J 2024

The κ-core and the κ-balancedness of TU games

BARTL, David and Miklós PINTÉR

Basic information

Original name

The κ-core and the κ-balancedness of TU games

Authors

BARTL, David and Miklós PINTÉR

Edition

Annals of Operations Research, 2024, 0254-5330

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Article in a journal

Field of Study

10101 Pure mathematics

Country of publisher

Germany

Confidentiality degree

is not subject to a state or trade secret

References:

Impact factor

Impact factor: 4.500

Marked to be transferred to RIV

Yes

RIV identification code

RIV/47813059:19520/24:A0000441

Organization unit

School of Business Administration in Karvina

EID Scopus

Keywords in English

TU games with infinitely many players; Bondareva–Shapley Theorem; κ-Core; κ-Balancedness; κ-Additive set function; Duality theorem for infinite LPs

Tags

Tags

International impact, Reviewed

Links

GA21-03085S, research and development project.
Changed: 3/1/2025 08:19, doc. RNDr. David Bartl, Ph.D.

Abstract

In the original language

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem for infinite TU games with and without restricted cooperation, to the cases where the core consists of κ-additive set functions. Our generalized Bondareva–Shapley Theorem extends previous results by Bondareva (Problemy Kibernetiki 10:119–139, 1963), Shapley (Naval Res Logist Q 14:453–460, 1967), Schmeidler (On balanced games with infinitely many players, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1967), Faigle (Zeitschrift für Oper Res 33(6):405–422, 1989), Kannai (J Math Anal Appl 27:227–240, 1969; The core and balancedness, handbook of game theory with economic applications, North-Holland, 1992), Pintér (Linear Algebra Appl 434(3):688–693, 2011) and Bartl and Pintér (Oper Res Lett 51(2):153–158, 2023).

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