automated algorithms often operate
as “black boxes”, making it difficult for individuals to
understand how decisions are made. This lack of
transparency and accountability can foster mistrust
and skepticism about the fairness and accuracy of
decisions taken.
In many cases, algorithmic bias can be the result
of lack of knowledge, testing or sufficient oversight.
How a model is developed, applied and governed
is key to mitigating these risks. Independently of
the input dataset used, the personal biases of
individuals designing the assumptions of the model
can also play a role in leading to unjust outcomes.
These personal biases may be accidental (for
example, the result of those inputting the data
having insufficient technical expertise) or intentional,
for example, to pursue political aims.
One risk that could come into focus more over the
next two years is algorithmic bias against people’s
political identity.58
Algorithmic political bias might be
used intentionally to, for example, affect recruitment
into public-sector jobs or access to certain public
services or financial services. What makes this risk
especially dangerous is that individuals’ political
biases are widely known, and those biases can
easily find their way into algorithms or data sets.
Furthermore, individuals’ political views can
increasingly be determined, even against their will,
from their online activities.59
Similarly to individual biases, societal biases can
also play a role.60
These are likely to become more
prevalent as societal divisions deepen. In the
GRPS, Societal polarization is ranked #4 over a
two-year time horizon. Regionally, Latin America
and the Caribbean, Eastern Asia and Europe
manifest the most pressing concerns over Societal
polarization in the next two years, according to the
EOS.
Citizen surveillance risks
Government technology (GovTech) is entering a
new era, as AI, data analytics and digital platforms
become the backbone of public administration.61
Technology companies have long worked closely
with governments, for example, in the sensitive
Mitchell Luo, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 36
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Misinformation and disinformation
Online harms
Societal polarization
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Misinformation and disinformation
Online harms
Societal polarization
Censorship and surveillanceCensorship and surveillance
Global risk interconnections: Censorship and surveillanceF I G U R E 1 . 2 4
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Reference
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Edges
Relative influence
High
Low
Medium
Risk influence
Nodes
High
Low
Medium
National risk perceptions: Censorship and surveillanceF I G U R E 1 . 2 5
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question “Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
1st
10th
20th
30th
34th
Rank
Global Risks Report 2025 37
Defense and Intelligence sectors. More recently, a
broader range of government services, including
other sensitive domains such as taxation,
environmental protection, and voter verification
and registration, have also become increasingly
technology-dependent.62
Governments now have
unprecedented access to data on citizens – and
technology companies often have even better
access than the governments themselves do.63
As
the computing power available to governments
and technology companies continues to rise, it
becomes easier for both entities to monitor citizens’
activities.
When managed responsibly, analysis and
processing of citizen data enables governments and
the technology companies with whom they work to
enhance public services. This can remain beneficial
for citizens if effective legal guardrails are in place
and both governments and technology providers
act in ways that earn trust.64
However, without
these conditions, the risks of misuse of surveillance
capabilities rise.65
There is divergence worldwide around how
governments can use the data that they can access,
reflecting ideology and culture, as well as the
technological capacity and resources available to
each government. Regulations, such as the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
also play a role, aiming to enhance personal data
protection by placing stricter limits on data usage by
governments and businesses.
Meanwhile, citizens often remain unaware of
how their personal data is collected, used and
shared, limiting their ability to make informed
decisions. Figure 1.24 shows the close connectivity
between Censorship and surveillance, Societal
polarization, Misinformation and disinformation
and Online harms, highlighting the confluence of
these risks in the digital ecosystem.
Censorship and surveillance ranks #16 in
the GRPS risk ranking on a two-year outlook,
increasing five positions since last year, showing
that concern respondents have around this issue is
real and growing. In a world of deepening societal
and political divisions, amplified by eroding trust in
the digital environment, concerns with Censorship
and surveillance are most pronounced in Eastern
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and
Central Asia, according to the EOS (Figure 1.25).
Notably, Nicaragua ranks this risk as the fourthmost
severe threat over the next two years, while
eight other economies identify it among their top
15 risks.
Actions for today
A. Expand upskilling for people building and
using automated algorithms
Organizations should use AI models that minimize bias
and mitigate unintended consequences in content
creation and distribution. While technical solutions for
significantly debiasing automated algorithms already
exist, their consistent application remains a challenge.
If implemented correctly, these solutions could greatly
reduce the risks associated with model bias. Common
debiasing strategies include data pre-processing
before training a model, in-processing techniques
during training, and post-processing steps after
training.66
These methods help ensure that AI models
are fairer and more equitable.
However, due to the rapid pace of change in
AI development and the increasing complexity
of its applications, keeping up with the latest
advancements in algorithmic debiasing is difficult
for many involved in building and using automated
algorithms. To address this, there is a pressing
need for continuous upskilling of developers, data
Victoria Prymak,
Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 38
scientists and policy-makers. Governments, civil
society and academia should collaborate to create
comprehensive training programmes that are
frequent, regular, and reflect the latest advancements
in AI and algorithmic fairness.67
These programmes
should focus not only on technical skills but also
emphasize the importance of ethical decisionmaking,
responsible data-handling, and the societal
impact of AI systems.
B. Boost funding for digital literacy
The GRPS finds that Misinformation and
disinformation and Societal polarization are
the two risks for which Public awareness and
education has the most long-term potential for
driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
(Figure 1.26). Censorship and surveillance is also
within the top five risks that could be addressed in
this way. There is an urgent need for comprehensive
public awareness campaigns to educate citizens
about the risks associated with digital spaces, as
well as the tools and practices they can use to
protect themselves and boost trust in their use
of platforms. For example, citizens should be
educated on privacy and security settings for their
devices, including two-factor authentication, and
app permissions. Awareness programmes should
also cover recognizing phishing attempts, protecting
personal data, and securely navigating social media.
Additionally, digital literacy initiatives should help
individuals understand the role of algorithms and
data in shaping their online experiences, fostering
critical thinking to identify and challenge biased
or harmful content. Governments, civil society
and private-sector organizations all have a role in
promoting these campaigns, ensuring they are
accessible to diverse populations.
C. Improve accountability and transparency
frameworks
The World Economic Forum’s Digital Trust
Framework68
spells out key governance themes for
ensuring AI’s sustainable and responsible adoption.
They include accountability and transparency.
The former could involve establishing supervisory
boards and AI councils, as well as human oversight
processes. These committees should consider
diverse perspectives from technologists, ethicists,
legal experts, creators and others to effectively
assess GenAI products and features. They should
be responsible for reviewing AI practices, identifying
potential risks and ensuring compliance with both
internal policies and external regulations.
Regarding transparency, nurturing consumers’
trust requires organizations to inform about AIgenerated
content and its use through appropriate
labelling and disclosures. Information on related
data practices, safety policies and potential risks
(such as bias and privacy) of the AI model used
in GenAI products should be made available via
accessible documentation. Standards and technical
solutions to ensure content authenticity – such as
digital watermarking, content origin and history, and
blockchain-based rights management – are currently
under development to support a trustworthy
information ecosystem. However, successful
adoption at scale requires policy frameworks that
are aligned with common principles, rules and
technological standards.
Share of respondents (%)
Misinformation and disinformation
Societal polarization
Online harms
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Decline in health and wellbeing
Censorship and surveillance
Intrastate violence
(riots, mass shootings, gang violence, etc.)
Infectious diseases
Crime and illicit economic activity (incl. cyber)
Talent and/or labour shortages
Top risks addressed by public awareness and educationF I G U R E 1 . 2 6
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 39
Endnotes
1.	 For brevity, “short- to medium-term” is henceforth referred to as “short-term” in this report. Both refer to the 2027 time
horizon.
2.	 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Number of Conflicts 1975-2023, https://ucdp.uu.se/.
3.	 The interconnections maps in this report are not focused on a specific time horizon.
4.	 Saran, Samir, “5 geopolitical questions for 2025”, World Economic Forum, 5 November 2024, https://www.weforum.org/
stories/2024/11/5-geopolitical-questions-for-2025/.
5.	 Mosely-Tate, Ryan, “How generative AI is boosting the spread of disinformation and propaganda”, MIT Technology
Review, 4 October 2023, https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/10/04/1080801/generative-ai-boosting-
disinformation-and-propaganda-freedom-house/.
6.	 World Economic Forum, Chief Risk Officers Outlook, 14 October 2024, https://www.weforum.org/publications/chief-risk-
officers-outlook-october-2024/.
7.	 Feingold, Spencer and Simon Torkington, “What is a geopolitical recession and how could we avoid one?”, World
Economic Forum, 13 May 2024, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/05/what-is-a-geopolitical-recession-and-are-we-
heading-into-one/.
8.	 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Fact Sheet, 31 December 2016, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/
files/bnote1216.pdf.
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un-security-council#:~:text=The%20UN%20Security%20Council%20is,twenty%2Dfirst%2Dcentury%20
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security.
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13.	 D’Silva, Brian and Abir Ibrahim, “Food security: Can war-torn Sudan recover and help address the global food crisis?”,
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statistics.
15.	 Luursema, Ilias, “The African Union: Achievements, Challenges, and the Future of Africa”, The Collector, 19 February
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16.	 Global Trade Alert, New Interventions per year, adjusted for reporting lags, https://www.globaltradealert.org/global_
dynamics/year-from_2023/year-to_2023/day-to_1129.
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ip_24_5589.
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outcomes”, Zeitgeist Series Briefing 40, Global Trade Alert, 5 November 2024, https://www.globaltradealert.org/reports/.
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International Monetary Fund (IMF),15 January 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/
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23.	 Global Trade Alert, Policy Instruments Used, 2020-24, https://www.globaltradealert.org/global_dynamics/area_all/year-
from_2020.
24.	 Aiyar, et al., 2023.
25.	 For details, see: https://www.makeinindia.com/.
26.	 Ilyina, Anna, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu and Michele Ruta, “Industrial Policy is Back But the Bar to Get it Right Is High”, IMF
Global Risks Report 2025 40
Blog ,12 April 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/04/12/industrial-policy-is-back-but-the-bar-to-get-it-
right-is-high.
27.	 Doktor, Roslyn, Robb Henzi and Landry Signé, “What is RegTech and what does it mean for policymakers?”, World
Economic Forum, 21 June 2022, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/06/what-is-regtech-and-what-does-it-mean-for-
policymakers/.
28.	 World Economic Forum, Chief Economists Outlook September 2024, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Chief_
Economists_Outlook_September_2024.pdf.
29.	 Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, “As inflation recedes, global economy needs policy triple pivot”, IMF Blog, 22 October 2024,
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30.	 International Monetary Fund (IMF), IMF World Economic Outlook: Steady but slow, resilience amid divergence, April 2024,
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the%20historical,growth%2Denhancing%20policies%20and%20reforms.
31.	 Gourinchas, 2024.
32.	 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Global Financial Fragilities Mount Despite Rate Cuts and Buoyant Markets, 22 October
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buoyant-markets.
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34.	 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Global Financial Fragilities Mount Despite Rate Cuts and Buoyant Markets, 22 October
2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/10/22/global-financial-fragilities-mount-despite-rate-cuts-and-
buoyant-markets.
35.	 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Quarterly Review, Investor optimism prevails over uncertainty, 10 December
2024, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2412a.htm.
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37.	 Gourinchas, 2024.
38.	 Szczerbowicz, et al., 2019.
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45.	 Aiyar, et al., 2023.
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48.	 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, State of Compute Access 2024: How to Navigate the New Power Paradox, 18
November 2024, https://institute.global/insights/tech-and-digitalisation/state-of-compute-access-2024-how-to-navigate-
the-new-power-paradox.
49.	 Mosely-Tate, 2023.
50.	 Li, Cathy and Agustina Callegari, “Stopping AI disinformation: Protecting truth in the digital world”, World Economic
Forum, 14 June 2024, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/06/ai-combat-online-misinformation-disinformation/.
51.	 Bantourakis, Minos, “How can we build trustworthy media ecosystems in the age of AI and declining trust?”, World
Economic Forum, 9 October 2023, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/news-media-literacy-trust-ai/.
52.	 Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis and Richard Fletcher, “Public perspectives on trust in news”, Reuters Institute, University of Oxford,
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53.	 World Economic Forum, Principles for the Future of Responsible Media in the Era of AI, 15 January 2024, https://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_Principles_for_the_Future_of_Responsible_Media_in_the_Era_of_AI_2024.pdf.
Global Risks Report 2025 41
54.	 Badman, Annie and Matthew Kosinski, “What is AI security?”, IBM, 5 June 2024, https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/ai-
security.
55.	 Shin, Donghee, et al., “Countering algorithmic bias and disinformation and effectively harnessing the power
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es/111307539/10776990221129245.pdf.
56.	 European Data Protection Supervisor, Synthetic Data, https://www.edps.europa.eu/press-publications/publications/
techsonar/synthetic-data_en.
57.	 UN General Assembly, “Contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”,
Human Rights Council, 3 June 2024, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/084/20/pdf/g2408420.pdf.
58.	 Peters, Uwe, “Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems”, Philosophy & Technology, vol. 35, no. 2, 30
March 2022, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8967082/.
59.	 Ibid.
60.	 US National Institute of Standards and Technology, There’s more to AI Bias than Biased Data, NIST Report Highlights, 16
March 2022 https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/03/theres-more-ai-bias-biased-data-nist-report-highlights.
61.	 World Economic Forum and Berlin Government Technology Centre, in collaboration with Capgemini, The Global Public
Impact of GovTech: A $9.8 Trillion Opportunity, January 2025, https://reports.weforum.org/docs/ WEF_The_Global_
Public_Impact_of_GovTech_2025.pdf.
62.	 Sharon, Tamar and Raphaël Gellert, “Regulating Big Tech expansionism? Sphere transgressions and the limits of Europe’s
digital regulatory strategy”, Information, Communication and Society, 16 August 2023, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/1369118X.2023.2246526.
63.	 Khanal, Shaleen, Hongzhou Zhang and Araz Taeihagh, “Why and how is the power of Big Tech increasing in the policy
process? The case of generative AI”, Policy and Society, 27 March 2024, https://academic.oup.com/policyandsociety/
advance-article/doi/10.1093/polsoc/puae012/7636223.
64.	 World Economic Forum, Earning Digital Trust: Decision-Making for Trustworthy Technologies, 15 November 2022, https://
www.weforum.org/publications/earning-digital-trust-decision-making-for-trustworthy-technologies/.
65.	 Königs, Peter, “Government Surveillance, Privacy, and Legitimacy”, Philosophy & Technology, vol. 35, no. 8, 5 February
2022, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-022-00503-9.
66.	 Feast, Josh, “Root Out Bias at Every Stage of Your AI-Development Process”, Harvard Business Review, October 30,
2020, https://hbr.org/2020/10/root-out-bias-at-every-stage-of-your-ai-development-process.
67.	 World Economic Forum in collaboration with Accenture, Governance in the Age of Generative AI: A 360º Approach for
Resilient Policy and Regulation, White paper, October 2024, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Governance_in_the_
Age_of_Generative_AI_2024.pdf.
68.	 For more details, see: https://initiatives.weforum.org/digital-trust/framework.
Global Risks Report 2025 42
Global Risks 2035:
The point of no return
2
The world in 20352.1
The current and short-term risks landscape
described in Chapter 1 may be exacerbated in
terms of severity as the world moves towards 2035
– unless we collectively act on such foresight today
and work collaboratively across all stakeholder
groups towards a more promising future. This
chapter focuses on the longer-term horizon,
outlining survey results for the likely impact of
risks in the next 10 years and providing in-depth
assessments of three risk themes – pollution,
biotech and super-ageing societies. The chapter
concludes with a retrospective analysis of findings
from the last two decades of Global Risks Reports.
The GRPS suggests that the road to 2035 will be
challenging to navigate. Respondents are far less
optimistic about the outlook for the world over the
longer term than the short term. As noted in the
Key findings section, 62% of respondents to the
GRPS predict a turbulent or stormy outlook over the
next 10 years (Chapter 1, Figure A).
Comparing the two- and 10-year timeframes in
more detail reveals a markedly deteriorating global
risks landscape. All 33 risks surveyed increase in
severity score over the long term compared to the
short term, reflecting respondents’ concerns about
Short-term severity (2 years)
Long-termseverity(10years)
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
2.5
1
1
7
7
3 3.5 4 4.5 5.55
Visible area
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Deteriorating risks
Relative severity of global risks over a 2- and 10-year periodF I G U R E 2 . 1
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2024-2025.
Note
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale [1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity].
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble bursts
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Concentration of strategic resources
Crime and illicit economic activity
Critical change to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain
Disruptions to critical
infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Extreme weather events
Geoeconomic confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource shortages
Non-weather related natural disasters
Online harms
Pollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or labour shortages
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Asset bubble bursts
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Concentration of strategic resources
Crime and illicit economic activity
Critical change to Earth systems
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Debt
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain
Disruptions to critical
infrastructure
Economic downturn
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Extreme weather events
Geoeconomic confrontation
Inequality
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections
Intrastate violence
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource shortages
Non-weather related natural disasters
Online harms
Pollution
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
Talent and/or labour shortages
Global Risks Report 2025 43
the heightened frequency or intensity of these risks
over the course of the 10-year horizon (Figure 2.1).
Environmental and, to a lesser degree, technological
risks dominate the long-term global risks landscape
according to the GRPS. In fact, nearly all
environmental risks are included in the top 10 (Figure
2.2). Extreme weather events are anticipated to
become even more severe, with the risk ranked first
over the next decade for the second year running.
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse ranks #2,
up from #3 last year and with a significant deterioration
compared to its two-year ranking (#21). Critical
change to Earth systems at #3, Natural resource
shortages at #4 and Pollution at #10 complete the
very bleak outlook for environmental risks.
Technological risks fare little better than
environmental risks over the next 10 years. Adverse
outcomes of AI technologies follows Biodiversity
loss and ecosystem collapse as one of the risks
expected to increase in severity the most from the
two-year to the 10-year timeframe, ranking #6 on
the 10-year risk outlook compared to #31 on the
two-year risk outlook.
Societal risks round out the top 10 on the 10-year
horizon. Inequality (wealth, income) stands at #7,
followed by Societal polarization at #8. This is an
important pair of risks to watch, given how related
they can be to bouts of social instability, and to
both domestic political and geostrategic instability.
In super-ageing societies, such as Japan, South
Global risks over the long term (10 years), ranked by severityF I G U R E 2 . 2
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Please estimate the likely impact (severity) of the following risks over a 10-year period."
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Inequality
Cyber espionage and warfare
Societal polarization
Pollution
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Extreme weather events
Critical change to Earth systems
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Natural resource shortages
Misinformation and disinformation
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Korea, Italy or Germany, unfavourable demographic
trends could accentuate these societal risks over
the next 10 years. Pensions crises and labour
shortages in the long-term care sector are likely
to become acute problems, with no easy fix
for governments. Section 2.5, Super-ageing
societies explores this risk theme.
Economic risks fall mostly in the bottom half of the
10-year risk ranking and have remained relatively
stable compared to last year’s survey. But as
Section 2.6, Looking back: 20 years of the
Global Risks Report shows, economic risks tend
to be volatile over time – meaning that an economic
crisis should not be ruled out over the next 10
years. One significant area of concern is Crime and
illicit economic opportunity, which has increased
16 positions year-on-year to #15 in the 10-year
ranking.
Geopolitical risks, despite topping the immediateterm
ranking and featuring among the top 10 in the
short-term ranking are noticeably absent from the
top 10 rankings when it comes to the outlook for
the next decade. Nonetheless, State-based armed
conflict has increased from #15 last year to #12,
and there has been an uptick in the Biological,
chemical or nuclear weapons risk by seven
positions to #19. State-based armed conflict
remains a long-term concern for respondents from
the Middle East and Northern Africa in particular;
this is the only region with a geopolitical risk in the
top five (Figure 2.3).
