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This article examines the threshold of a sufficiently serious breach within the European Union’s noncontractual liability, focusing exclusively on public authorities – European Union institutions (Articles 268 and 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and Member States under the Francovich/Brasserie–Factortame line of case-law. It clarifies the relationship between a sufficiently serious breach and the principle of legitimate expectations (as an expression of legal certainty) and distinguishes this principle from the Charter right to good administration (Article 41), which primarily binds European Union bodies. The analysis is guided by two questions: (1) how the Court of Justice has defined and refined SSB across leading judgments; and (2) which criteria it applies when determining whether the threshold is met. Methodologically, the study offers a structured, caseanchored framework that consolidates and systematises the Court’s factors into a five-step test: clarity and precision of the rule; scope of administrative or policy discretion; excusability and complexity; persistence in the face of settled case-law or binding judgments; and systemic or institutional contribution. A mapped set of judgments, supported by short case studies, demonstrates how the test operates across domains and highlights points of alignment and divergence between Union and State liability (including the Bergaderm convergence and the stricter standard for judicial breaches in Köbler). The findings confirm that annulment is not, by itself, sufficient to establish liability; rather, the sufficiently serious breach turns on a context-sensitive assessment of discretion and institutional conduct. By integrating dispersed jurisprudence into an operational test and clarifying the interface with annulment actions, the article enhances predictability for courts and claimants and provides practical guidance for pleading and adjudication in European Union damages actions.