The overall 10-year risk outlook has remained
relatively stable compared to last year’s Global
Risks Report, suggesting that little has been
achieved when it comes to risk mitigation or
solutions. Extreme weather events (#1), Natural
resource shortages (#4), Misinformation and
disinformation (#5), Adverse outcomes of AI
(#6) and Pollution (#10) rank identically compared
to last year’s edition. However, when it comes
to Pollution, it is noticeable that younger survey
respondents are especially concerned, with the
under 30s age group ranking it at #3. There is
also divergence across stakeholder groups in how
Pollution is ranked, with government respondents,
Global Risks Report 2025 44
civil society and academia placing Pollution
as a top 10 risk, but not the private sector or
international organizations (Figure 2.4).
Section 2.3, Pollution at a crossroads explores
under-appreciated pollutant risks that are likely to
become more top of mind by 2035, given their
significant impacts on health and ecosystems.
Unless concrete action is taken today to address
polluting activities, these impacts will only worsen.
Looking further down the 10-year risk ranking
(Chapter 1, Figure G), many positions have
remained stable year-on-year, including
Concentration of strategic resources and
technologies (#13), Censorship and surveillance
(#14), Asset bubble bursts (#30), Inflation (#32)
and Non-weather related natural disasters (#33)
as the lowest-ranked risk. Adverse outcomes of
frontier technologies (#23) has also remained
relatively stable, increasing just one position since
last year’s report. The risks that have seen the
biggest falls in their 10-year ranking compared
to last year’s report are Intrastate violence, down
seven positions to #29 and Decline in health and
well-being, down eight positions to #28.
The latter three risks – Adverse outcomes of
frontier technologies, Intrastate violence, and
Decline in health and well-being – are all related
to Section 2.4, Losing control of biotech?, which
provides an in-depth analysis of risks in the sector.
Advances in biotech are leading to increasingly fast
progress in medicine and explain, perhaps, some
of the increased optimism regarding the Decline
in health and well-being risk. But this progress
comes alongside new low-probability, but highimpact
risks. These include interstate or Intrastate
violence from biological terrorism, and Adverse
outcomes of frontier technologies involving
accidental or malicious misuse of gene editing
technologies or of brain-computer interfaces.
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Extreme weather events
Critical change to
Earth systems
Natural resource shortages
Pollution
Latin America
and the Caribbean
Extreme weather events
Critical change to
Earth systems
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Societal polarization
Natural resource shortages
Northern America
Extreme weather events
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Critical change to
Earth systems
Natural resource shortages
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Eastern Asia
Cyber espionage and
warfare
Adverse outcomes of
AI technologies
State-based armed
conflict
Natural resource shortages
Extreme weather events
Middle East and
Northern Africa
Extreme weather events
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Critical change to
Earth systems
Misinformation and
disinformation
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Europe
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Extreme weather events
Lack of economic
opportunity
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Natural resource shortages
Sub-Saharan Africa
Critical change to
Earth systems
Extreme weather events
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Adverse outcomes of
AI technologies
Misinformation and
disinformation
South-Eastern Asia
Extreme weather events
Pollution
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Critical change to
Earth systems
Inequality
Southern Asia
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Global risks over the long term (10 years), by regionF I G U R E 2 . 3
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Note
Each column represents the top 5 risks by region. Sample size by region varied, and all respondents
were weighted equally for the purposes of global rankings. The results are based on the following:
Eastern Asia, n = 38 (4% of total), Europe, n = 345 (40%), Latin America and the Caribbean, n = 105
(12%), Middle East and Northern Africa, n = 52 (6%), Northern America, n = 140 (16%),
South-Eastern Asia, n = 46 (5%), Southern Asia, n = 78 (9%) and Sub-Saharan Africa, n = 49 (6%).
Global Risks Report 2025 45
Extreme weather events
Critical change to
Earth systems
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Misinformation and
disinformation
Pollution
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Societal polarization
Inequality
Natural resource shortages
State-based armed
conflict
Academia
Extreme weather events
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Critical change to
Earth systems
Cyber espionage and
warfare
Misinformation and
disinformation
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Societal polarization
Natural resource shortages
State-based armed
conflict
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Private sector
Extreme weather events
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Critical change to
Earth systems
Natural resource shortages
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Pollution
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Misinformation and
disinformation
Societal polarization
Inequality
Civil society
Extreme weather events
Critical change to
Earth systems
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Inequality
Misinformation and
disinformation
Natural resource
shortages
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Pollution
Concentration of
strategic resources
Government
Extreme weather events
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Critical change to
Earth systems
Natural resource shortages
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Concentration of
strategic resources
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Societal polarization
Inequality
Misinformation and
disinformation
International
organizations
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
Global risks over the long term (10 years), by stakeholder groupF I G U R E 2 . 4
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 46
Structural forces2.2
In last year’s Global Risks Report, we introduced
the concept of Structural forces into our analysis
of global risks. Four spheres – technological,
geostrategic, climatic and demographic – continue
to form the backdrop to the global risks that will
play out over the next decade and beyond.
We define these Structural forces as the longterm
shifts in the arrangement of, and relationships
between, the systemic elements of the global
landscape. These forces have the potential to
materially impact the speed, spread or scope of
global risks, and will in turn be influenced by each
other. We are continuing to witness how these
structural forces are converging, accelerating and
creating instability in societies, economies and
institutions. If left unaddressed, they could steer
our world toward an increasingly fractured and
unsustainable path.
The four Structural forces are summarized in
Box 2.1. They are Technological acceleration;
Geostrategic shifts; Climate change; and
Demographic bifurcation. While all four forces
have global ramifications, some, such as climate
change, are more multi-directional in their
development, which could allow for several potential
futures. Similarly, while all represent longer-term
shifts to the structural landscape, some have the
potential to manifest more quickly due to underlying
variables. Geostrategic shifts, for example, may
lead to further divergence between leading powers,
while technological acceleration can foster new
discoveries that transform systems rapidly. As the
results of the GRPS show, the Structural forces’
influence on the global risks landscape is well
underway.
Structural forcesB O X 2 . 1
Technological acceleration relates to development
pathways of emerging technologies and the expected
significant developments over the next 10 years.
Section 1.5: Technology and polarization analyses
risks associated with citizens’ rising digital footprints
in the context of Societal polarization, while Section
2.4: Losing control of biotech? explores the risks
associated with accelerating progress in biotech.
Climate change encompasses the range of possible
trajectories of global warming and consequences to
Earth systems. As a Structural force, climate change
is closely related to trends in pollution: Unsustainable
patterns of production and consumption are driving
increasing pollution of air, water and land, with the
nature and scale of impacts on health and ecosystems
still coming to light. This is explored in Section 2.3:
Pollution at a crossroads.
Geostrategic shifts refers to evolving sources and
concentration of geopolitical power. This, in turn,
influences the global order, impacting alliances and
their dynamics, as well as the offensive and defensive
projection of soft and hard power. The ongoing loss
of support for current multilateral institutions, and its
impacts for global stability and humanitarian needs, is
explored in Section 1.3: “Geopolitical recession”,
while Section 1.4: Supercharged economic tensions
focuses on the risks of global trade fragmenting.
Demographic bifurcation refers to changes in the
size, growth and structure of populations around
the world. While some countries are super-ageing
societies, with over 20% of their populations aged
over 65 years old, others have far younger population
structures. Section 2.5: Super-ageing societies
examines key risks that these countries are likely to
experience – pensions crises and a long-term care
crunches – as well as the knock-on impacts worldwide.
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2024.
Note
Refer to Appendix A: Definitions and Global Risks List for
further detail.
Global Risks Report 2025 47
Pollution at a crossroads2.3
	– Short-lived climate pollutants such as black carbon and methane are accelerating the pace of climate
change.
	– Freshwater and ocean pollution are severely impacting human and ecosystem health, with antimicrobial
pollution emerging as an increasing concern.
	– Nitrogen and waste pollution are becoming more costly, generating a range of health and ecosystem
impacts.
Pollution ranks #10 in the GRPS 10-year risk
ranking, with 23% of respondents expressing
maximal concern (Figure 2.5). Moreover, it is
noticeable that younger survey respondents are
especially alarmed, with the under 30s age group
ranking it at #3 in the 10-year risk ranking.
In 2024, six of the nine “planetary boundaries”
for environmental health were crossed, with a
seventh boundary in jeopardy.1
These boundaries
contribute to the stability of the world’s lifesupport
system, including our economies and
societies. Unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption are driving climate change, Pollution,
and biodiversity loss, referred to by the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) as the Triple Planetary Crisis.2
Pollution
is the world’s largest environmental risk factor for
disease and premature deaths,3
and its impacts
are unequal, with 92% of Pollution-related deaths
and the greatest burden of related economic losses
occurring in low- and middle-income countries.4
Pollution poses greater risks in specific
geographies and disproportionately affects
vulnerable groups of the population that are
exposed to higher levels of Pollution. Marginalized
communities, urban areas and industrial zones
bear the large brunt of its impacts due to proximity
to sources of emissions, including waste disposal
sites, and often limited green spaces. These
disparities create further inequities in healthcare
access and burden, as well as in economic costs.
By 2035, the compounded effects of Pollution
threaten to erode ecosystem resilience, diminishing
its ability to sustain life and deliver essential
services. Decline in health and well-being
(Figure 2.6) is increasingly associated with pollutant
exposure, including the rising incidences of
cardiovascular diseases, respiratory conditions,
infertility rates and cancer.5
Anthropogenic activities are key drivers of all
types of Pollution. These activities are expected
to increase further over the next decade unless a
different course of action is taken. Some polluting
activities and pollutants are addressed under
climate adaptation and mitigation efforts, including
the drive towards net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. However, there is a concerning common
denominator of many countries’ green transition
pathways: explicit, comprehensive plans for tackling
the mounting health and ecosystem impacts of
Pollution are missing.
Economies globally are at different stages of the
green transition. In the EOS, executives were asked
Short- (2 years) and long-term (10 years) risk severity score: PollutionF I G U R E 2 . 5
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
10-year rank: 10nd
Introduction of harmful materials into the air, water and soil stemming from human activity, resulting in impacts to and loss of human life,
financial loss and/or damage to ecosystems. Includes, but is not limited to: household and industrial activities; environmental accidents
such as oil spills; and radioactive contamination.
10-year average risk severity score: 5.1
7
High Low
6 5 4 3 2 1
Severity
Proportion of respondents
Note
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale
[1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity]. The percentages in the
graphs may not add up to 100% because values have
been rounded up/down.
2 years
2%
2%
10 years
9%
23% 24% 20% 15% 12% 5%
12% 20% 26% 21% 10%
Proportion of respondents
Global Risks Report 2025 48
to identify the top five risks most likely to pose the
biggest threat to their respective country in the next
two years. While Pollution (air, water, soil) ranks
#18 of the 34 global risks, it emerges as the #1
concern in Central Asia and as a leading concern in
Southern Asia (#6) and among lower-middle income
economies (#11). At the country level, Pollution
ranks among the top three risks in 10 countries,
including Malta, Azerbaijan, Ghana, and Kosovo.
Particularly in densely populated countries such
as Bangladesh (#3) and India (#4), Pollution has
become one of the most critical challenges to tackle
(Figure 2.7).
A Pollution-conscious green transition is needed.
Some of the pollutants that must be accounted for
in that transition are newer or emerging, not well
understood, or do not yet have enough evidence
of their potential impacts. Different pollutants
tend to come under the regulatory spotlight only
as our awareness of their profound long-term
impacts on health and ecosystems grows. Better
understanding these pollutants and their impacts
is a first step towards both targeted policies and
adaptive strategies. The pollutants can be analysed
within the lenses of air, water and land - even
though, once introduced, they do not remain
confined to a single environmental domain but
create complex, interdependent impacts.
“Super pollutants” in the air
Air pollutants include particulate matter (PM),
ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and carbon
monoxide. Exposure to air pollutants is a particularly
severe health risk for vulnerable populations,
including children, pregnant women, people with
pre-existing or chronic health conditions, and the
elderly.6
Air Pollution also significantly reduces
work productivity, leading to increased sick
days and commensurate economic losses.7
Like
Pollution overall, air Pollution impacts societies
unequally, with people in lower and middle-income
countries exposed to higher risks.8
In 2024, people
in the most polluted areas of the world were found
to be breathing air at least six times more polluted
than those in the least polluted areas.9
Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), known
as “super pollutants”, are a group of pollutants
that remain in the atmosphere for a relatively
short period of time in comparison to longerlived
GHGs.10
However, these pollutants have a
disproportionately higher impact on air quality
and global warming. SLCPs include mainly black
carbon, methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and
tropospheric ozone. They are responsible for up to
45% of near-term global warming.11
Speed is crucial
for incorporating SLCP reductions into a Pollutionconscious
green transition.
Black carbon
Black carbon, more commonly known as soot, is
a SLCP that consists of tiny black particles that
can be carried for thousands of kilometres. It is
a component of PM, specifically PM2.5, which is
formed by the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels.
Its particles can penetrate the bloodstream through
the alveoli in lungs to transport toxic compounds
around the body.12
PM2.5 has been linked to a
wide range of health implications, including chronic
Global risk interconnections: PollutionF I G U R E 2 . 6
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Reference
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Critical change
to Earth systems
Decline in health
and well-being
Extreme weather
events
Infectious diseases
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Natural resource
shortages
Critical change
to Earth systems
Decline in health
and well-being
Extreme weather
events
Infectious diseases
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Natural resource
shortages
Edges
Relative influence
High
Low
Medium
Risk influence
Nodes
High
Low
Medium
PollutionPollution
Global Risks Report 2025 49
National risk perceptions: Pollution (air, water, soil)F I G U R E 2 . 7
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question “Which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
1st
10th
20th
31st
Rank
respiratory conditions, strokes, heart attacks and
cancer, as well as to early childhood development
issues and long-term effects on cognition and
health.13
The particles of black carbon also
affect the ecosystem by increasing plant surface
temperature, interfering with rainfall and diminishing
sunlight, which has a significant effect on crop
losses each year.14
Black carbon contributes to accelerating the
melting of ice and snow in polar and mountainous
areas. Tackling black carbon is a “win-win” for both
air Pollution and climate, as it is a particle that is up
to 1,500 times stronger than carbon dioxide (CO2
)
per unit of mass.15
While atmospheric warming is
an emerging area of research on black carbon, any
efforts to tackle the reduction of black carbon offer
a quicker solution when combined with ongoing
reduction of CO2
.
Sources of black carbon vary from region to
region and include sectors such as energy use
(commercial and residential), industrial production,
agricultural burning, combustion-powered
cookstoves, and forest wildfires. Addressing
black carbon emissions has the potential to slow
the rate of warming of the climate by up to 50%
worldwide and up to two-thirds in the Arctic,16
and
can be achieved through cost-effective, affordable
measures.17
Methane
Methane is a powerful SLCP with a warming
potential over 80 times that of CO2
over a 20year
period, which makes it a major contributor to
climate change.18
The main sources of methane
emissions include fossil fuels, agriculture and waste.
Methane has a relatively short atmospheric lifetime
of approximately 12 years, which means that
efforts to reduce methane can yield relatively rapid
climate benefits.19
It is a major precursor to groundlevel
ozone, an air pollutant that poses health
risks, decreases agricultural yields, and stresses
ecosystems.20
Failure to reduce methane emissions is recognized
as one of the most significant short-term risks
for limiting near-term global temperature rise.21
The Global Methane Pledge (GMP), supported by
159 countries, has set an ambitious target to cut
global methane emissions by 30% by 2030 from
2020 levels.22
Meeting the GMP has the potential
to reduce warming by at least 0.2 °C by 2050 and
Global Risks Report 2025 50
annually prevent 26 million tons of crop losses,
255,000 premature deaths, 775 thousand asthmarelated
hospitalizations and 73 billion hours of lost
labour due to extreme heat.23
Water pollutants
Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)
Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), also
known as “forever chemicals” are used in consumer
products to make them water, grease or stain
resistant. They are useful in many industries, and
are now being detected in our drinking water,
soil, air and food. They pose a significant threat to
people’s health, as they do not easily break down,
and are toxic at extremely low levels.24
Exposure to
certain levels of PFAS can lead to significant health
impacts, including decreased fertility in women,
developmental delays in children, increased risk
of certain cancers and reduced ability of the body
to fight infections.25
Governments are increasingly
showing concern over the impacts of PFAS
Pollution, and regulations are emerging to limit
human exposure.
Micro- and nanoplastics
The world is currently producing more than
430 million tonnes of plastic annually.26
Each
year, 19 million tonnes of plastic waste leak into
the environment – 13 million onto land and six
million into rivers and coastlines. Plastic does not
biodegrade,27
and over 99% of plastic is directly
derived from fossil fuels.28
Plastic Pollution in
aquatic environments includes Pollution from
shipping and fishing.29
Microplastics – pieces of plastic of less
than five millimetres wide – include plastics
originally manufactured to be that size (‘primary
microplastics’), for example microbeads, industrial
plastic powders and pellets, but also pieces of
plastic that have resulted from the degradation
and fragmentation of larger items, for example
plastic bottles, synthetic textiles and tyres. The
World Health Organization (WHO) concludes that
although further work is required to understand the
impacts of microplastics on human and biodiversity
health,30
their presence has been detected both in
our bodies and in the air, causing rising concern.
Microplastics also affect the soil ecosystem and
restrict the growth of plants,31
both in marine and
freshwater settings. Nanoplastics – pieces of plastic
even smaller than microplastics at 100-1,000
nanometers wide – are an emerging area of high
risk, as there is an increased chance of them being
ingested, inhaled or absorbed.
Chemicals present in plastics are endocrine
disrupting, interfering with hormone actions in the
body. These chemicals can be released during the
entire life cycle, with more than 13,000 chemical
substances identified.32
This is an area of emerging
research and concern given that endocrinedisrupting
chemicals are linked to significant health
effects including infertility, obesity, cancer, thyroid
problems and developmental issues.33
Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceutical Pollution falls into the category of
“contaminants of emerging concern”,34
alongside
personal care products, sunscreen, insect
repellents and detergents, which all tend to be
long-lived and therefore accumulate at low levels
over long periods of time in the environment. While
pharmaceuticals have been well-established as
water pollutants for decades, it is only recently that
the extent and nature of that Pollution is starting
to be assessed.35
This is currently an unregulated
category of pollutants.
Antimicrobial resistance in both people and animals
is in part associated with antimicrobials entering
water bodies, along with overuse and misuse of
antimicrobials. Antimicrobials are medicines that
are used to treat infections in people, animals and
plants and include a range of antibiotics, antivirals,
antifungals and antiparasitics.36
Antimicrobials,
when released into water from manufacturing
waste, healthcare facilities, farming, and directly
from consumers (both people and animals), can
remain in the environment. Globally, there is
insufficient awareness of and incentives among
manufacturers and users of antimicrobials for
sparing usage and correct disposal. The WHO
issued guidelines on antimicrobial Pollution from
medicines manufacturing in September 2024,
aimed at providing a basis for better practices and
regulation.37
Muhammad Numan, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 51
Nitrogen and waste disposal
Nitrogen
Industrial agriculture has long been dependent
on nitrogenous fertilizers to increase productivity.
This has resulted in nitrogen Pollution becoming
a major contaminant of soil, water and air. A key
part of the problem is that the more these fertilizers
are used to increase crop yields, the more is lost
to the environment, escaping into water and the
atmosphere, the latter as ammonia.
If groundwater becomes contaminated with
nitrogen it can become a health issue. For example,
high nitrate levels in drinking water can cause
reproductive problems, methemoglobinemia,
colorectal cancer, thyroid disease and neural
tube defects.38
Nitrogen in rivers flows into the
sea causing eutrophication of coastal waters, a
phenomenon generating various seawater health
issues. Recent evidence shows that eutrophication
is a problem that is on a worsening trend.39
Livestock manure and fertilizers in agriculture are
responsible for 81% of ammonia emissions into the
air globally. That contributes to 50% (in the EU) and
30% (in the United States) of PM2.5 air Pollution,
causing chronic illnesses that can lead to premature
mortality.40
Livestock manure and fertilizer use also
leads to nitrous oxide production, a potent GHG,
and the most important substance for the depletion
of the stratospheric ozone layer, with implications
for the increased occurrence of skin cancer.
Waste disposal
Waste can be categorized by origin (e.g. municipal
solid waste or industrial waste), character (e.g.
hazardous waste or organic waste) or type (e.g.
e-waste or healthcare waste). Improper waste
disposal can lead to the spread of infectious
diseases, the release of methane, and exposure to
Pollution from chemicals released through landfills,
organic waste, and burning of waste. For example,
exposure to improperly managed e-waste and its
components can release a wide range of different
chemical particles into the environment, which can
have multiple adverse health and developmental
impacts, especially in young children and pregnant
women.
Without urgent action on waste management,
by 2050 its global annual cost – factoring in both
the direct cost and the hidden costs of Pollution,
ill health and climate change from poor waste
disposal practices – could almost double from $361
billion to $640 billion.41
Actions for today
A. Improve monitoring, reporting and evaluation
systems
For many emerging pollutants, such as
nanoplastics, there is a lack of reliable data
on health risks including reproductive and
developmental toxicity and longer-term effects
of low-level exposures. The GRPS finds that
the approach with the third-highest potential for
driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
regarding Pollution over the next 10 years is
Research and development (Figure 2.8). However,
a lack of real-time data or a unified system for
reporting, both nationally and internationally for
many pollutants makes it difficult to measure,
monitor and act. There must be an improvement
Risk Governance: PollutionF I G U R E 2 . 8
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2024-2025.
“Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10
years? Select up to three for each risk.”
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Pollution (air, soil, water, etc.)Share of respondents
Approach
a. Financial instruments
b. National and local regulations
c. Minilateral treaties and
agreements
d. Global treaties and
agreements
e. Development assistance
f. Corporate strategies
g. Research & development
h. Public awareness and
education
i. Multistakeholder engagement
Global Risks Report 2025 52
of the current monitoring, reporting and evaluation
(MRE) systems to identify and understand emerging
risks of pollutants and track progress over time.
By improving existing MRE systems and sharing
protocols, stakeholders can inform policy decisions,
enhance transparency on pollutants and increase
targeted interventions on Pollution sources and
their impacts.
B. Strengthen regulatory frameworks
To mitigate the health and ecosystem impacts of
pollutants, more holistic and pre-emptive regulatory
action is needed. Actions taken today can reduce
the impacts of Pollution to 2035. According
to a report by UNEP, approximately one-third
of countries worldwide lack legally mandated
standards for outdoor air quality.42
A Pollutionconscious
future requires building upon and
strengthening regulatory frameworks to include
and address well-established pollutants, but also
new and emerging challenges. National and local
regulations is identified by GRPS respondents
as the approach with the most potential for
driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
regarding Pollution over the next 10 years (Figure
2.8). Effective regulation requires adaptive policies
informed by ongoing scientific research.
C. Unlock ambitious funding
Chronic underfunding of initiatives on Pollution
persists. For example, less than 1% of all
international development funding ($17.3 billion)
was expressly committed to targeting outdoor
air Pollution between 2015 and 2021.43
Largescale,
integrated and private-public-philanthropic
collaborative action on funding is required for
Pollution prevention at local, national and
international scale. Innovative funding mechanisms
will be required to address the transboundary
nature of Pollution. For example, international
financial institutions and multilateral development
banks can further support Pollution mitigation
efforts by providing concessional loans or grants.
One specific area requiring more funding is
technological solutions. Many existing technologies
make certain types of Pollution mitigation not
only feasible, but economically advantageous by
creating healthier environments and improving
human health. Examples include improving waste
management with advanced filtration systems and
proper segregation at source, and methane capture
technologies. Deploying current technologies
widely and immediately, while continuously refining
approaches as data improves, sets the foundation
for a healthier, sustainable and resilient future.
Governments can incentivize the integration of
such technologies into industrial practices. Publicprivate
collaboration in this area to unlock ambitious
funding can help turn Pollution challenges into
opportunities.
Photoholgic, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 53
	– It is becoming easier for threat actors to make use of advances in biotech to modify or create new
biological agents, which if released could lead to pandemics or be used in targeted biological attacks.
	– While biotech is offering groundbreaking solutions for health issues, these can come with new risks,
from possible clinical complications to unknown long-term impacts.
	– Unless comprehensive global ethical boundaries are set for biotech developments, then ethical
concerns are likely to be disregarded by some, leading to new sources of division and conflict within
societies.
Losing control of biotech?2.4
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies,
including biotech, is one of the risks with the
sharpest rise in GRPS ranking between the twoyear
and 10-year time horizons, by ten positions
to #23. This divergence shows that, while global
risks stemming from the field of biotech are not top
of mind today, they will become more so within
a decade. There are three sets of risks in biotech
that need to be watched closely over the coming
years: Rising accessibility of bioweapons; negative
health impacts as the flipside of efforts to cure or
prevent health issues; and the potential for those
with access to leading-edge biotech to cross ethical
boundaries.
In each of these three areas, the first warning
signs are already emerging. Risks will grow over
time and become more complex as further rapid
technological progress is made. Advances in
biotech are being supercharged by convergent
technologies such as AI and machine learning
approaches, streamlining the ability of both
legitimate researchers and threat actors to make
sense of large datasets.
Regional and national responses in the EOS reveal
pockets of heightened concern around Adverse
outcomes of frontier technologies, including
biotech. Several nations, such as Qatar, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Switzerland and Demark, assign this risk
relatively high significance, reflecting their unique
geopolitical or economic priorities. High-income
regions exhibit moderate concern overall, whereas
emerging economies have lower short-term
rankings for this risk but may face rising exposure
as technology adoption accelerates (Figure 2.10).
These risks come alongside tremendous new
opportunities for breakthrough improvements
not only in health, but also well-being, as well
as agriculture, the development of new building
materials, mining and many other areas.44
Within
a decade, products made using synthetic biology
will permeate our societies much more than
today,45
and the tech-driven bioeconomy will play
an increasingly important role in climate-change
mitigation.46
The scope of opportunities related to
human genome editing, specifically, accelerated
following the award in 2020 of the Nobel Prize
in Chemistry to Emmanuelle Charpentier and
Jennifer Doudna for their development of Clustered
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats associated
protein 9 (CRISPR-Cas9), a technology
that allows for precise cuts in DNA to modify
Short- (2 years) and long-term (10 years) risk severity score:
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
F I G U R E 2 . 9
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2024-2025.
10-year rank: 23rd
Intended or unintended negative consequences of advances in frontier technologies on individuals, businesses, ecosystems and/or
economies. Includes, but is not limited to: biotechnology; geo-engineering; and quantum computing.
10-year average risk severity score: 4.5
7
High Low
6 5 4 3 2 1
Severity
Proportion of respondents
Note
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale
[1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity]. The percentages in the
graphs may not add up to 100% because values have
been rounded up/down.
2 years
1%
10 years
3%
13% 18% 20% 20% 16% 9% 4%
8% 16% 23% 32% 16%
Global Risks Report 2025 54
genetic code. Genome editing technologies,
including CRISPR-Cas9, have already been used
to treat gene-related diseases such as sickle cell
disease and haemophilia, among others. There
has also, for example, been recent success in
treating an inherited condition that causes vision
loss in childhood.47
Gene editing technologies are
also used in some areas of research into cancer48
and viruses such as HIV,49
and there is hope that
CRISPR-Cas9 could be used to counter antibiotic
resistance. Overall, some 2,000 gene therapies are
under development worldwide.50
Many of these will
become available within a decade, representing
previously unthinkable progress. Eventually, gene
therapies may become seen as an obvious choice
to protect against disease, as vaccinations are
today.
Significant progress is taking place in another
promising field: brain-computer interfaces. The first
people suffering from quadriplegia have received
brain implants connecting their neural signals to
digital devices.51
Further, alternative technology (in
several cases with sensors attached to the outside
of the head and neck) is being applied to facilitate
communication between the brain and artificial
limbs, benefiting, for example, war veterans or
people with motor neurone disease.52
Broadening bioweapons threat
Risk perceptions around Adverse outcomes of
frontier technologies are likely in part to reflect
the fear that militaries and terrorists will continue to
pursue new uses of biotech as more potent and
stealth forms of weaponry. Attaining and building out
biotech leadership is likely to rise up the agendas
of leading militaries. Over the next decade, biotechbased
weapons could also become increasingly
integrated with other (non-biological) weaponry.
Cyber espionage and warfare, and Biological,
chemical or nuclear weapons and hazards used in
combination have far greater, compounding impacts
than when used on their own.
Advances in AI-driven biotech will make biological
weapons easier and cheaper to develop over the
next decade.53
The weapons themselves could
be made more harmful than previous versions.54
Or, they could be different to those previously
built in that they might eventually be focused on
specific target groups of people based on genetic
characteristics, leaving other people unharmed.
Over the next decade there is also a risk that
non-state actors could develop such weapons,
National risk perceptions: Adverse outcomes of frontier technologiesF I G U R E 2 . 1 0
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question “which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
Rank
1st
10th
20th
30th
34th
Global Risks Report 2025 55
increasing the severity of future terrorist attacks.
One area of particular concern is dual use of AI
models: In a laboratory experiment reported in
2022, an AI system that had previously been used
for medicinal drug discovery was trained to find
and combine toxicity molecules. Within only six
hours, 40,000 compounds at least as toxic as
the sample nerve agent had been generated.55
Theoretically, there is an unlimited number of new
toxic substances that could be created using
such models.56
The researchers involved in the
experiment emphasized that the computing power
and software required for such experiments is easily
attainable today.57
Experts are also warning about the relative ease
with which viruses capable of infecting humans,
such as monkeypox or smallpox, could be
enhanced to evade human immune systems,
making standard vaccines ineffective. With the
tools and information required to alter a pathogen’s
genetic code becoming easier to access, it may
only be a matter of time before a threat actor
releases a virus that causes the next pandemic.58
As the costs of setting up a laboratory and
purchasing the necessary equipment are relatively
limited, the main barrier to threat actors misusing
advances in biotech is having the scientific expertise
itself – a barrier that will be far from insurmountable
over the next decade. Of course, it will also take
considerable (and unrelated) expertise to translate
the creation of new toxic substances into the
building of weaponry, given the complexities of
transporting and disseminating the substances
created. But unlike in the nuclear sector, where
strict protocols and monitoring of materials and
equipment make proliferation efforts relatively easy
for governments to detect, this set of conditions
is not present in the same way when it comes to
weaponizing biotech.
Biotech can also provide a bridge from the biological
world to the cyber realm. As far back as 2017,
researchers in the United States demonstrated
that it was possible to hack a computer using DNA
sequence data. Under certain preconditions, they
were able to introduce malware into DNA purchased
online (at minimal cost), which was read and then
processed by a computer that in turn became
compromised by the malware.59
Looking ahead
a decade, as Cyber espionage and warfare
becomes more sophisticated and more people
become acquainted with biotech developments, it
is conceivable that the researchers’ warning – that
hackers could use the DNA sequences from faked
blood samples to gain access to hack computers
– could come true.60
Indeed, GRPS respondents
express concern with the risk interconnection
between Adverse outcomes of frontier
technologies and Cyber espionage and warfare,
as shown in Figure 2.11 below.
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Censorship and surveillance
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Inequality
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Online harms
Societal polarization
Adverse outcomes
of AI technologies
Censorship and surveillance
Crime and illicit
economic activity
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Decline in health
and well-being
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Inequality
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Online harms
Societal polarization
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Adverse outcomes
of frontier technologies
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons or hazards
Risk interconnections: Adverse outcomes of frontier technologiesF I G U R E 2 . 1 1
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Edges
Relative influence
High
Low
Medium
Risk influence
Nodes
High
Low
Medium
Reference
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 56
Opaque health concerns
Beyond modifying biological agents and creating
new ones for bioweaponry and terrorism, over
the coming years there will be other opportunities
to misuse – accidentally or on purpose –
technologies for editing DNA and applying that
to human cells (as well as animals, plants and
ecosystems). Part of the trouble with human
genome editing technology is that it is too new to
predict its long-term effects on both the individuals
being treated and future generations.
Problems can arise at the time an individual
is receiving gene editing therapy. These may
involve a range of clinical complications61
or
off-target effects (which are very common for
CRISPR-Cas9). In some gene editing processes,
an individual’s genome is subject to significant
rearrangements, which have the potential to
generate other health issues, such as cancer
or even new genetic diseases that are not yet
understood by scientists and doctors.
In 2018, twins with the genomes of their embryos
edited to be resistant to HIV were born in China.
The case remains unique in the world – as far as is
publicly known – and caused ethical controversy
at the time. The twins were guaranteed anonymity
by the Chinese government and so there has
not been any publicly available tracking of their
subsequent health status. The case demonstrates
the reach of the technology, and other such
surprise announcements by state or non-state
actors cannot be excluded over the next decade.
Although it may still be generally perceived to
be a low-probability risk today, there only needs
to be one instance of nefarious application of
human genome editing (possibly in an unregulated
or non-professional environment) for serious
consequences to result, perhaps involving loss of
control with cascading health impacts.
Other areas of biotech present health risks that
are also still somewhat opaque. For now, the risks
associated with brain-computer interfaces appear
distant, but this could change over 10 years. One
category of risks is of a clinical nature, involving
possible damage to the brain if the medical
intervention is not carried out correctly or in case
of complications. A growing number of individual
biohackers are already implanting various small
devices in different parts of their bodies, some of
which they intend to link to the internet. These
operations are often undertaken at considerable
risk to themselves. If this trend catches on, it could
lead not only to unforeseen medical complications
for some of the individuals involved, but ultimately
also to a world in which person-to-person
connections start being replaced by permanent
person-machine connectivity, partially divorced
from physical reality. The COVID-19 pandemic
highlighted the devastating impact of lessening
face-to-face interaction; developments such as
this have the potential to magnify that.
Crossing ethical boundaries
The wide variety of applications of genome
editing, from enhancing health or performance to
editing foetuses, leads to difficult ethical questions
around where the use of these technologies
should stop. For example, would it be ethical to
apply gene editing to change a child’s eye or skin
colour, to modify height or, if that were to become
possible, to increase intelligence? What might be
unintended consequences, in current or future
generations, of editing genes and entire genomes
in these ways?
Toon Lambrechts,
Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 57
The societal consequences also bear
consideration. There is a risk of a future world in
which a select global few have access to and use
human genome editing technology to become
stronger, healthier and happier, with the rest of the
population – which over a 10-year timeframe is still
likely to be the vast majority – unable to afford it.
Gene therapy treatment, such as CAR-T therapy
(an immunotherapy for cancer) for one person
can easily cost half a million dollars or more for
the therapy alone.62
The limited access to such
technologies is likely to represent another source
of Inequality, exacerbating Societal polarization
and political tensions.
Inequality and ethical considerations will
increasingly also play out among countries. The
concentration of biotech innovation among a few
dominant biotech companies and countries could
result in limited access to everyone else. This
could leave low-income economies vulnerable
due to limited awareness and expertise. The
interconnection between Adverse outcomes of
frontier technologies and the Concentration of
strategic resources and technologies, observed
in the EOS, highlights this risk.
The push for rapid progress will also increasingly
test ethical boundaries in the domain of braincomputer
interfaces. As more people opt for
having a brain-computer interface, the time
is likely to come over the next decade when
demand will arise for the technology from those
who are interested in enhancing the performance
of their brains, potentially augmenting their own
knowledge or productivity with an AI “add on”. At
some point in this chain of developments, serious
risks will emerge. The digital device to which the
individual is connected may be able to “read” the
thoughts of the individual, compromising privacy.
This could represent a substantive form of control
over the individual by whoever is managing the
connected device and its online content, whether
that controller is an organization or the state.
The individual might only be able to reverse the
situation by having the implant removed.
Actions for today
All stakeholders should act today to safeguard
human development and ecosystems over the
coming decade and beyond, allowing the benefits
of biotech to be reaped while limiting the scope for
adverse impacts. Specific areas to focus on are:
A. Build a global set of norms
The pace of change in the sector is so fast that
regulators globally struggle to keep up. Rising
geopolitical tensions suggest that the political will
for a comprehensive cross-border agreement on
acceptable uses of biotech is unlikely to be present
for some time, posing an ongoing challenge. But
ultimately, intergovernmental agreements will be
required to keep biotech risks under control. If
one or more countries deviate from ethical and
technical protocols, there is every chance that
malicious or accidental developments in biotech
will quickly become a problem for other countries,
as well. As part of such a new framework, a global
ethical oversight body should be established,
consisting of individuals respected worldwide for
their humanity and ethical positions, as well as
top minds on biotech itself who are able to keep
abreast of cutting-edge Research & development
and help to direct government efforts in this
Risk Governance: Adverse outcomes of frontier technologiesF I G U R E 2 . 1 2
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
“Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10
years? Select up to three for each risk.”
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
(quantum, biotech, geoengineering)
Share of respondents
Approach
a. Financial instruments
b. National and local regulations
c. Minilateral treaties and
agreements
d. Global treaties and
agreements
e. Development assistance
f. Corporate strategies
g. Research & development
h. Public awareness and
education
i. Multistakeholder engagement
Global Risks Report 2025 58
regard. Research & development was listed
by GRPS respondents as the top approach for
mitigating risks from Adverse outcomes of frontier
technologies (Figure 2.12).
Pending such an intergovernmental agreement,
which could take years, a less ambitious objective
for the short term would be to establish and agree
on a set of broad norms to guide government
policies on biotech worldwide. Leading bioethics
experts have emphasized the importance of
broad-based dialogue across societies63
to help
establish such norms. Regarding human genome
editing specifically, progress has already been
made in this regard: the WHO in 2019 established
an expert advisory committee to examine the
scientific, ethical, social and legal challenges
associated with it.64
The committee in 2021
published a framework for governance65
covering
the key applications of human genome editing
as well as a set of recommendations.66
This is
helpful guidance for countries, many of which do
not yet have a legal framework covering all human
genome editing applications.
B. Empower people through biotech education
Biosafety rules exist and are strictly adhered to
in most countries when it comes to recognized
institutions undertaking work on gene editing.
They include, for example, storage requirements,
design of laboratories, protocols to safeguard the
health of researchers and measures to prevent
the escape of organisms into the environment.67
However, individuals and communities that are
outside of recognized institutions, and who are
experimenting with biotech also need to be made
aware of and adhere to these biosafety rules.
In the years ahead, understanding the risks in the
field of biotech is going to become increasingly
important at an individual level. Misinformation
and disinformation around biotech is a serious
problem, with biohackers who are not medical
professionals touting health remedies or
performance-enhancing procedures based on
biotech. As these uses of biotech become more
ubiquitous, individuals will need to gain a more
nuanced understanding of when it can be helpful
to them, and when it may pose a danger to their
health. A collaborative educational effort between
the public sector, companies in the Biotech sector,
and educational institutions should be launched to
deepen citizens’ understanding of the technology
and its risks.
C. Incentivize biotech leaders to work in the
public sector
The public sector needs to continue to focus
on making it attractive for the leading minds
in the Biotech sector to work there, amid stiff
competition from large pharma or technology
companies, biotech startups or academia. The
only way that regulators will be able to keep
up with developments in biotech over the next
decade will be to attract these top minds – if not
into full-time employment then at least in the form
of regular and intensive dialogue.
National Cancer Institute,
Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 59
Super-ageing societies2.5
	– Pension crises will start to bite over the next decade in super-ageing societies as dependency ratios rise
further and government finances are stretched.
	– Labour shortages in several sectors, in particular long-term care, are likely to become a characteristic of
super-ageing societies unless policies shift.
	– Super-ageing societies will pose global economic and labour-market challenges, even for countries still
benefiting from their demographic dividend.
Countries are termed “super-ageing” or “superaged”
when over 20% of their populations are
over 65 years old.68
Several countries have already
exceeded that mark, led by Japan69
and including
some countries in Europe.70
Many more countries
across Europe and Eastern Asia in particular are
projected do so by 2035. Globally, the number of
people aged 65 and older is expected to increase
by 36%, from 857 million in 2025 to 1.2 billion in
2035.71
By 2035, populations in super-ageing societies
could be experiencing a set of interconnected
and cascading risks that underscore the GRPS
finding that the severity – albeit not the ranking – of
the risk of Insufficient public infrastructure and
social protections is expected to rise from the
two-year to the 10-year time horizon (Figure 2.13).
An ongoing concern is that government funding
for public infrastructure and social protections gets
diverted during short-term crises.
Some super-ageing societies could be facing
crises in their state pensions systems as well as
in employer and private pensions, leading to more
financial insecurity in old age and exacerbated
pressure on the labour force, which includes a
growing number of unpaid caregivers. Indeed,
super-ageing societies by 2035 are likely to face
labour shortages.
Ranked second globally according to the EOS,
Labour and talent shortage is selected as the
top risk in Europe and Eastern Asia, where superageing
is most pronounced. Twenty-one countries
place the risk in first place, including two of the
most super-ageing societies, Japan and Germany,
while 40 other economies view it as one of the top
five risks (Figure 2.14).
The long-term care sector will be especially
affected by labour shortage. Care occupations are
expected to see significant demand growth globally
by 2030. Care systems – health care and social
care – in super-ageing societies are already under
clear and immediate strain. They will struggle to
serve a fast-growing population over 60 years of
age that has additional care needs while recruiting
and retaining enough care workers. Care systems
are, in great part, funded by governments and
account for about 381 million jobs globally – 11.5%
of total employment.72
The accumulation of debt
2%
Short- (2 years) and long-term (10 years) risk severity score: Insufficient public
infrastructure and social protections
F I G U R E 2 . 1 3
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
10-year rank: 24th
Non-existent, inadequate, or inequitable public infrastructure, services and social protections. Includes, but is not limited to: unaffordable
or inadequate social security and benefits; housing; public education; child and elderly care; healthcare; sanitation and transportation
systems; and pension systems.
10-year average risk severity score: 4.5
7
High Low
6 5 4 3 2 1
Severity
Proportion of respondents
Note
Severity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale
[1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity]. The percentages in the
graphs may not add up to 100% because values have
been rounded up/down.
2 years
10 years
5%
12% 15% 22% 23% 18% 8%
4%8% 17% 25% 26% 16%
Global Risks Report 2025 60
and competing spending needs on, for example,
security and defense are likely to constrain the
reach and sustainability of public expenditure
on care systems over the next decade. Without
increased public or blended investment, care
demand will continue to be unmet.
Economies already experiencing this challenge
are resorting to stop-gap measures, including
attracting migrant care workers from other
economies. But if this turns into a talent drain
from countries with more youthful societies, those
countries may then struggle to reap the benefits
of their demographic dividend and will, several
decades from now, run into super-ageing society
challenges of their own.
There will be no easy solutions to this problem
set, given the sustained strength to 2035 of the
two underlying trends generating higher average
dependency ratios, not only across super-ageing
societies, but at the global level: declining fertility
rates and rising life expectancy, though not
necessarily in better health.73
Pension crises
Over the next decade the pensions crises and
their implications will start hitting home in superageing
societies, as it becomes clear that current
state pension systems were designed for a
much younger demographic with fewer years of
retirement that needed funding. But it is not only
state pension systems that will be struggling.
Many employees are moving from Defined Benefits
to Defined Contribution schemes – putting the
onus on the individual to come up with strategies
for saving over a lifetime. However, for many
people this can be challenging as they may have
insufficient income, lack the requisite financial
understanding,74
or fail to make good early
decisions about savings and retirement.75
As dependency ratios rise, fewer people will be
contributing to employer and private pensions
schemes relative to the number of people whose
retirements need funding, and with the length of
those retirements rising. This will put pressure on
institutional pension funds, some of which may
seek to increase their returns by allocating higher
proportions of their assets to riskier investments,
such as crypto assets, private credit or other
National risk perceptions: Labour and/or talent shortageF I G U R E 2 . 1 4
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Executive Survey Opinion rank of national risks from the question “which five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your
country in the next two years?”
Rank
1st
10th
20th
30th
34th
Global Risks Report 2025 61
alternative investments. These riskier investments
will not always pay off, and over time this could
worsen the already suboptimal funding ratios of
some of these institutions. If there are extended
periods of market underperformance, this could
lead to many more individuals facing shortfalls in
funding their retirement.76
The pension gaps in super-ageing societies will be
exacerbated by the long-term impacts of the rise
of the “gig economy” and the associated failure
to make sufficient pensions contributions during
periods of gig work. Pension shortfalls will also
disproportionately affect lower-income workers
who have not managed to make significant savings
during their careers, even if they have been fully
employed. In the EU, for example, already today one
in five elderly people face the risk of poverty or social
exclusion77
and this figure is set to rise by 2035.
Women on average have significantly higher
pensions gaps than men given time taken out of
formal employment over the course of their careers
to care for children or elderly relatives, as well as
their lower average pay compared to men. In the
EU, women’s pensions are nearly 30% lower than
those of men, meaning that they are at a 35% higher
risk of poverty.78
The societal implications of Insufficient public
infrastructure and social protections, such as
pensions and care systems, are shown in Figure
2.15, which reveals that Inequality was selected by
GRPS respondents as a significant connected risk.
A common proposal for alleviating the pensions
crisis in super-ageing societies is raising the
statutory retirement age, and in some countries this
has already occurred. However, attempts to do this
to the extent needed to stem the pension crises
will face resistance from voters, a rising proportion
of whom are themselves close to retirement. This
segment of the population tends to have high voter
turnout, making it increasingly likely that policy
outcomes will be in their favour. Intergenerational
tensions could become an ongoing feature of superageing
societies, with discontented younger working
cohorts resenting being called upon to pay more
towards funding retiree pensions.
There is also a gap between what global executives
believe needs to be done to adjust pension schemes
and what they view as businesses’ responsibilities.
One-quarter of global executives (25%) support
policy changes to pension schemes and retirement
ages, but a lower share (14%) of executives view
such measures as an effective business practice for
expanding their talent base, as reported in the World
Economic Forum's Future of Jobs Report 2025. This
illustrates the complexity of aligning key stakeholder
interests behind pension reforms.
Even if official retirement ages can be increased, the
impact on reducing the scale of the pension crises
may be smaller than hoped for. Some people do
not manage to work to their expected retirement
age, as their working lives are cut short by illness or
disability, job loss or other reasons. The inability to
extend retirement age is an especially significant risk
for people in physically demanding jobs. However,
many would like to be upskilled or reskilled to be
able to extend their careers.
Risk interconnections: Insufficient public infrastructure and social protectionsF I G U R E 2 . 1 5
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Reference
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Edges
Relative influence
High
Low
Medium
Risk influence
Nodes
High
Low
Medium
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Decline in health
and well-being Inequality
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Societal polarization
Decline in health
and well-being Inequality
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Societal polarization
Global Risks Report 2025 62
Long-term care crunch
In super-ageing societies, the balance between
public sector, private sector and family support
in the provision of long-term care is varied. The
predominant case globally is that government
healthcare and social services, and other
government financial assistance for retirees, play
important roles.79
In high-income countries with less
of a contribution by the public sector, more of a role
is played by private insurance, private care facilities,
and home care services.80
Given the rising demand for its services, the care
sector overall is set to need many more workers
by 2035. In the United States, for example,
demand for long-term care services and support
workers alone is projected to grow by 44% from
2020-2035.81
This rising demand needs to be set
against an environment in which staff are often
underpaid and overworked. Unless long-term
care providers can find ways to improve pay and
working conditions, the risk of labour shortages
in the sector will only rise. Market forces can lead
to more private-sector provision of long-term care
filling some of the void. However, for many families,
paying for private long-term care will remain out of
reach financially.
Immigration into super-ageing societies is
already playing a role in addressing the sector’s
labour needs. However, migrant workers are
overrepresented in the less regulated areas of the
care economy, such as home-based care and
domestic work, and earn nearly 13% less than the
national average.82
The political climate around
immigration is strained and may become more
so over the coming years, with anti-immigration
policies becoming more mainstream in several
super-ageing societies.
Similarly, over a 10-year timeframe, there is only
so much that increased labour-force participation
in super-ageing societies can contribute to
addressing the long-term care crunch. Attracting
more women to enter the formal workforce can
play a role. However, the balance of incentives
available to women needs rethinking for there to
be a meaningful change in female labour-force
participation. Women currently provide two-thirds of
unpaid work worldwide, which keeps 708 million of
them from joining the labour force.83
Without meaningful transformation of the care
sector and its resourcing, the scope for either
immigration or increased labour force participation
to solve the long-term care crunch over the next 10
years remains limited. Governments and companies
may be tempted to turn to technology in an effort
to increase sectoral productivity. This can involve
everything from automated reminders to take pills,
to chatbots responding to medical queries and
robots delivering meals, ideally freeing up time
for more social interactions wherever possible.
But while these and other technologies may help
optimize care delivery and reach, demand for care
skills and jobs is likely to be far from fully met by
technological innovation
Super-ageing societies of the
future
While today’s super-ageing societies are the ones
that will feel the brunt of the negative impacts
of demographic trends on their economies and
societies over the next decade, ripple effects will
be felt worldwide, leading to risks elsewhere, too.
Global economic growth over the next decade is
likely to be constrained by demographics in superageing
societies, many of which are among the
world’s largest economies. In addition, there are
likely to be direct knock-on impacts from today’s
super-ageing societies. Despite policy pushback
on immigration in the short-medium term, in the
longer term the need to fill labour shortages could
be decisive in shaping policy. As a consequence,
countries with more youthful populations will face
the risk of depletion of their own future workforces
as many more young, working-age people migrate
to super-ageing societies to help fill labour shortages
there. Working-age people who remain in the superageing
societies of the future could be left hardpressed
to sustain the rest of the populations there.
Celine Ylmz, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 63
Many countries with youthful demographics are in
Sub-Saharan Africa, which has by far the highest
fertility rate globally.84
These demographics will help
sustain rising working-age populations for several
decades. But a key challenge over the next decade
will be to generate employment opportunities on
a sufficient scale and that offer job security. The
International Labour Organization (ILO) notes that
72% of young adult workers (aged 25 to 29) in the
region are in a form of work deemed “insecure”.85
Limited investment in human capital, which is
essential to developing an attractive economy that
can generate sufficient employment opportunities,
is a significant risk.86
Societies that are young today and looking at
positive demographic trends for the next decade
or more could ultimately follow similar demographic
trajectories to the super-ageing societies of today
and will then face problems that could be even
more complex. While this risk may play out fully
only over several decades, eventually low-income,
super-ageing societies of the future could face
a perfect storm – all the social and economic
problems associated with today’s super-ageing
societies but without fully developed social safety
nets in place, and without the pools of private
savings accumulated by some in today’s superageing
societies.
Actions for today
A. Further encourage flexible work policies
Organizations in both the public and private sectors
need to further develop their flexible work policies
as part of their Corporate strategies (Figure 2.16),
with more options for leaving and coming back
to the workforce at different life stages. This will
help employees who are taking a non-linear life
path, for example, including education, working
across different sectors, and professional training
or reskilling in the middle of a career, as well as
years taken out to care for children or elderly family
members before coming back to work.87
B. Campaign to improve pre-retirement health
choices
A large-scale, multi-faceted public-private effort
to improve the health choices of future retirees
should be launched. An impactful way to address
the long-term care crisis, and to give the elderly
the opportunity to contribute productively to the
economy, is for individuals to lead healthier lives
pre-retirement, thereby diminishing the need for
long-term care in the first place. In Singapore, for
example, the government is creating a “health
district” to help their citizens live healthier, longer
lives.88
Such initiatives can include helping people
to understand the impacts of building healthy
habits early on, focusing on key areas such as
exercise, nutrition and social interactions. National
and local regulations, the approach cited in the
GRPS as having the most potential for driving
action on risk reduction and preparedness when it
comes to Insufficient public infrastructure and
social protections, can play a role in this regard
(Figure 2.16). The initiative would have not only
an individual dimension, but a patriotic, nationallevel
one, too: By becoming healthier for longer,
individuals can contribute to a stronger economy
and lower fiscal pressures in the decades ahead.
Austin Curtis, Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2025 64
C. Proactively build social cohesion across
generations
At a societal level, all stakeholders need to
reconsider the prospect of an inter-generational
conflict playing out and take measures today to
avoid that. The upcoming demographic shifts could
be an opportunity to reframe the conversation.
Every young person will become old, if they
are lucky; engaging in more cross-generational
social activities could increase life satisfaction for
everyone, improve long-term social cohesion and
provide real benefits towards resolving a range
of global problems.89
More can also be done
to encourage older individuals to remain in the
workforce, for example by reskilling and by tailoring
jobs more to their skill sets. Corporate strategies
(Figure 2.16) also have a role to play: Organizations
could consider incentivizing the creation of crossgenerational
teams.
Risk Governance: Insufficient public infrastructure and social protectionsF I G U R E 2 . 1 6
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
“Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10
years? Select up to three for each risk.”
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Share of respondents
Approach
a. Financial instruments
b. National and local regulations
c. Minilateral treaties and
agreements
d. Global treaties and
agreements
e. Development assistance
f. Corporate strategies
g. Research & development
h. Public awareness and
education
i. Multistakeholder engagement
Global Risks Report 2025 65
Looking back: 20 years of the Global Risks Report2.6
of the Global Risks Report over the last 20 years
and the fluctuations of those rankings over that time
period. The figure illustrates how consistently or
variably each risk has been perceived over time, as
represented by the standard deviation of its ranking.
The sections that follow assess further how the 10year
outlooks for key risks and risk categories have
changed over the last two decades.
Key trends in risk perceptions
Environmental risks have consistently topped
the 10-year ranking
When assessing the evolution of perceptions of
the four Structural forces, Climate change is the
Standard deviation of ranking (the higher the value, the more variable the rank)
Averagerank
30
20
18
25
15
10
5
1
0 5 108 15 20
Crime and illicit economic activity
Debt
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Inflation
Extreme weather events
Natural resource shortages
Non-weather related
natural disasters
Biological, chemical,
or nuclear weapons
or hazards
State-based
armed conflict
Infectious diseases
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Asset bubble bursts
Economic
downturn
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Critical change to Earth systems
Pollution Involuntary migration or displacement
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
Societal polarization
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Geoeconomic confrontation
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Concentration of strategic resources
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Intrastate
violence
Inequality
Misinformation and
disinformation
Talent and/or labour shortages
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Censorship and
surveillance
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Decline in health
and well-being
High average rank, high fluctuation
Low average rank, high fluctuationLow average rank, low fluctuation
High average rank, low fluctuation
Crime and illicit economic activity
Debt
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Inflation
Extreme weather events
Natural resource shortages
Non-weather related
natural disasters
Biological, chemical,
or nuclear weapons
or hazards
State-based
armed conflict
Infectious diseases
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Asset bubble bursts
Economic
downturn
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Critical change to Earth systems
Pollution Involuntary migration or displacement
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
Societal polarization
Disruptions to a systemically
important supply chain
Geoeconomic confrontation
Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment
Concentration of strategic resources
Cyber espionage
and warfare
Intrastate
violence
Inequality
Misinformation and
disinformation
Decline in health
and well-being
Talent and/or labour shortages
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Censorship and
surveillance
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
The first edition of the Global Risks Report was
launched in 2006 in a risks landscape characterized
by terrorism and concerns around avian influenza,
among other risks. Over the course of the 20 editions
of the report, we have lived through significant events
that have reshaped our economic and societal
landscapes, from the 2007-2008 global financial
crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic. We have also
witnessed the compounding effects of the Structural
forces of Technological acceleration,
Geostrategic shifts, Climate change and
Demographic bifurcation (Box 2.1). These
Structural forces are determining long-term shifts
in the arrangement of, and relation between, the
systemic elements of the global landscape.
Figure 2.17 shows the average 10-year risk outlook
rankings of the risks covered in the current edition
Average risk ranking and variability, 2006-25F I G U R E 2 . 1 7
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey
2005-2006 to 2024-2025.
Mean line
Risk categories
Economic
Environmental
Geopolitical
Societal
Technological
Number of years
of data
5 10 15 20
Note
Average risk severity and fluctuation over a 20-year period, based on the list of global risks in the
Global Risks Report 2025. The x-axis represents the standard deviation of risk severity rankings,
indicating volatility in risk perception. The y-axis denotes the average severity ranking, where
higher values reflect more critical risks. Dot size corresponds to the frequency of a risk’s
appearance across the last twenty editions of the Global Risks Report. Online harms was not
included in Figure 2.17 due to being a new risk introduced in the Global Risks Report in 2025.
Global Risks Report 2025 66
one that has been most consistently perceived
as experiencing a clear ongoing systemic shift.
Environmental risks have dramatically increased
in ranking over the 10-year time horizon since the
introduction of the Global Risks Report in 2006,
and in recent years continuously rank as severe
concerns. The highest-ranking environmental risks
over the last 20 years have been Critical change to
Earth systems, Extreme weather events, Natural
resource shortages and Pollution, as highlighted
in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.17. As the
effects of Climate change-induced events and
developments have become more visible over time,
and public awareness of their implications has risen,
the rankings of environmental risks have continued
to rise.
The clearest example is Extreme-weather events,
currently ranked as the #1 risk for the next 10 years.
Since 2014, it has consistently ranked as a top 6
risk (Figure 2.18). From 2017-2020 it ranked as the
top risk and has retaken that spot since 2024.
The ranking of Extreme weather events has
tended to rise as such events have worsened in
intensity and frequency. Extreme weather events
are becoming more common and expensive, with
the cost per event having increased nearly 77%,
inflation-adjusted, over the last five decades.90
The
effects of climate change-driven Extreme weather
events are being felt across the world and often hit
the poorest communities the hardest. Global heat
records continue to be broken.91
The Pollution risk demonstrates shifting
prominence over time in the 10-year risk outlook.
First introduced in 2009, Pollution risk initially
encompassed Air pollution and nanoparticles
pollution (paint, cosmetics, healthcare). Over the
subsequent 10 years, the risk evolved in concept
and rose in perceived importance (Figure 2.19). In
2017, Human-made environmental damage and
disasters (e.g. oil spills, radioactive contamination,
etc.) ranked #7 and entered the top 10 risks over
the 10-year horizon. Ever since, concerns about
Pollution, according to our historical GRPS data,
have remained a top 10 long-term risk, and this
year also ranked #6 over the two-year time horizon.
Among the other environmental risks, Critical
change to Earth systems jumped in ranking in
the 10-year risk outlook from #21 in 2013 to #4 in
2014 and has been in the top five ever since, aside
from 2017 when it was #6. Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse has experienced one of the
largest increases in ranking among all risks, moving
from #37 in 2009 to #2 in 2025.
Perennial worries about conflict
Both State-based armed conflict and Intrastate
violence feature in the upper-left quadrant of
Figure 2.17, showing that concerns about conflict,
although especially high today, have never been far
from top of mind among decision-makers over the
last 20 years.
24
1
5
10-yearriskrank
10
15
20
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2022 2023 2024 20252017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Extreme weather events: Evolution in ranking, 2009-2025F I G U R E 2 . 1 8
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2005-2006 to 2024-2025.
Extreme weather events (floods, heatwaves, etc.)
Global Risks Report 2025 67
Looking deeper into State-based armed conflict,
its 10-year risk ranking experienced noticeable
upticks in 2010-2011, when it rose from #24 to #7
– perhaps in part because of the start of the Syrian
civil war in March 2011. A similar uptick is seen
from 2014-2015, as the war in Syria escalated, with
heavy casualties.92
The heightened long-term risk perceptions have
unfortunately been validated by the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, and the wars in the Middle
East and Sudan, among others. Indeed, Statebased
armed conflict is the #1 short-term concern
today among GRPS respondents. Section 1.3:
“Geopolitical recession” notes the growing
realization that we are in an era of conflict, without
multilateral solutions in sight.
State-based armed conflict is a clear example
of the interconnected nature of risks and of
their compounding effects. Conflict intensifies
humanitarian crises, including Involuntary
migration or displacement. Perceptions of this
risk in the GRPS have experienced a pattern similar
to that of State-based armed conflict, in particular
from 2015 onwards.
Societal risks are the third major long-term
concern
The third category of risks with a strong presence
in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.17 is societal
risks. Although this risk category has not featured
in every edition of the Global Risks Report, five of
the eight risks rank above the average: Inequality
(wealth, income), Lack of economic opportunity
or unemployment, Societal polarization,
Infectious diseases, and Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms.
Inequality, Lack of economic opportunity or
unemployment, and Societal polarization are
the three societal risks that have ranked high
consistently. These rankings provided steady
indications that we were moving towards a more
polarized world. Looking at Societal polarization
more closely, it has increased its ranking from #21
when it was introduced in 2012 to #8 this year.
Economic risks are perceived as less of a longterm
risk
Looking at Figure 2.17, six economic risks
rank below the average over the last 20 years:
Disruptions to critical infrastructure, Disruptions
to a systematically important supply chain,
Crime and illicit economic activity, Economic
downturn, Inflation and Concentration of
strategic resources (and technologies).
Only two economic risks have presented an
above-average long-term threat according to GRPS
respondents: Debt (corporate, public, household),
which, as shown in Figure 2.20, has remained
relatively stable as a long-term risk since the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, and Asset bubble burst.
31
1
5
10-yearriskrank
10
15
20
25
Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2022 2023 202520242017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Pollution: Evolution in ranking, 2009-2025F I G U R E 2 . 1 9
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Report, 2009-2025.
Pollution (air, soil, water, etc.)
Global Risks Report 2025 68
While Asset bubble burst was one of the topranked
long-term risks during and in the immediate
aftermath of the financial crisis, its ranking
subsequently fell off sharply as the global economy
regained a stable footing in subsequent years.
Technological acceleration is the structural
force to watch
Perceptions of long-term technological risks
have been among the most volatile of all the risks
considered in the last 20 years of the Global Risks
Report. While this can be explained by the current
set of technology risks being relatively new to
the report, it nonetheless is a warning sign that
technological risks might be the area to watch the
most for unexpected future risk developments. The
impacts of technological acceleration are difficult
to assess. Even going back to the first edition of
the Global Risks Report in 2006, it was noted that
risks associated with new technologies were among
those whose outcomes were very unclear.
Over the course of the 20 editions of the Global
Risks Report, the category of technology has
itself changed frequently, with risks in 2006
related to the Convergence of technologies,
Nanotechnology, Electromagnetic fields
and Pervasive computing. Such threats have
evolved markedly and today the category includes
Misinformation and disinformation, Censorship
and surveillance, Adverse outcomes of
frontier technologies, Adverse outcomes of AI
technologies, and Cyber espionage and warfare.
Undoubtedly, this categorization will be subject to
further significant realignment in the coming years
given the pace and range of different possible
directions of technological change.
44
40
30
25
20
15
10
5
10-yearriskrank
35
1
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2022 2023 202520242017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Debt and Asset bubble burst: Evolution in ranking, 2009-2025F I G U R E 2 . 2 0
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Report, 2009-2025.
Asset bubble burst Debt (public, corporate, household) No data
Global Risks Report 2025 69
Endnotes
1.	 See: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Planetary Boundaries – defining a safe operating space for humanity,
https://www.pik-potsdam.de/en/output/infodesk/planetary-boundaries.
2.	 United Nations Climate Change blog, What is the Triple Planetary Crisis?, 13 April 2022, https://unfccc.int/news/what-is-
the-triple-planetary-crisis.
3.	 Fuller, Richard, Philip J Landrigan, Kalpana Balakrishnan, et al., “Pollution and health: a progress update”, The Lancet
Planet Health, vol. 6, 2022, pp. e535-e547, https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanplh/ PIIS2542-5196(22)00090-0.
pdf.
4.	 Ibid.
5.	 The Lancet Commission on Pollution and Health, October 22, 2017, https://www.thelancet.com/commissions/
pollutionand-health.
6.	 See: World Health Organization (WHO), Air quality, energy and health, https://www.who.int/teams/environment-climate-
change-and-health/air-quality-energy-and-health/health-impacts.
7.	 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Economic Consequences of Outdoor
Air Pollution, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/the-economic-consequences-of-outdoor-air-
pollution_9789264257474-en.
8.	 American Lung Association, Disparities in the Impact of Air Pollution, 2 November 2023, https://www.lung.org/clean-air/
outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities.
9.	 The University of Chicago, Air Quality Life Index, 2022, https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/the-index/.
10.	 For details on SLCPs, see: Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Short-lived Climate pollutants, https://www.ccacoalition.org/
content/short-lived-climate-pollutants.
11.	 Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Scientific Advisory Panel 2013 Annual Science Update, https://www.ccacoalition.org/
sites/default/files/resources//SAP%202013%20Annual%20Science%20Update%20%28Full%29_Oct23.pdf.
12.	 World Health Organization (WHO), Ambient (outdoor) air pollution, Fact Sheet, 24 October 2024, https://www.who.int/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ambient-(outdoor)-air-quality-and-health.
13.	 American Lung Association, Health impact of air pollution, 2024, https://www.lung.org/research/sota/health-risks.
14.	 For more on black carbon, see: Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Black Carbon, https://www.ccacoalition.org/short-lived-
climate-pollutants/black-carbon.
15.	 Ibid.
16.	 Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone, 2011, https://www.
ccacoalition.org/resources/integrated-assessment-black-carbon-and-tropospheric-ozone.
17.	 Shindell, Drew, Johan C. I. Kuylenstierna, Elisabetta Vignati, et al., “Simultaneously Mitigating Near-Term Climate Change
and Improving Human Health and Food Security”, Science, vol. 335, no. 6065, 13 January 2012, pp. 183-189, https://
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18.	 For more details on methane, see: Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Methane, https://www.ccacoalition.org/short-lived-
climate-pollutants/methane.
19.	 Ibid.
20.	 European Climate and Health Observatory, Ground-level ozone, 3 July 2024, https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/
observatory/evidence/health-effects/ground-level-ozone.
21.	 UN Environment Programme (UNEP), New global methane pledge aims to tackle climate change, 22 September 2021,
https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/new-global-methane-pledge-aims-tackle-climate-change.
22.	 See: Global Methane Pledge, https://www.globalmethanepledge.org/.
23.	 Ibid.
24.	 National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), “Forever Chemicals” Called PFAS Show Up in Your Food, Clothes, and
Home, 10 April 2024, https://www.nrdc.org/stories/forever-chemicals-called-pfas-show-your-food-clothes-and-home.
25.	 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Our Current Understanding of the Human Health and Environmental Risks
of PFAS, 16 May 2024, https://www.epa.gov/pfas/our-current-understanding-human-health-and-environmental-risks-
pfas.
26.	 United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, What is plastic pollution?, 25 August 2023, https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/blog/2023/08/explainer-what-is-plastic-pollution/.
27.	 United Nations Exhibits, In Images: Plastic is forever, June 2021, https://www.un.org/en/exhibits/exhibit/in-imagesplastic-
forever#:~:text=Plastic%20waste%20can%20take%20anywhere,in%20the%20last%2013%20years..
28.	 Center for International Environmental Law, et al., Plastic & Health: The Hidden Costs of a Plastic Planet, February
2019, https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Plastic-and-Health-The-Hidden-Costs-of-a-Plastic-PlanetGlobal
Risks Report 2025 70
February-2019.pdf.
29.	 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), Plastic Pollution, Issues Brief, May 2024,
https://iucn.org/resources/issues-brief/plastic-pollution.
30.	 World Health Organization (WHO), Dietary and inhalation exposure to nano- and microplastic particles and potential
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37.	 World Health Organization, New global guidance aims to curb antibiotic pollution from manufacturing, 3 September 2024,
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47.	 Nature, CRISPR therapy restores some vision to people with blindness, 9 May 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/
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49.	 Khamaikawin, W., et al., “CRISPR/Cas9 genome editing of CCR5 combined with C46 HIV-1 fusion inhibitor for cellular
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50.	 World Economic Forum, Accelerating Global Access to Gene Therapies: Case Studies from Low- and Middle-Income
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51.	 Libassi, Matthew, Feinstein Institutes researchers first to use double neural bypass to restore feeling, movement in man
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52.	 RAND Corporation, Brain-Computer Interfaces Are Coming. Will We Be Ready?, 27 August 2020, https://www.rand.org/
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Global Risks Report 2025 71
53.	 Carter, Sarah R., Nicole Wheeler, Sabrina Chwalek, Chris Isaac and Jaime M. Yassif, “The Convergence of Artificial
Intelligence and the Life Sciences: Safeguarding Technology, Rethinking Governance, and Preventing Catastrophe”,
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the-life-sciences/.
54.	 Revill, James, Clarissa Rios and Louison Mazeaud, “What will be the impact of AI on the bioweapons treaty?”, Bulletin
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bioweapons-treaty/.
55.	 Urbina, F., F. Lentzos, C. Invernizzi and S. Ekins, “Dual use of artificial-intelligence-powered drug discovery”, Nature
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57.	 Urbina, et al., 2022.
58.	 Rao, Arya, Al Ozonoff and Pardis Sabeti, “The next pandemic virus could be built using AI”, The Hill, 16 September 2024,
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59.	 Regalado, Antonio, “Scientists Hack a Computer Using DNA”, MIT Technology Review, 10 August 2017, https://www.
technologyreview.com/2017/08/10/150013/scientists-hack-a-computer-using-dna/.
60.	 Ibid.
61.	 Rasul, M.F., et al., “Strategies to overcome the main challenges of the use of CRISPR/Cas9 as a replacement for cancer
therapy”, Molecular Cancer, vol. 21, no. 64, 3 March 2022, https://molecular-cancer.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/
s12943-021-01487-4.
62.	 Willyard, Cassandra, “The effort to make a breakthrough cancer therapy cheaper”, MIT Technology Review, 12 April 2024,
https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/12/1091161/car-t-cancer-therapy-treatment-expense/.
63.	 US National Human Genome Research Institute, Synthetic Biology, https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-
issues/Synthetic-Biology#:~:text=Synthetic%20biology%20is%20a%20field,them%20to%20have%20new%20abilities.
64.	 For more details on the committee, see: World Health Organization, Expert Advisory Committee on Developing Global
Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing, https://www.who.int/groups/expert-advisory-
committee-on-developing-global-standards-for-governance-and-oversight-of-human-genome-editing.
65.	 World Health Organization (WHO), Human genome editing: A framework for governance, Expert Advisory Committee
on Developing Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing, 2021, https://iris.who.int/
bitstream/handle/10665/342484/9789240030060-eng.pdf?sequence=1.
66.	 World Health Organization (WHO), Human genome editing: Recommendations, Expert Advisory Committee on Developing
Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing, 2021, https://iris.who.int/bitstream/hand
le/10665/342486/9789240030381-eng.pdf?sequence=1.
67.	 See, for example, ABSA International, The Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity, https://absa.org/.
68.	 World Bank Group, Independent Evaluation Group, Approach Paper: World Bank Support to Aging Countries, 28 May
2019, https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_agingcountries.pdf.
69.	 Edmond, Charlotte and Marilyn North, “More than 1 in 10 people in Japan are aged 80 or over. Here's how its ageing
population is reshaping the country”, World Economic Forum, 28 September 2023, https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2023/09/elderly-oldest-population-world-japan/.
70.	 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Leaving No One Behind In An Ageing World, World Social
Report 2023, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2023/01/2023wsr-chapter1-.
pdf.
71.	 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2024,
https://population.un.org/wpp/.
72.	 International Labour Organization (ILO), Decent work and the care economy, 2024 International Labour Conference,
Geneva, https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40ed_norm/%40relconf/documents/
meetingdocument/wcms_921863.pdf.
73.	 AgelessRX, Adding Healthy Years: The Difference Between Lifespan & Healthspan, 27 June 2024, https://agelessrx.com/
the-difference-between-lifespan-and-healthspan/.
74.	 World Economic Forum, Longevity Economy Principles: The Foundation for a Financially Resilient Future, 15 January 2024,
https://www.weforum.org/publications/longevity-economy-principles-the-foundation-for-a-financially-resilient-future/.
75.	 Amaglobeli, David, Era Dabla-Norris and Vitor Gaspar, “Getting older but not poorer”, Finance & Development, March
2020, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2020/03/pdf/impact-of-aging-on-pensions-and-public-policy-gaspar.
pdf.
76.	 Petiole, How to future-proof your pension against the global retirement crisis, 10 June 2024, https://www.petiole.com/en/
insights/articles/how-to-future-proof-your-pension-against-the-global-retirement-crisis.
77.	 European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), Navigating Challenges in Pension Sustainability, speech
by Petra Hielkema, EIOPA Chairperson, 10 October 2024, https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/navigating-challenges-pension-
sustainability-2024-10-10_en.
Global Risks Report 2025 72
78.	 Ibid.
79.	 International Social Security Association, Long-term care in ageing societies: issues and strategies, 5 February 2021,
https://www.issa.int/analysis/long-term-care-ageing-societies-issues-and-strategies.
80.	 Butler, Stuart M., “The Challenging Future of Long-term Care for Older Adults”, Journal of the American Medical
Association Health Forum, 26 May 2022, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2792871.
81.	 US Health Resources and Services Administration, Long-Term Services and Support: Demand Projections, 2020-2035,
November 2022, https://bhw.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/bureau-health-workforce/LTSS-Projections-Factsheet.pdf.
82.	 Marks, Eliza, Migrant workers in the care economy, International Labour Organization (ILO), 10 October 2024, https://
www.ilo.org/publications/migrant-workers-care-economy.
83.	 International Labour Organization (ILO), Unpaid care work prevents 708 million women from participating in the labour
market, 29 October 2024, https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/unpaid-care-work-prevents-708-million-women-
participating-labour-market.
84.	 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects 2024, 2024,
https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/.
85.	 International Labour Organization (ILO), Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024: Sub-Saharan Africa, August 2024,
https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/Sub-Saharan%20Africa%20GET%20Youth%202024_0.pdf.
86.	 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Regional Economic Outlook – Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2024/04/19/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2024.
87.	 See, for example, Stanford Center on Longevity, The 100-year life is here. We're not ready, New Map of Life, https://
longevity.stanford.edu/the-new-map-of-life-report/.
88.	 Singapore Housing and Development Board, Health District at Queenstown, October 2021, https://www.hdb.gov.sg/
about-us/news-and-publications/publications/dwellings/Health-District-Queenstown.
89.	 Stringer, Heather, “Better connecting the generations could change the world”, American Psychological Association, 4
March 2024, https://www.apa.org/topics/aging-older-adults/connecting-generations-improve-world.
90.	 Whitt, Jessica and Scott Gordon, “This is the economic cost of extreme weather”, World Economic Forum, 17 January
2023, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/01/extreme-weather-economic-cost-wef23/.
91.	 World Meteorological Organization, 2024 is on track to be hottest year on record as warming temporarily hits 1.5°C [Press
release], 11 November 2024, https://public.wmo.int/news/media-centre/2024-track-be-hottest-year-record-warming-
temporarily-hits-15degc.
92.	 Pettersson, T. and P. Wallensteen, “Armed conflicts, 1946–2014”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 52, iss. 4, 14 July
2015, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343315595927.
Global Risks Report 2025 73
Appendix A
Definitions and Global Risks List
Definitions
For the purposes of this report, “Climate
change” is a structural force that encompasses
the trajectories of global warming and possible
consequences to Earth systems, reflecting
anthropogenic actions and environmental changes.
“Demographic bifurcation” is a structural force
that refers to changes to the size, growth and
structure of national, regional or global populations,
and the resulting impact on socioeconomic and
political structures. It includes, but is not limited to,
migration, fertility and ageing rates.
“Geostrategic shifts” is a structural force that
refers to changing geopolitical power dynamics.
It encompasses global and regional alliances and
relations, the offensive and defensive projection of
different sources of power (including economic),
and national attitudes relating to key actors,
governance mechanisms and strategic goals.
“Global risk” is the possibility of the occurrence
of an event or condition that, if it occurs, would
negatively impact a significant proportion of global
GDP, population or natural resources.
“Structural force” is the long-term shift in the
arrangement of and relation between the systemic
elements of the global landscape. These shifts
are not risks in and of themselves, but have the
potential to materially influence the speed, spread
and scope of global risks. These include but are not
limited to: climate change, demographic bifurcation,
geostrategic shifts and technological acceleration.
“Technological acceleration” is a structural force
that refers to technological developments enabled
by exponential growth in computing power and
analysis. It has the potential to blur boundaries
between technology and humanity, and rapidly give
rise to novel and unpredictable global risks.
“Under-the-radar risk” is a global risk where new
intelligence, a marked deterioration, key decision
point or similar suggests that the severity of the risk
(likelihood or impact) is increasing and/or is higher
than indicated by global risk perceptions.
Global risk list
Table A.1 presents the list of 33 global risks and
definitions adopted in the Global Risks Perception
Survey 2024-2025 (GRPS).
To ensure legibility, the names of some of the global
risks have been abbreviated throughout the report.
The portion of the full name used in the abbreviation
is in bold in Table A.1.
SOCIETAL
Decline in health and
well-being
Regular or chronic impacts on physical and mental health and well-being that require substantive medical attention
and/or limit activities of daily living. Includes, but is not limited to: conditions linked to ageing, excessive consumption
habits, and climate change (including heatwaves) and pollution.
Erosion of human rights
and/or civic freedoms
Loss of protections for rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of individual status, and/or the freedoms that
underpin civic space. Includes, but is not limited to the right to: life and liberty; work and education; freedom of
expression; peaceful assembly; non-discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity and other characteristics; and
privacy.
Inequality (wealth,
income)
Present or perceived substantive disparities in the distribution of assets, wealth or income within or between
countries, resulting in material differences in related economic outcomes. Includes, but is not limited to: growing or
persistent poverty and economic polarization.
Infectious diseases Spread of viruses, parasites, fungi or bacteria leading to a widespread loss of life and economic disruption. Includes,
but is not limited to: zoonotic diseases, releases of natural or man-made pathogens, the resurgence of pre-existing
diseases due to lower levels of immunity, the rise of antimicrobial resistance, and the impact of climate change and
environmental degradation on pathogens and their vectors.
TA B L E A .1 Definitions of global risks
Global Risks Report 2025 75
Insufficient public
infrastructure and social
protections
Non-existent, inadequate or inequitable public infrastructure, services and social protections. Includes, but is not
limited to: unaffordable or inadequate social security and benefits, housing, public education, child and elderly care,
healthcare, sanitation and transportation systems, and pension systems.
Lack of economic
opportunity
or unemployment
Structural deterioration of work prospects or standards of work and/or persistent barriers to the realization of
economic potential and security. Includes, but is not limited to: erosion of workers' rights; stagnating wages; rising
unemployment and underemployment; displacement due to automation or the green transition; stagnant social
mobility; and unequal access to educational, technological and economic opportunities.
Involuntary migration
or displacement
Forced movement or displacement across or within borders, stemming from, but not limited to: persistent
discrimination and persecution; lack of economic advancement opportunities; human-made disasters; natural
disasters and extreme weather events, including the impacts of climate change; and internal or interstate conflict.
Societal polarization Present or perceived ideological and cultural divisions within and across communities leading to declining social
stability, gridlocks in decision-making, economic disruption and increased political polarization.
TECHNOLOGICAL
Adverse outcomes of AI
technologies
Intended or unintended negative consequences of advances in AI and related technological capabilities (including
Generative AI) on individuals, businesses, ecosystems and/or economies.
Adverse outcomes of
frontier technologies
(quantum, biotech,
geoengineering)
Intended or unintended negative consequences of advances in frontier technologies on individuals, businesses,
ecosystems and/or economies. Includes, but is not limited to: brain-computer interfaces, biotechnology, geoengineering
and quantum computing.
Censorship and
surveillance
Broad and pervasive observation of a place or person and/or suppression of communication, information and ideas,
physically or digitally, to the extent that it significantly infringes on human and civil rights (e.g. privacy, freedom of
speech and freedom of expression).
Cyber espionage and
warfare
Use of cyber weapons and tools by state and non-state actors to gain control over a digital presence, cause
operational disruption, and/or compromise or damage an entity’s technological and information networks and
infrastructure. Includes: defensive and offensive cyber operations that occur during or trigger armed conflict, and
cyberattacks that steal classified, sensitive data or intellectual property to gain an advantage.
Misinformation and
disinformation
Persistent false information (deliberate or otherwise) widely spread through media networks, shifting public opinion in
a significant way towards distrust in facts and authority. Includes, but is not limited to: false, imposter, manipulated
and fabricated content.
Online harms Erosion of protection from and/or prevalence of harmful behaviour that poses a digital threat to the emotional
or mental health and well-being of individuals. Includes, but is not limited to: online child sexual abuse, online
harassment and cyber bullying.
GEOPOLITICAL
State-based armed
conflict (proxy, civil wars,
coups, terrorism, etc.)
Bilateral or multilateral use of force between states and/or between a state and non-state actor(s), often with
ideological, political or religious goals, manifesting as war and/or organized, sustained violence. Includes, but is not
limited to: hot wars, proxy wars, civil wars, guerilla warfare, terrorism, genocide and assassinations.
Biological, chemical
or nuclear weapons
or hazards
Intentional or accidental release of biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological hazards, resulting in loss of life,
destruction and/or international crises. Includes, but is not limited to: accidents at or sabotage of biolaboratories,
chemical plants and nuclear power plants; and intentional or accidental release of biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons.
Geoeconomic
confrontation (sanctions,
tariffs, investment
screening)
Deployment of economic levers by global or regional powers to reshape economic interactions between nations,
restricting goods, knowledge, services or technology with the intent of building self-sufficiency, constraining
geopolitical rivals and/or consolidating spheres of influence. Includes, but is not limited to: currency measures,
investment controls, sanctions, state aid and subsidies, and trade controls.
Intrastate violence
(riots, mass shootings,
gang violence, etc.)
Use of force that takes place within a country or community that results in loss of life, severe injury or material
damage. Includes, but is not limited to: mass shootings as well as crimes threatening or causing physical harm to the
community, such as gang violence, gender-based violence and abductions.
ENVIRONMENTAL
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Severe consequences for the environment, humankind and economic activity due to destruction of natural capital
stemming from species extinction or reduction, spanning both terrestrial and marine ecosystems.
Global Risks Report 2025 76
Critical change to Earth
systems
Long-term, potentially irreversible and self-perpetuating changes to critical planetary systems, as a result of breaching
a critical climatic or ecological threshold or ‘tipping point’, at a regional or global level. Includes, but is not limited
to: sea level rise from collapsing ice sheets, carbon release from thawing permafrost, and disruption of ocean or
atmospheric currents.
Extreme weather events
(floods, heatwaves, etc.)
Loss of human life, damage to ecosystems, destruction of property and/or financial loss due to extreme weather
events. Includes, but is not limited to: land-based (e.g. wildfires), water-based (e.g. floods), and atmospheric and
temperature-related (e.g. heat-waves) events, including those exacerbated by climate change.
Natural resource
shortages (food, water)
Supply shortages of food or water for human, industry or ecosystem use, manifesting as food and water insecurity
at a local, regional or global level, stemming from, but not limited to: human overexploitation and mismanagement
of critical natural resources, climate change (including drought and desertification), and/or a lack of suitable
infrastructure.
Non-weather-related
natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes,
tsunamis, solar flares,
etc.)
Loss of human life, damage to ecosystems, destruction of property and/or financial loss due to non-weather-related
natural disasters. Includes, but is not limited to: land-based (e.g. earthquakes, volcanos), water-based (e.g. tsunamis)
and extra-terrestrial-based (e.g. asteroid strikes and geomagnetic storms) events.
Pollution (air, soil, water,
etc.)
Introduction of harmful materials into the air, water and soil stemming from human activity, resulting in impacts to
and loss of human life, financial loss and/or damage to ecosystems. Includes, but is not limited to: household and
industrial activities; environmental accidents, such as oil spills; and radioactive contamination.
ECONOMIC
Asset bubble burst Prices for housing, investment funds, shares and other assets become increasingly disconnected from the real
economy, leading to a severe drop in demand and prices. Includes, but is not limited to: cryptocurrencies, housing
prices and stock markets.
Concentration of
strategic resources
and technologies
Concentration of strategically important resources (minerals, materials, technologies) among a small number of
individuals, businesses or states that can control access and dictate discretionary pricing.
Crime and illicit
economic activity
(incl. cyber)
Global proliferation of organized crime or the illicit activities of businesses and individuals that undermine economic
advancement and growth, facilitated on both a borderless and digital basis. Includes, but is not limited to:
illicit financial flows (e.g. tax evasion, sanctions evasion and money laundering), illicit trade and trafficking (e.g.
counterfeiting, human trafficking, wildlife trade and weapons), and cybercrime (including ransomware, data theft and
online fraud)
Debt (public, corporate,
household)
Corporate, household, or public finances struggle to service debt accumulation, resulting in mass bankruptcies or
insolvencies, liquidity crises or defaults and sovereign debt crises.
Disruptions to a
systemically important
supply chain
Major disruption or collapse of a systemically important global supply chain or industry with an impact on the global
economy, financial markets or society leading to an abrupt shock to the supply and demand of systemically important
goods and services at a global scale. Includes, but is not limited to: energy, technological hardware, medical
supplies, and fast-moving consumer goods.
Disruptions to critical
infrastructure
Overload or shutdown of physical and digital infrastructure (including satellites) or services underpinning critical
systems, including the internet, telecommunications, public utilities, financial systems or energy, stemming from,
but not limited to: cyberattacks, intentional or unintentional physical damage, extreme weather events, and natural
disasters.
Economic downturn
(recession, stagnation)
Near-zero or slow global growth lasting for several years or a global contraction (recession or depression).
Inflation Sustained increases in the price of goods and services. Includes the potential for broad sections of the population
being unable to maintain current lifestyle with declining purchasing power.
Talent and/or labour
shortages
Global, geographical or industry mismatches between labour and skills supply and demand.
Global Risks Report 2025 77
Appendix B
Global Risks Perception Survey 2024-2025
The Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS)
is the World Economic Forum’s source of original
risks data, harnessing the expertise of the Forum’s
extensive network of academia, business,
government, international organizations and civil
society. Survey responses were collected from 2
September to 18 October 2024 from the World
Economic Forum’s multistakeholder communities.
Updates to the GRPS 2024-2025
The list of 33 global risks included in the survey was
updated in 2024 as follows: 	
– One new risk was added in response to
observed trends in technological advancements
– “Online harms”, defined as the erosion of
protection from and/or prevalence of harmful
behaviour that poses a digital threat to the
emotional or mental health and well-being of
individuals. Includes, but is not limited to: online
child sexual abuse, online harassment and
cyber bullying.	
– In addition:	
– “Chronic health conditions” was renamed
“Decline in health and well-being” to update
clarity of risk for respondents.	
– “Inequality or lack of economic opportunity”
has been separated out into two separate
societal risks: “Inequality (wealth, income)”
and “Lack of economic opportunity or
unemployment”, with “Unemployment”
merged with the latter.	
– “Insufficient public infrastructure and
services” has been renamed “Insufficient
public infrastructure and social protections”.	
– “Cyber insecurity” has been renamed “Cyber
espionage and warfare”, with cybercrime
now included as an economic risk within
“Crime and illicit economic activity (incl.
cyber)”, formerly referred to as “Illicit
economic activity”.	
– “Technological power concentration” as a
technological risk has been recategorized as
an economic risk within “Concentration of
strategic resources and technologies”.	
– “Intrastate armed conflict" has been
renamed “State-based armed conflict
(proxy, civil wars, coups, terrorism, etc.)”,
with “Terrorism” no longer a separate risk
but now merged within the definition.
Methodology
The GRPS 2024–2025 was further refined this year
to gather more granular perceptions of risk and to
incorporate new approaches to risk management
and analysis. To that end, the GRPS 2024–2025
was comprised of seven sections:	
– Current risk landscape asked respondents to
select one risk among 33 pre-selected risks that
they believe is most likely to present a material
crisis on a global scale in 2025. The final rank is
based on a simple tally of the number of times
a risk was identified. This has changed from last
year, when respondents were asked to select
up to five risks among 20 pre-selected risks that
differed from the main risk list. The 33 options
are listed in Appendix A above. Respondents
were also able to write in additional risks to
Other, a free-text field.	
– Short- and long-term risks landscape asked
respondents to estimate the likely impact
(severity) of each of the 33 global risks, on a 1-7
scale [1 = Low severity, 7 = High severity], over
both two-year and 10-year periods. “Severity”
is meant to take into consideration the impact
on populations, the economy or environmental
resources on a global scale. Respondents
were also allowed to nominate any other risk
considered missing from the 33 global risks. A
simple average based on the scores selected
was calculated. In addition, if a respondent
selected the highest severity score (7) for any
of the 33 risks, they were asked a follow-up
question to identify areas of particular concern
with respect to the identified risk.	
– Consequences seeks to understand the
potential consequences of risks, to create a
network map of the global risk landscape.
Respondents were provided 10 randomly
selected global risks (from the full list of 33
global risks) and were then asked to select
up to five global risks (from the full list) likely
to be triggered by each of the 10 randomly
selected risks. In the visual results, “Nodes:
Risk influence” is based on a simple tally of
Global Risks Report 2025 78
all bidirectional relationships identified by
respondents. “Edges: Relative influence” is
based on a simple tally of the number of times
the risk was identified as a consequence.
The graphics in the report do not show all
connections: weaker relationships identified by
less than 25% of respondents were not included
as edges.	
– Risk governance asked respondents to identify
approach(es) that they expect to have the most
potential for driving action on risk reduction
and preparedness over the next 10 years,
with respect to the most severe risks (severity
score of 6 or 7 over the 10-year timeframe).
Respondents could choose among the following
nine approaches: Financial instruments
(e.g. insurance, catastrophe bonds, public
risk pools); National and local regulations
(e.g. environmental, operational, financial
regulations and incentives); Minilateral treaties
and agreements (e.g. Basel, Wassenaar,
regional free trade agreements); Global
treaties and agreements (e.g. United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
[UNFCC], Paris, Montreal, Nonproliferation
Treaty [NPT], World Trade Organization [WTO]);
Development assistance (e.g. international
aid for disaster risk response and reduction);
Corporate strategies (e.g. environmental,
social and governance [ESG] reporting,
resilient supply chains, social initiatives,
public-private partnerships [PPPs]); Research
and development (e.g. new technologies,
early-warning systems, global risk research);
Public awareness and education (e.g.
campaigns, school curricula, media products);
Multistakeholder engagement (e.g. platforms
for exchanging knowledge, best practices,
alignment). A simple tally of the number of times
an approach was identified was calculated for
each risk. To ensure legibility, the names of
some of the global risks have been abbreviated
in the figures.	
– Risk outlook asked respondents to
characterize the evolution of the global risks
landscape based on a number of factors. It
first asked respondents to select a statement
that they believe best characterizes the global
political environment for cooperation on
global risks in 10 years. Respondents were
provided with four options: (1) Continuation
or reinvigoration of the US-led, rules-based
international order; (2) Multipolar or fragmented
order in which middle and great powers contest,
set and enforce regional rules and norms; (3)
Bipolar or bifurcated order shaped by strategic
competition between two superpowers; (4)
Realignment towards a new international order
led by an alternative superpower. A simple tally
for each of the four options was calculated.	
– Finally, respondents were asked to select a
statement that best characterizes their outlook
for the world over the next two and 10
years. Respondents were provided with the
same five options for both time periods: (1)
Calm: negligible risk of global catastrophes; (2)
Stable: isolated disruptions, low risk of global
catastrophes; (3) Unsettled: some instability,
moderate risk of global catastrophes; (4)
Turbulent: upheavals and elevated risk of global
catastrophes; (5) Stormy: global catastrophic
risks looming. A simple tally for each of the five
options was calculated.
This year the risk outlook question asking
respondents to indicate which statement best
characterizes current and future global efforts to
manage the Earth’s resources was removed from
the survey in an effort to streamline questions asked
to respondents
Completion thresholds
A total of 1,112 responses to the GRPS were
received. From these, 909 were kept, based on the
threshold of at least one non-demographic answer,
a minimum answer time of two minutes, and the
filtering of multiple submissions based on browser
cookies as well as partial responses that have
overlapping IP numbers and demographic answers
with a fully recorded response (100%).	
– Current risk landscape: 909 respondents
selected at least one risk.	
– Short- and long-term risks landscape: 780
respondents evaluated the severity of at least
one risk in one timeframe.	
– Consequences: 596 respondents paired at
least one risk with one consequence.	
– Risk governance: 461 respondents selected at
least one approach for at least one risk.	
– Risk outlook: 562 respondents answered at
least one question.	
– Outlook for the world: 561 respondents
answered over at least one timeframe.	
– Sample distribution: 909 respondents who
answered at least one non-demographic
question were used to calculate the sample
distribution by place of residence (region),
gender, age, area of expertise and organization
type.
Figure B.1 presents key descriptive statistics and
information about the profiles of the respondents.
Global Risks Report 2025 79
Survey sample compositionF I G U R E B . 1
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Gender
Region
Age group
Female,
38.7%
Other, 0.2%
Male,
61.1%
<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
14%
17%
28%
25%
12%
5%
Organization
Europe, 39.7%
Northern
America, 16.1%
Middle East and
Northern Africa, 6%
Business,
36%
Academia,
19%
Government,
17%
Civil society,
13%
International
Organizations,
12%
Other,
4%
Latin America and
the Caribbean, 12.1%
Eastern Asia, 4.4%
Central Asia, 0.3%
Oceania, 1.6%
South-Eastern
Asia, 5.3%
Southern Asia, 9%
Sub-Saharan Africa, 5.6%
Global Risks Report 2025 80
Appendix C
Executive Opinion Survey: National
Risk Perceptions
Table C.1 presents the list of 34 risks that were
incorporated into the World Economic Forum’s
2024 Executive Opinion Survey (EOS), which
was administered between April and August 2024.
The risks are comparable to those in the GRPS
2024-2025 but are applied at a more granular level
to reflect the possible short-term and country-level
manifestations of global risks.
To ensure legibility, the names of some of the global
risks have been abbreviated throughout this report.
The portion of the full name used in the abbreviation
is in bold.
National risk listF I G U R E C . 1
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Economic downturn
(recession, stagnation)
Labour and/or talent shortage
Inflation
Public debt
Energy-supply shortage
Crime and illicit economic activity
Private debt
(corporate, household)
Asset bubble burst
Attacks on critical infrastructure
Concentration of strategic resources and technologies
Biodiversity loss
(marine, freshwater, terrestrial)
Extreme weather events
(floods, heatwaves, etc.)
Food-supply shortage
Non-weather related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, solar flares etc.)
Pollution
(air, soil, water, etc.)
Water-supply shortage
Armed conflict
(interstate, intrastate, proxy wars, coups etc.)
Intrastate violence
(civil strikes, riots)
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards
Societal polarization
Chronic health conditions and decline in health
and well-being (heart, cancer, diabetes, depression etc.)
Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms
Infectious diseases
(COVID-19, influenza, tuberculosis, malaria, etc.)
Involuntary migration
Unemployment or lack of economic opportunity
Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Insufficient public services and social protections
(incl. education, infrastructure, pensions)
Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence technologies
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
(quantum, biotech, geoengineering etc.)
Cyber insecurity
Censorship and surveillance
Misinformation and disinformation
Terrorist Attacks
Geoeconomic confrontation
(sanctions, tariffs, investment screening etc.)
Global Risks Report 2025 81
Over 11,000 respondents were presented with the
following question: “Which five risks are the most
likely to pose the biggest threat to your country
in the next two years?” and were asked to select
these from the list of 34 risks in Table C.1.
“Risk 1” indicates the most frequently selected
risk in each economy. Tied risks are presented
in alphabetical order, with the tie indicated by
numbering.
To analyse the results of country or economy
groups (such as the G20 or EU), country-level
results are aggregated by taking a simple average
of the ranking of the risk (from 1-34) by the
countries or economies included in the group.
Global Risks Report 2025 82
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Albania
1st Involuntary migration
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Crime and illicit economic activity
4th Insufficient public services and social
protections
5th Inequality (wealth, income)
Algeria
1st Inflation
2nd Water supply shortage
3rd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
4th Cyber insecurity
5th Infectious diseases (COVID-19, influenza,
tuberculosis, malaria etc.)
Angola
1st Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Inflation
4th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
5th Public debt
Argentina
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Inflation
4th Public debt
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Armenia
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Involuntary migration
3rd Misinformation and disinformation
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Geoeconomic confrontation (sanctions,
tariffs, investment screening etc.)
Australia
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Energy supply shortage
3rd Inflation
4th Food supply shortage
5th Labour and/or talent shortage
Austria
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Societal polarization
4th Cyber insecurity
5th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
Azerbaijan
1st Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
2nd Pollution (air, water, soil)
3rd Misinformation and disinformation
4th Inflation
5th Involuntary migration
Bahrain
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
5th Cyber insecurity
Bangladesh
1st Inflation
2nd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
3rd Pollution (air, water, soil)
4th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Belgium
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Involuntary migration
3rd Inflation
4th Public debt
5th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
4th Public debt
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Bosnia and Herzegovina
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Inflation
4th Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
5th Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
Botswana
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
2nd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Food supply shortage
5th Inflation
Brazil
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Public debt
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Global Risks Report 2025 83
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Brunei Darussalam
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Inflation
5th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Bulgaria
1st Inflation
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Pollution (air, water, soil)
Cameroon
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
2nd Inflation
3rd Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
4th Energy supply shortage
5th Chronic health conditions and decline in
well-being
Canada
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Inflation
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
5th Misinformation and disinformation
Cape Verde
1st Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
4th Inflation
5th Public debt
Chad
1st Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
2nd Water supply shortage
3rd Energy supply shortage
4th Food supply shortage
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Private debt (corporate, household)
Chile
1st Crime and illicit economic activity
1st Societal polarization
3rd Involuntary migration
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
Colombia
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Societal polarization
Costa Rica
1st Crime and illicit economic activity
2nd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Public debt
4th Insufficient public services and social
protections
5th Water supply shortage
Côte D'Ivoire
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
4th Public debt
5th Inflation
Croatia
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
3rd Inflation
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Asset bubble burst
Cyprus
1st Involuntary migration
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Inflation
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Private debt (corporate, household)
Czechia
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Misinformation and disinformation
4th Public debt
5th Societal polarization
Global Risks Report 2025 84
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Democratic Republic of the Congo
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
4th Crime and illicit economic activity
5th Food supply shortage
Denmark
1st Cyber insecurity
2nd Attacks on critical infrastructure
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
Dominican Republic
1st Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
2nd Public debt
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Involuntary migration
Ecuador
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Crime and illicit economic activity
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Energy supply shortage
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Egypt
1st Inflation
2nd Public debt
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
5th Water supply shortage
El Salvador
1st Public debt
2nd Erosion of human rights and/or civic
freedoms
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Food supply shortage
Estonia
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Misinformation and disinformation
5th Cyber insecurity
Finland
1st Public debt
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Involuntary migration
5th Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
France
1st Inflation
2nd Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
3rd Involuntary migration
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Water supply shortage
Gabon
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
1st Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Energy supply shortage
4th Water supply shortage
5th Public debt
Georgia
1st Cyber insecurity
2nd Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
3rd Societal polarization
4th Involuntary migration
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Germany
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Involuntary migration
4th Misinformation and disinformation
5th Energy supply shortage
Ghana
1st Inflation
2nd Pollution (air, water, soil)
3rd Public debt
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Greece
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
3rd Inflation
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Public debt
Guatemala
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Insufficient public services and social
protections
3rd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
4th Societal polarization
5th Crime and illicit economic activity
Global Risks Report 2025 85
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Honduras
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Involuntary migration
Hong Kong SAR, China
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Geoeconomic confrontation (sanctions,
tariffs, investment screening etc.)
4th Asset bubble burst
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Hungary
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Public debt
5th Misinformation and disinformation
Iceland
1st Inflation
2nd Non-weather-related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.)
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Energy supply shortage
India
1st Water supply shortage
2nd Misinformation and disinformation
3rd Erosion of human rights and/or civic
freedoms
4th Pollution (air, water, soil)
5th Labour and/or talent shortage
Indonesia
1st Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Food supply shortage
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
1st Inflation
2nd Water supply shortage
3rd Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Geoeconomic confrontation (sanctions,
tariffs, investment screening etc.)
Iraq
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Water supply shortage
4th Energy supply shortage
5th Crime and illicit economic activity
Ireland
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Misinformation and disinformation
4th Energy supply shortage
5th Cyber insecurity
Israel
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Terrorist attacks
3rd Attacks on critical infrastructure
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
Italy
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
3rd Inflation
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Jamaica
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Crime and illicit economic activity
3rd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
4th Inflation
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Japan
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Non-weather-related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.)
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Energy supply shortage
Jordan
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
2nd Inflation
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Water supply shortage
5th Public debt
Kazakhstan
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Water supply shortage
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Inflation
Global Risks Report 2025 86
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Kenya
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
3rd Public debt
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Food supply shortage
Kosovo*
1st Inflation
2nd Pollution (air, water, soil)
3rd Cyber insecurity
4th Involuntary migration
5th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
Kyrgyzstan
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Water supply shortage
3rd Pollution (air, water, soil)
4th Inflation
5th Public debt
Lao PDR
1st Inflation
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Energy supply shortage
5th Public debt
Latvia
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Cyber insecurity
4th Attacks on critical infrastructure
5th Inflation
Lesotho
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Food supply shortage
3rd Chronic health conditions and decline in
well-being
4th Water supply shortage
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Liberia
1st Energy supply shortage
1st Food supply shortage
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
5th Public debt
5th Inflation
Luxembourg
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Cyber insecurity
4th Private debt (corporate, household)
5th Inflation
Malawi
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
3rd Public debt
4th Inflation
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Malaysia
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Inflation
4th Food supply shortage
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Mali
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Energy supply shortage
3rd Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
4th Cyber insecurity
5th Chronic health conditions and decline in
well-being
Malta
1st Pollution (air, water, soil)
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Inflation
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Energy supply shortage
Mauritius
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
3rd Public debt
4th Inflation
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Global Risks Report 2025 87
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Mexico
1st Water supply shortage
2nd Crime and illicit economic activity
3rd Energy supply shortage
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Insufficient public services and social
protections
Mongolia
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Energy supply shortage
3rd Pollution (air, water, soil)
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
Morocco
1st Water supply shortage
2nd Inflation
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Namibia
1st Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
2nd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
3rd Water supply shortage
4th Food supply shortage
5th Labour and/or talent shortage
Nepal
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
2nd Involuntary migration
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Pollution (air, water, soil)
Netherlands
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Energy supply shortage
3rd Cyber insecurity
4th Societal polarization
5th Misinformation and disinformation
New Zealand
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Nicaragua
1st Erosion of human rights and/or civic
freedoms
2nd Involuntary migration
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Censorship and surveillance
5th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Nigeria
1st Food supply shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3.01rd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
3.02rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Energy supply shortage
North Macedonia
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Involuntary migration
4th Food supply shortage
5th Labour and/or talent shortage
Norway
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Energy supply shortage
4th Involuntary migration
5th Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
Oman
1st Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
4th Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
5th Inflation
Pakistan
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Water supply shortage
4th Energy supply shortage
5th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
Panama
1st Public debt
2nd Water supply shortage
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Insufficient public services and social
protections
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Paraguay
1st Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
2nd Insufficient public services and social
protections
3rd Crime and illicit economic activity
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Public debt
Global Risks Report 2025 88
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Peru
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
3rd Crime and illicit economic activity
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Societal polarization
Philippines
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Inflation
4th Food supply shortage
5th Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
Poland
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Inflation
5th Attacks on critical infrastructure
Portugal
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Insufficient public services and social
protections
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Public debt
Qatar
1th Inflation
2st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3nd Asset bubble burst
4rd Attacks on critical infrastructure
5th Geoeconomic confrontation (sanctions,
tariffs, investment screening etc.)
Romania
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Inflation
4th Chronic health conditions and decline in
well-being
4th Public debt
Rwanda
1st Inflation
2nd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
3rd Food supply shortage
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Cyber insecurity
Saudi Arabia
1st Asset bubble burst
2nd Inflation
3rd Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
4th Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Senegal
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
2nd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
3rd Private debt (corporate, household)
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
4th Misinformation and disinformation
Serbia
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Misinformation and disinformation
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Pollution (air, water, soil)
5th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
Sierra Leone
1st Food supply shortage
2nd Water supply shortage
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Inflation
5th Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots)
Singapore
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Inflation
4th Cyber insecurity
5th Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
Slovakia
1st Public debt
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
4th Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
5th Societal polarization
Slovenia
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
4th Insufficient public services and social
protections
5th Public debt
South Africa
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
3rd Water supply shortage
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Global Risks Report 2025 89
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
South Korea
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
3rd Societal polarization
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Inflation
Spain
1st Public debt
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Societal polarization
4th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
5th Water supply shortage
Sri Lanka
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Public debt
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Inflation
Sweden
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Involuntary migration
3rd Crime and illicit economic activity
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Misinformation and disinformation
Switzerland
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Energy supply shortage
4th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
5th Cyber insecurity
Taiwan, China
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Labour and/or talent shortage
3rd Geoeconomic confrontation (sanctions,
tariffs, investment screening etc.)
4th Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
5th Non-weather-related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.)
Thailand
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Private debt (corporate, household)
3rd Pollution (air, water, soil)
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Public debt
Tunisia
1st Water supply shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Food supply shortage
4th Public debt
5th Inflation
Türkiye
1st Inflation
2nd Involuntary migration
3rd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Labour and/or talent shortage
Ukraine
1st Involuntary migration
2nd Attacks on critical infrastructure
3rd Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
5th Public debt
United Arab Emirates
1st Inflation
2nd Asset bubble burst
3rd Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
4th Cyber insecurity
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
United Kingdom
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
5th Involuntary migration
United Republic of Tanzania
1st Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
2nd Public debt
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Chronic health conditions and decline in
well-being
5th Inflation
United States of America
1st Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
2nd Inflation
3rd Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
4th Food supply shortage
5th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
Uruguay
1st Labour and/or talent shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
4th Crime and illicit economic activity
5th Extreme weather events (floods,
heatwaves etc.)
Global Risks Report 2025 90
Top five risks identified by the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)TA B L E C . 2
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Source
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.
Uzbekistan
1st Water supply shortage
2nd Energy supply shortage
3rd Pollution (air, water, soil)
4th Public debt
5th Labour and/or talent shortage
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Insufficient public services and social
protections
4th Water supply shortage
5th Inflation
Viet Nam
1st Adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence
technologies
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Inflation
4th Labour and/or talent shortage
4th Water supply shortage
Yemen
1st Armed conflict (interstate, intrastate, proxy
wars, coups etc.)
2nd Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
3rd Unemployment or lack of economic
opportunity
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Chronic health conditions and decline in
well-being
Zambia
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Food supply shortage
3rd Water supply shortage
4th Poverty and inequality (wealth, income)
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Zimbabwe
1st Energy supply shortage
2nd Food supply shortage
3rd Water supply shortage
4th Inflation
5th Economic downturn (e.g. recession,
stagnation)
Global Risks Report 2025 91
Appendix D
Risk governance
GRPS respondents were asked to identify
approach(es) that they expect to have the most
potential for driving action on risk reduction and
preparedness over the next 10 years. The following
figures present the set of 33 global risks with
corresponding
risk reduction and preparedness approaches for
addressing them. As well as figures of the top 10
risks addressed by those approaches not already
covered in Chapters 1 or 2.
Global Risks Report 2025 92
200 6040 80 100
Share of responses (%)
Risk governanceF I G U R E D . 1
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Financial instruments National and local regulations Minilateral treaties and agreements
Development assistance Corporate strategiesGlobal treaties and agreements
Research and development Public awareness and education Multi-stakeholder engagement
Note
Respondents could select up to three responses from the following nine options: Financial
instruments, National and local regulations, Minilateral treaties and agreements, Global treaties and
agreements, Development assistance, corporate strategies, Research & development, Public
awareness and education, Multi-stakeholder engagement.
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
(quantum, biotech, geoengineering)
Asset bubble bursts
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards
Censorship and surveillance
Concentration of strategic resources
(and technologies)
Crime and illicit economic activity (incl. cyber)
Critical change to Earth systems
Cyber espionage and warfare
Debt (public, corporate, household)
Decline in health and wellbeing
Disruptions to a systemically important supply chain
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Economic downturn (recession, stagnation)
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Extreme weather events (floods, heatwaves, etc.)
Geoeconomic confrontation
(sanctions, tariffs, investment screening)
Inequality (wealth, income)
Infectious diseases
Inflation
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Intrastate violence
(riots, mass shootings, gang violence, etc.)
Involuntary migration or displacement
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Misinformation and disinformation
Natural resource shortages (food, water)
Non-weather related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, solar flares etc.)
Online harms
Pollution (air, soil, water, etc.)
Societal polarization
State-based armed conflict
(proxy, civil wars, coups, terrorism, etc.)
Talent and/or labour shortages
Global Risks Report 2025 93
Share of respondents (%)
Infectious diseases
Non-weather related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, solar flares etc.)
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
(quantum, biotech, geoengineering)
Pollution (air, soil, water, etc.)
Extreme weather events (floods, heatwaves, etc.)
Critical change to Earth systems
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Natural resource shortages (food, water)
Decline in health and wellbeing
Cyber espionage and warfare
Top global risks addressed by Research and developmentF I G U R E D . 2
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
Share of respondents (%)
Crime and illicit economic activity (incl. cyber)
Pollution (air, soil, water, etc.)
Censorship and surveillance
Intrastate violence
(riots, mass shootings, gang violence, etc.)
Adverse outcomes of AI technologies
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Online harms
Asset bubble bursts
Top global risks addressed by National and local regulationsF I G U R E D . 3
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 94
Share of respondents (%)
Non-weather related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, solar flares etc.)
Involuntary migration or displacement
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Extreme weather events (floods, heatwaves, etc.)
Natural resource shortages (food, water)
Infectious diseases
Inequality (wealth, income)
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Economic downturn (recession, stagnation)
Top global risks addressed by Development assistanceF I G U R E D . 4
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
AAAA
Share of respondents (%)
Debt (public, corporate, household)
Inflation
Asset bubble bursts
Economic downturn (recession, stagnation)
Insufficient public infrastructure
and social protections
Inequality (wealth, income)
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Extreme weather events (floods, heatwaves, etc.)
Non-weather related natural disasters
(earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, solar flares etc.)
Top global risks addressed by Financial instrumentsF I G U R E D . 5
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 95
Share of respondents (%)
Talent and/or labour shortages
Disruptions to a systemically important
supply chain
Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment
Asset bubble bursts
Economic downturn (recession, stagnation)
Inflation
Inequality (wealth, income)
Pollution (air, soil, water, etc.)
Disruptions to critical infrastructure
Debt (public, corporate, household)
Top global risks addressed by Corporate strategiesF I G U R E D . 6
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Share of respondents (%)
Societal polarization
Misinformation and disinformation
Intrastate violence
(riots, mass shootings, gang violence, etc.)
Censorship and surveillance
Talent and/or labour shortages
Erosion of human rights and/or of civic freedoms
Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies
(quantum, biotech, geoengineering)
State-based armed conflict
(proxy, civil wars, coups, terrorism, etc.)
Concentration of strategic resources
(and technologies)
Geoeconomic confrontation
(sanctions, tariffs, investment screening)
Top global risks addressed by Multi-stakeholder engagementF I G U R E D . 7
Source
World Economic Forum Global Risks
Perception Survey 2024-2025.
"Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness
over the next 10 years?"
Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Global Risks Report 2025 96
The World Economic Forum’s Centre for the New Economy and Society is
pleased to acknowledge and thank the following organizations as its valued
Partner Institutes, without which the realization of the Global Risks Report
would not have been feasible:
Albania
Institute for Contemporary Studies, Tirana
Business University and College
Helton Cevi, Project Coordinator
Artan Hoxha, President of ISB and Administrator of
TBU
Oltjon Valisi, Assistant Project Coordinator
Algeria
Centre de Recherche En Economie Appliquée
Pour Le Développement - CREAD
Yacine Belarbi, Director
Khaled Menna, Director of Macroeconomics and
Economic Integration
Angola
Jobartis
João Freitas, Country Manager
Luis Verdeja, Director
Argentina
IAE Business School, Universidad Austral
Eduardo Fracchia, Director of Academic
Department of Economics
Martin Calveira, Research Economist
Armenia
Economy and Values Research Center
Sevak Hovhannisyan, Board Member and Senior
Associate
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Indonesia, Italy,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
Dynata
Thomas Huff, Senior Project Manager
Steffen Bott, Vice President, Sales
Valentyna Chuikina, Associate Account Director
Austria
Austrian Institute of Economic Research - WIFO
Gabriel Felbermayr, Director
Michael Peneder, Project Lead
Alexandros Charos, Survey Expert
Bahamas, The
The Government and Public Policy Institute,
University of the Bahamas
Zhivargo Laing, Executive Director
Jeannie D. Gibson, Policy Assistant
Bahrain
Bahrain Economic Development Board
Khalid Humaidan, Chief Executive
Nada Al-Saeed, Executive Director
Rima AlKilani, Executive Director
Fatema Alatbi, Senior Executive
Sara Ishaq, Senior Executive
Bangladesh
Centre for Policy Dialogue - CPD
Dr Fahmida Khatun, Executive Director
Dr Khondaker Golam Moazzem, Research Director
Ms Jebunnesa, Programme Associate
Nishat Tasnim Anika, Programme Associate
Barbados
University of the West Indies
Jonathan G. Lashley, Senior Fellow
Don Marshall, Professor
Kenisha Chase, Research Assistant
Benin
Institut de Recherche Empirique en Economie
Politique - IREEP
Leonard Wantchekon, President
Stéphania Houngan, Research Associate
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras,
Panama
INCAE Business School
Ronald Arce, Director
Enrique Bolaños, President
Bosnia and Herzegovina
School of Economics and Business, University
of Sarajevo
Jasmina Selimovic, Dean
Zlatko Lagumdzija, Professor
Amra Kapo, Associate Professor
Botswana
Botswana National Productivity Centre
Letsogile Batsetswe, Research Consultant and
Statistician
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Manager
Jacob Mmola, Executive Director
Partner Institutes
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Global Risks Report 2025 97
Brazil
Fundação Dom Cabral
Carlos Arruda, Professor of Innovation and
Competitiveness
Hugo Tadeu, Professor of Innovation
Miguel Costa, Research Assistant
Rodrigo Morado, Research Assistant
Bulgaria
Center for Economic Development
Maria Prohaska, Director
Ivalina Simeonova, Project Manager
Cameroon
Compétitivité Cameroon
Hermann Fotie II, Permanent Secretary
Tanankem Belmondo Voufo, Expert Investment
Climate
Jean-Baptiste Nsoe Nkouli, Competitiveness
Observatory Expert
Cape Verde
INOVE Research
Frantz Tavares, CEO
Jerónimo Freire, Project Manager
Júlio Delgado, Director
Chad
Groupe de Recherches Alternatives Et de
Monitoring Du Projet Pétrole-Tchad-Cameroun
Simael Mbairassem, Economist in charge of
Research and Public Policies
Maoundonodji Gilbert, Managing Director
Chile
University Adolfo Ibañez Business School
Rodrigo Wagner, Associate Professor of Finance
China
Dataway Horizon
Lingling Qiao, General Manager
Yuming Zhi, Research Director
Zhuyu Yao, Senior Project Manager
Colombia
National Planning Department of Colombia
Jorge Ivan Gonzalez, General Director, Department
of National Planning
Monica Lorena Ortiz Medina, Technical Director,
Innovation and Private Sector Development
Sara Patricia Rivera, Adviser, Innovation and Private
Sector Development
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo-Invest Consulting
Teza Bila Minlangu, Administrator
Faila Tabu Ngandi, Managing Director
Bertin Muderhwa, Head of Service in charge
of Studies and Statistics at the Federation of
Businesses of Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Centre de Promotion des Investissements en
Côte D’ivoire - CEPICI
Solange Amichia, CEO
Ramatou Fall, Director of Business Climate
Simon Meledje, Head of Planning and Monitoring
Bernadine Yeble N'Guessan, Research officer
Cyprus
Cyprus Employers and Industry Confederation
- OEB
Antonis Frangoudis, Director Business Development
and Economic Affairs Department
Bank of Cyprus
Kyriacos Antoniou, Governance Officer
Andreas Alexandrou, Manager Strategy and
Customer Insights
Czech Republic
CMC Graduate School of Business
Tomáš Janča, Executive Director
Denmark
Danish Technological Institute
Stig Yding Sørensen, Senior Specialist
Andreas Bjerre Lunkeit, Consultant
Ecuador
ESPAE Graduate School of Management -
ESPOL
Sara Wong, Professor
Tania Tenesaca, Project Coordinator
Xavier Ordeñana, Dean
Egypt
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies - ECES
Abla Abdel Latif, Executive Director, and Director of
Research
Salma Bahaa El Din, Senior Economist
Ahmed Maged, Research Assistant
Hossam Khater, Research Assistant
Mohamed Khater, Research Assistant
Estonia
Estonian Institute of Economic Research -EKI
Marje Josing, Director
Finland
ETLA Research Institute of the Finnish Economy
Aki Kangasharju, Managing Director
Päivi Puonti, Head of Forecasting
Ville Kaitila, Researcher
France
Business France
Louise Cassagnes, Economist
Manuel Marcias, Head of Service: Economic studies
Georgia
TSU Center for Analysis and Forecasting
Vakhtang Charaia, Director
Otar Anguridze, Head of the Board
Shota Gulbani, Expert
Mariam Lashkhi, Project Manager
Mamuka Tsereteli, Expert
Germany
Institute for Innovation and Technology within
the VDI/VDE Innovation + Technik GmbH
Michael Nerger, Project Leader
Global Risks Report 2025 98
Ghana
Association of Ghana Industries
Yaw Adu-Gyamfi, President
Seth Twum-Akwaboah, CEO
John Defor, Direcctor, Policy and Research
Greece
SEV Hellenic Federation of Enterprises
Michael Mitsopoulos, Director - Business
Environment and Regulatory Affairs
Athanasios Printsipas, Senior Advisor - SEV
Business Council for Sustainable Development
Guatemala
FUNDESA
Juan Carlos Paiz, President of the Board of
Directors
Juan Carlos Zapata, CEO
Fernando Spross, Associate Researcher
Priscilla González, Corporate Affairs Coordinator
Hong Kong SAR, China
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
Simon Ngan, Director, Policy and Research
Wilson Chong, Senior Economist
Hungary
KOPINT-TÁRKI Economic Research Ltd
Peter Vakhal, Senior Research Associate
Éva Palócz, CEO
Iceland
The Icelandic Centre for Future Studies
Karl Friðriksson, CEO
India
LeadCap Knowledge Solutions Pvt Ltd LeadCap
Ventures
Sangeeth Varghese, Managing Director and CEO
Vidyadhar Prabhudesai, Director and COO
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines
and Agriculture - Deputy of Economic Affairs
Zahra Naseri, Director of Statistics & Economy
Information Centre
Hanie Ziadlou, Senior Research Analyst
Iraq
Baghdad Economic Forum
Faris Raheem Aal-Salman, Chairman of the Board
of Directors
Thabit Kadhim Khudhur, Vice Chairman of the
Board of Directors
Ireland
Irish Business and Employers Confederation -
IBEC
Geraldine Anderson, Head of Research
Israel
Manufacturers' Association of Israel - MAI
Ron Tomer, President
Ruby Ginel, CEO
Dan Catarivas, General Manager, Foreign Trade and
International Relations Division
Itai Nakash, Deputy General Manager, Foreign
Trade and International Relations Division
Jamaica
Mona School of Business and Management MSBM,
The University of the West Indies, Mona
David McBean, Executive Director
Franklin Johnston, Director
Yvette Cameron-Harris, Project Administrator
Jamaica Promotions Corporation - JAMPRO
Shulette Cox, Vice President, Research, Advocacy,
and Project Implementation
National Competitiveness Council Jamaica
Sharifa Powell, Consultant Project Manager
Japan
Waseda University
Jusuke Ikegami, Professor
Mitsuyo Tsubayama, Coordinator
Shoko Miya, Coordinator
Jordan
Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation
Hadram Al Fayez, Director
Mira Mango, Head of Competitiveness and
Business Environment Division
Kazakhstan
N/A
Kenya
University of Nairobi
Karuti Kanyinga, Research Professor and Director,
Institute for Development Studies (IDS)
Vincent Mugo, Project Assistant, IDS
Paul Kamau, Associate Research Professor, IDS
Korea, Rep.
Korea Development Institute
Inho Song, Executive Director, Economic
Information and Education Center
Joohee Cho, Head, Public Opinion Analysis Unit
Boyoung Han, Senior Reseach Associate, Public
Opinion Analysis Unit
Kosovo*, North Macedonia
Economic Chamber of North-West Macedonia
Drilon Iseni, Executive Director
Durim Zekiri, Operations Manager
Miranda Ajdini, Legal Associate
Kuwait
Kuwait University
Fahad Al-Rashid, Committee Chair
Adel Al-Husainan, Committee Member
Majed Jamal Al-Deen, Committee Member
Kyrgyz Republic
Economic Policy Institute
Marat Tazabekov, Chairman
Global Risks Report 2025 99
Lao PDR
Enterprise and Development Consultants Co.
Ltd - EDC
Buakhai Phimmavong, Managing Partner
Thipphasone Inthachack, Office Administrator
Latvia
Stockholm School of Economics in Riga
Arnis Sauka, Head of the Centre for Sustainable
Development
Lesotho
Private Sector Foundation of Lesotho - PSFL
Thabo Qhesi, CEO
Bokang Tsoanamatsie, Public Relations Officer
Qothoase Khofane, Researcher
Liberia, Sierra Leone
GQRDOTCOM Limited - GQR
Omodele Jones, CEO
Lithuania
Innovation Agency Lithuania
Jone Kalendiene, Head of Research and Analysis
Division
Irena Karelina, Analyst
Luxembourg
Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce
Christel Chatelain, Director of the Economic Affairs
Department
Jean-Baptiste Nivet, Sr Economist
Sidonie Paris, Economist
Malawi
Malawi Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry
Chancellor Kaferapanjira, Chief Executive
Madalitso Kazembe, Director, Business Environment
and Policy Advocacy
Manfred Maguru, Economic Analyst
Chancy Mkandawire, Economic Analyst
Malaysia
Malaysia Productivity Corporation
Dato' Abdul Latif Abu Seman, Director General
Zahid Ismail, Deputy Director General
Dr Mazrina Mohamed Ibramsah, Deputy Director
General
Wan Fazlin Nadia Wan Osman, Director
Mali
Mali Applied and Theoretical Economics
Research Group - GREAT
Massa Coulibaly, Executive Director
Wélé Fatoumata Binta Sow, Researcher
Badiégué Diallo, Administrative and Financial
Assistant
Malta
Competitive Malta - Foundation for National
Competitiveness
Adrian Said, Associate
Matthew Castillo, Associate
Mauritius
Economic Development Board
Sanroy Seechurn, Head of Department
Ken Poonoosamy, CEO
Dooshala Ramjutun-Ramlaul, Manager
Mexico
Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad -
IMCO
Valeria Moy, General Director
Ivania Mazari, Program Manager
Ministry of the Economy
Jorge Eduardo Arreola Cavazos, General Director
for Competitiveness and Competition
Carlos Rubén Altamirano Márquez, Director
Fernando Tonatiuh Parra Calvo, Underdirector for
Competitiveness
Mongolia
Open Society Forum - OSF
Erdenejargal Perenlei, Executive Director
Oyunbadam Davaakhuu, Program Manager
Montenegro
The Institute for Strategic Studies and
Prognoses - ISSP
Maja Drakic Grgur, Project Coordinator
Veselin Vukotic, President
Morocco
The Policy Centre for the New South
Dr Karim El Aynaoui, Executive President
Asmaa Tahraoui, Senior Knoweldge Manager
Abdelaaziz Ait Ali, Head Economics Research
Department
Namibia
Institute for Public Policy Research - IPPR
Ndapunikwa Fikameni, Research Associate
Salmi Shigwedha, Research Associate
Graham Hopwood, Director
Nepal
Competitiveness and Development Institute -
CODE
Dr Ramesh C. Chitrakar, Project Director/ Country
Coordinator
Abhinandan Baniya, Associate Team Member
Menaka Shrestha, Team Member
Netherlands
Amsterdam Centre for Business Innovation,
University of Amsterdam
Henk Volberda, Director and Professor
Rick Hollen, Senior Research Associate
Roos Exterkate, Research Assistant
Nigeria
Nigerian Economic Summit Group - NESG
Laoye Jaiyeola, CEO
Dr Olusegun Omisakin, Director of Research and
Development
Sodik Olofin, Economist
Global Risks Report 2025 100
Oman
National Competitiveness Office - NCO
Dr Salim Abdullah Al Shaikh, Acting Chief of NCO
Juhaina Saleh Al Balushi, Economic Researcher
Jawaher Sultan Al Habsi, Business Analyst
Pakistan
Mishal Pakistan
Amir Jahangir, CEO
Puruesh Chaudhary, Director
Amna Sabahat Bhutta, Director
Paraguay
Paraguayan Foundation for Cooperation and
Development
Martin Burt, CEO
Luis Fernando Sanabria, CEO
Sol Urbieta, Management Assistant
Peru
Industrial Development Center of the National
Society of Industries
Luis Tenorio, Executive Director
Maria Elena Baraybar, Project Assistant
Benoni Sanchez, Head of Systems
Philippines
Makati Business Club - MBC
Roxanne Lu, Programs Director
Trisha Teope, Foreign Programs Officer
Poland
National Bank of Poland
Piotr Boguszewski, Economic Advisor
Piotr Szpunar, Director
Portugal
Business Administrators Forum - FAE
Paulo Carmona, President
Mariana Marques dos Santos, Member of the
Board
PROFORUM Association for the Development
of Engineering
Ilidio De Ayala Serôdio, Vice-President
Helena Roquette, Secretary
Qatar
Qatari Businessmen Association - QBA
Faisal Bin Qassim Al Thani, Chairman
Issa Abdull Salam Abu Issa, Secretary General
Sarah Abdallah, Deputy General Manager
Maria Jusay, Executive Secretary
Romania
Association for Women Entrepreneurship
Development - ADAF
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
Romania
Cornelia Rotaru, President
Gela Rotaru, Business Analyst
Cristina Savu, Communication Expert
Rwanda
Rwanda Development Board
Delphine Uwase, Ag. Head of Strategy and
Competitiveness Department
Kennedy Kalisa, Strategy Analyst
Richard Kayibanda, Ag. Chief Strategy and
Compliance Officer
Saudi Arabia
Alfaisal University
Mohammed Kafaji, Vice Dean for Quality Assurance
and Accreditation
National Competitiveness Centre
Eiman Habbas Al-Mutairi, CEO of the National
Competitiveness Centre
Waleed Al-Rudaian, Deputy CEO of the National
Competitiveness Centre
Salman Al-Tukhaifi, General manager
Abdulrahman M. Al-Ghamdi, Project Manager
Senegal
Université Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar
Thierno Thioune, Directeur du Centre de
Recherches Economiques Appliquées
Serbia
Foundation for the Advancement of Economics
- FREN
Aleksandar Radivojević, Coordinator
Dejan Molnar, Director
Singapore
Singapore Economic Development Board
Cheng Wai San, Director and Head
Teo Xinyu, Executive Officer, Senior
Slovak Republic
Business Alliance of Slovakia - PAS
Peter Serina, Executive Director
Robert Kičina, Member of the Board
Slovenia
Institute for Economic Research
Peter Stanovnik, Professor
Sonja Uršič, Senior Research Assistant
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics
Mateja Drnovšek, Full Professor
South Africa
Business Unity South Africa
Tyson Thamsanqa Sibanda, Economic Policy
Manager
Olivier Serrao, Economic Policy Executive Director
Cas Coovadia, CEO
Spain
IESE Business School
Pascual Berrone, Professor, Director of the
International Center for Competitiveness
María Luisa Blázquez, Research Associate
Sri Lanka
Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka - IPS
Kithmina Hewage, Research Economist
Tharindu Udayanga, Research Assistant
Switzerland
University of St.Gallen, Center for Financial
Services Innovation
Tobias Trütsch, Managing Director
Global Risks Report 2025 101
Taiwan, China
Taiwan Institute of Economic Research
Chen, Yi-Man, Research Fellow
Tsuo, I-Chun, Assistant Research Fellow
Tanzania
REPOA Ltd
Donald Mmari, Executive Director
Lucas Katera, Director of Collaborations and
Capacity Building
Cornel Jahari, Researcher and Field Manager
Thailand
Chulalongkorn Business School
Kanyarat (Lek) Sanoran, Associate Professor and
Assistant Dean for Administration of Dean's Office
Wilert Puriwat, Professor and Dean
Nat Kulvanich, Assistant Professor and Assistant
Dean for Planning & Development Affairs
Trinidad and Tobago
Arthur Lok Jack Global School of Business
Raynardo Hassanally, Alumni Relations Coordinator
Balraj Kistow, Programme Director
Ron Sookram, Academic Coordinator
Tunisia
Institut Arabe des Chefs d’Entreprises
Majdi Hassen, Executive Director
Hager Karaa, Head of Studies Department
Türkiye
TÜSIAD, Sabanci University Competitivness
Forum - REF
Esra Durceylan Kaygusuz, Director
Sezen Uğurlu Sum, Project Specialist
Ukraine
CASE Ukraine, Center for Social and Economic
Research
Dmytro Boyarchuk, Executive Director
Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Leading Economist
Oksana Kuziakiv, Senior Adviser
United Arab Emirates
Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Centre
Hanan Ahli, Director General of Federal
Competitiveness and Statistics Centre
Rashed Abdulkarim Al Blooshi, Undersecretary of
Department of Economic Development, Abu Dhabi
Uruguay
Universidad ORT Uruguay
Isidoro Hodara, Professor
Bruno Gili, Professor
Federico Monetti, Professor
Venezuela
Venezuelan Council for Investment Promotion
Jennyn Osorio, Economic Affairs Manager
Jorge García, Business Intelligence Manager
Viet Nam
Ho Chi Minh City Institute for Development
Studies - HIDS
Tran Hoang Ngan, Director
Trieu Thanh Son, Head of Research Management
Nguyen Manh Quan, Researcher
Yemen, Rep.
Yemeni Business Club - YBC
Fathi Abdulwase Hayel Saeed, Chairman
Ghadeer Ahmed Almaqhafi, Executive Director
Safa Abdullah Alsayaghi, Projects Manager
Zambia
University of Zambia
Joseph Simbaya, Director
Chitalu Chama Chiliba, Assistant Director and
Senior Research Fellow
Patricia Funjika, Research Fellow
Zimbabwe
National Competitiveness Commission
Phillip Phiri, Executive Director
Brighton Shayanewako, Director, Competitiveness
Douglas Muzimba, Chief Economist, International
Competitiveness
Elizabeth Magwaza, Economist
Global Risks Report 2025 102
Acknowledgements
Contributors
Mark Elsner
Head, Global Risks
Grace Atkinson
Insights Specialist, Global Risks
Saadia Zahidi
Managing Director, World Economic Forum
At the World Economic Forum, a debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Klaus
Schwab (Founder and Chairman of the Board of Trustees) and Børge Brende
(President), under whose guidance this report has been produced. This report
has relied heavily on the dedication and expertise of World Economic Forum
colleagues: Ricky Li, Ignacio Moreno and Gayle Markovitz.
The report has greatly benefited from the insight and expertise of the members
of the Global Risks Report Advisory Board: Rolf Atler (Hertie School of
Governance); Azeem Azhar (Exponential View); Amitabh Behar (Oxfam); Sarah
Cottle (S&P Global); Nita Farahany (Duke University); Niall Ferguson (Stanford
University); Charles Godfray (Oxford Martin School); Jim Leape (Stanford
University); Robert Muggah (Igarapé Institute); Eleni Myrivili (UN Habitat);
Jonathan Ostry (Georgetown University); Carol Ouko-Misiko (Institute of Risk
Management); Eduardo Pedrosa (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council);
Danny Quah (National University of Singapore); Daniel Ralph (Cambridge Centre
for Risks Studies); Pardis Sabeti (Harvard University); Samir Saran (Observer
Research Foundation); John Scott (formerly Zurich Insurance Group); Richard
Smith-Bingham (formerly Marsh McLennan); Effy Vayena (Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology Zurich); Charlotte Warakaulle (CERN); Amy Webb (Future Today
Institute); Beatrice Weder di Mauro (Graduate Institute Geneva); Ngaire Woods
(University of Oxford); and Alexandra Zapata Hojel (Future Tense Now).
We are also grateful to the following individuals from our Risk Communities:
Chief Risk Officers Community: Nadir Ahmed (Omnivest); Eric Allen (Russell
Reynolds); Yazid Alsabi (NDF); Fredrik Arnö (Vattenfall); Cherie Axelrod (Western
Union); Oliver Bartholet (Bank Julius Baer & Co); Alison Bewick (Nestlé);
Vanessa Candela (Celonis); Giuliano Carrozza Iorio (Petrobras); Manoj Chawla
(Emirates NBD); Laurie Cherpock (Chanel); Pedro Cupertino de Miranda
(Sonae); Diane Doering (Takeda Pharmaceutical Company); Mohamed
Dukandar (e&); Andressa Duran (Vale); Rui Eustáquio (EDP); Adam Farber
(Boston Consulting Group); Natasha Fields (World Trade Organization); Ed
Fishwick (BlackRock); François-Marie Gardet (Holcim); Peter Giger (Zurich
Insurance Group); Amy Gradnik (S&P Global); Bob Graham (Deloitte); Karen
Griffin (Mastercard); Arun Hari (Gulf International Bank); Erin Harris (Accenture);
Bahare Heywood (Clifford Chance LLP); Mats Holmström (SEB); Deborah
Hrvatin (CLS Bank International); Thomas Kyhl (PensionDanmark); Alex
Markovski (Rio Tinto); Enrica Marra (Mundys); Pierre-Yves Mathonet (Mubadala
Investment Company); Bhaskar Mehta (GFH Financial Group); Jody Myers (US
International Development Finance Corporation); Heike Niebergall-Lackner
(International Committee of the Red Cross); Torben Oeder (Volkswagen); Enrico
Piotto (EFG International); Sriram Ramchandran (Mahindra Group); Hanne
Raatikainen (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees);
Senem Rena (Aydem Enerji); Mark Steele (OakNorth Bank); Lakshmi ShyamSunder
(World Bank); Maria Thestrup (Gavi); Richard Thomas (Mercuria
Energy Group); Christopher Townsend (Allianz); Iliyana Tsanova (European
Commission); Gary Turner (Bain & Company Inc); Yoshihiro Uotani (SOMPO
Holdings); Alex Vallejo (PG&E); Jacob van der Blij (UNICEF); and Damian Vogel
(UBS AG).
Global Risks Report 2025 103
Global Future Council on Complex Risks: Saif Al-Dhaheri (UAE National
Emergency and Crisis Management Authority); Nayef Al-Rodhan (Oxford
University); Antonius Alijoyo (Center for Risk Management and Sustainability);
Abdullahi Alim (International Chamber of Commerce); Azeem Azhar (Exponential
View); Alta Charo (University of Wisconsin); Lisa Donahue (AlixPartners); Peter
Engelke (Atlantic Council); Roya Ensafi (University of Michigan); Florence Gaub
(NATO Defense College); Maha Hosain Aziz (New York University); Vikram
Mansharamani (Independent Thinker); Nasser bin Nasser (Ambit Advisory);
Mwanda Phiri (Charter Cities Institute); Frida Polli (Alethia); Maxime Stauffer
(Simon Institute for Longterm Governance); Araz Taeihagh (National University of
Singapore); Jessica Tan (Sunlife); Anna Tunkel (Sustainable Impact LLC); Ngaire
Woods (University of Oxford); and Ya-Qin Zhang (Tsinghua University).
This report has relied on the expertise of our colleagues who provided inputs:
Thom Almeida; Maria Alonso; Minos Bantourakis; Armita Behboodi; Shyam
Bishen; Matthew Blake; Sebastian Buckup; Morgan Booher; Agustina Callegari;
Aengus Collins; Nicole Cowell; Attilio Di Battista; Daniel Dobrygowski; Sean
Doherty; Sean Doyle; Mirek Dušek; Sam Grayling; Philipp Grosskurth; Annika
Green; Sriram Gutta; Susanne Helmsley; Audrey Helstroffer; Ximena Játiva;
Akshay Joshi; Jeremy Jurgens; Christian Kaufholz; Kateryna Karunska; Ariel
Kastner; Akanksha Khatri; Aoife Kirk; Connie Kuang; Benjamin Larsen; Till
Leopold; Cathy Li; Tobias Lindström Battle; Leandro Loss; Jessica Margolis;
Sriharsha Masabathula; Eleni Michalopoulou; Braulio Eduardo Morera; Haleh
Nazeri; Kelly Ommundsen; Kim Piaget; Drew Propson; Jahanara Rahemtulla;
Don Rodney Junio; Jean-Philippe Salcedo; Miriam Schive; Clemence Schmid;
Shuvasish Sharma; Brynne Stanton; Sheikh Tanjeb Islam; Kesang Tashi Ukyab;
Matthew Watkins; Roddy Weller; and Katie Young.
In addition to those mentioned above, we extend our thanks to the following
colleagues: Charlotte Beale; Sakshi Bhatnagar; Anna Bruce-Lockhart; Harry
Gray Calvo; Eoin Ó Cathasaigh; Beatrice Di Caro; Kateryna Gordiychuk; Rasha
Hasbini; Stephanie Holmes; Jamie Mathew John; Sybile Penhirin; Robin
Pomeroy; Emily Poyser; Anais Rassat; Julia Rignot; Kirsten Salyer; Marie Vilon;
and Yann Zopf.
We extend our thanks to the Institute of Risk Management (Carol Ouko-Misiko
and Victoria Robinson), the Institute of Risk Management India (Hersh Shah),
Oxfam (Amitabh Behar), Heiko von der Gracht, and Ostap Lutsyshyn for
support with the GRPS.
Design and Production: Thank you to all those involved in the design and
production of this year’s report and related assets: Luca Bottani, Davide Bruno,
Francesco Cordola, Mike Fisher, Floris Landi, Pietro Guinea Montalvo, JeanPhilippe
Stanway and Alessandro Zotta.
We would also like to thank Salesforce (Justine Moscatello and Campbell Powers)
and Lovelytics for the design of the interactive global risks data visualization.
Cover image: Albert Badia Costa
Global Risks Report 2025 104
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